



# | Assessment |

## Monthly Geopolitical Report: August 2025

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## Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 3:00 PM (EDT) on July 31, 2025; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.<sup>1</sup>*

# Assessment | Monthly Geopolitical Report: August 2025

## Key Findings

- Russia is likely to continue escalating its military operations in Ukraine beyond the U.S. deadline.
- Political pressure from Western states for Israel to end the Israel-Hamas war is unlikely to be successful unless the United States joins in; therefore, stasis in the conflict is likely.
- The non-tariff investment commitments from the likes of the European Union (EU), South Korea, and Japan reflect U.S. policy priorities to keep those states under the U.S. defense, technology, and energy umbrella at the direct expense of Russian energy and Chinese technology.
- The next EU budget will likely feature cuts to the agricultural sector and increased investment in the "competitiveness" of EU businesses to make them less dependent on foreign technology and defense products, which is reflected in the lopsided EU-U.S. trade agreement.
- There has been an uptick in the detention of foreigners—including U.S. nationals—in China.
- Political and security crises in Bolivia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Thailand will likely continue for many months.

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<sup>1</sup> Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide monthly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain.



## **| Europe**

### **Russia Likely to Continue Military Escalation Beyond U.S. Deadlines**

On July 29, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 10-day deadline for Russia to halt the war in Ukraine or face sweeping U.S. sanctions.<sup>2</sup> Although the Trump administration has released few details about what the sanctions could entail, it has indicated the new measures would likely involve secondary tariffs as high as 500 percent on countries that purchase Russian fossil fuels, including China, India, Türkiye, EU member states, and South Korea. It remains unclear how the Trump administration plans to implement such measures, as it is actively conducting trade negotiations with several of these countries. Meaningful secondary sanctions on Russia's largest trading partners, if enacted, would likely further reduce Russia's crucial oil and gas revenues in an already fragile wartime economy.

Despite the potential economic impact, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no indication he intends to halt the conflict. On July 29, high-ranking Kremlin officials—including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev<sup>3</sup> and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov—dismissed Trump's deadline outright and vowed that Russia will continue the conflict.<sup>4</sup> It is likely that Putin will offer an empty diplomatic gesture in an attempt to convince Trump to delay any new sanctions, but Russia will almost certainly continue fighting in Ukraine.

- **International Military Aid:** While the United States appeared reluctant to provide new aid to Ukraine in June, Trump announced on July 14 that he would allow NATO allies to purchase U.S. weapons systems and supply them to Ukraine. Though Trump made it clear that NATO would be financing the new weapons for Ukraine, this statement represents the Trump administration's most tangible military support for Ukraine to date.<sup>5</sup>
- **Battlefield Update:** Throughout June, Russian forces continued to press along the frontlines in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, achieving modest advances. In late July, reports emerged that Russian forces had begun conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into the strategic city of Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast.<sup>6</sup> While Russia does not maintain an enduring presence in the city, these limited operations suggest Russian forces are likely to stage larger sustained attacks in the coming months. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces have mostly halted Russian advances in Sumy Oblast and even retaken a small amount of territory near Kindrativka and Andrivka.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup>

[hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-29/trump-says-russia-has-10-more-days-to-reach-ukraine-truce](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-29/trump-says-russia-has-10-more-days-to-reach-ukraine-truce)

<sup>3</sup> [hXXps://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1949950319510561275](https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1949950319510561275)

<sup>4</sup> [hXXps://www.kp.ru/online/news/6493908/](https://www.kp.ru/online/news/6493908/)

<sup>5</sup> [hXXps://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/14/trump-sends-weapons-ukraine-00451109](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/14/trump-sends-weapons-ukraine-00451109)

<sup>6</sup> [hXXps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates)

<sup>7</sup> [hXXps://deepstatemap.live/en#6/48.4874865/37.0678711](https://deepstatemap.live/en#6/48.4874865/37.0678711)



## Ukraine: Legislation Regulating Anti-Corruption Bodies Prompts Backlash

On July 22, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed legislation that placed Ukraine's anti-corruption institutions of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) under the authority of Ukraine's prosecutor general. Opponents of the bill argued that subordinating NABU and SAPO to the prosecutor general's office effectively eliminated the agencies' ability to operate independently, as the prosecutor general is appointed by, and reports to, the president.

Zelensky's signature immediately triggered daily anti-government demonstrations in Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities. These demonstrations were the most significant civil society activity opposing Zelensky's government since the beginning of the war. Many in Ukraine argued that Zelensky's move dismantled key anti-corruption reforms hard-won as a result of the 2014 Maidan Revolution and expressed concerns the bill will hinder Ukraine's accession to the EU. The decision also prompted sharp criticism from the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which warned that the law undermined key reforms necessary for Ukraine's accession to their organizations.

In response to the swift criticism, on July 24, Zelensky proposed a draft law to the Verkhovna Rada to restore the independence of NABU and SAPO. On July 31, the Rada passed a new bill reversing the changes, which Zelensky signed later that day.

- **Impact:** Anti-corruption activists, opposition lawmakers, European leaders, and ordinary Ukrainians alike have welcomed Zelensky's reversal, saying the bill restores the safeguarding of both NABU and SAPO from political interference.<sup>8</sup> However, Zelensky and his inner circle are still likely to face slightly lower approval ratings and continued skepticism over their commitment to anti-corruption reforms as a result of the incident.

## EU Budget Includes Cuts to Agriculture and Increase in Competitiveness Spending

On July 16, 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed an EU budget for the years 2028–2034. The budget is nearly EUR 2 trillion, up from EUR 1.2 trillion from the previous seven-year period.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> [hXXps://kyivindependent\[.\]com/parliament-votes-on-bill-restoring-nabu-sapo-independence/](https://kyivindependent.com/parliament-votes-on-bill-restoring-nabu-sapo-independence/)

<sup>9</sup>

[hXXps://www.euronews\[.\]com/my-europe/2025/07/17/ursula-von-der-leyens-new-2-trillion-eu-budget-6-key-takeaways](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/17/ursula-von-der-leyens-new-2-trillion-eu-budget-6-key-takeaways)



EUR 590 billion is dedicated to the competitiveness, prosperity, and security fund.<sup>10</sup> Most of that money will go towards keeping European companies competitive internationally. In recent years, EU companies have complained they face economic and technological disadvantages that make their products uncompetitive. These include expensive energy prices, which factor into the final cost of goods. The EU also lacks major tech companies such as Apple, Google, or TSMC, which is also seen as a competitiveness problem.

- **Protests over Farm Cuts:** The agricultural sector faces one of the major cuts, with only EUR 300 billion dedicated to direct payouts to farmers, down from EUR 387 billion under the previous budget.<sup>11</sup> This could lead to farmer protests and also worsen the competitiveness issues for EU agricultural products.
- **EU Competitiveness:** Commission President von der Leyen argues the competitiveness funding will ameliorate any issues with funding cuts. For example, agriculture is an energy-intensive industry, and the sector will benefit from investments in making energy cheaper (such as by developing solar and wind power). Transportation and digitization competitiveness investments could also help agriculture by making it easier to move products and process payments or monitor supply chains.
- **Going Forward:** The budget must be approved by 2027 and is likely to see drastic changes in the meantime. Some member states, which need to contribute to the budget, have already said it is too expensive, while others will likely object to certain items, such as reduced farmer payouts or support for Ukraine.

## **Americas**

### **U.S. Tariffs and Trade Used for Geopolitics**

Recent U.S. trade policy is clearly about cementing tariffs. From April 2 to present, there has been little clarity on anything else, and many of the commitments announced alongside tariff rates are unlikely to materialize in full. However, analysis of the wording of those commitments—particularly language from the Japan/South Korea and EU trade deals—sheds light on other U.S. priorities. Both Japan and the EU are major vehicle exporters, and the Trump administration has ensured neither will receive a tariff advantage over the other. Further, those trade commitments also serve other U.S. priorities. For instance, the EU has agreed to buy U.S. natural gas directly at the expense of Russian supplies; a U.S. threat to sanction countries that buy Russian energy is due to come into effect shortly. Other investment commitments focus on U.S. technology and infrastructure building; these investments signal that the three trading powers will continue to collaborate and refrain

<sup>10</sup>

[https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/eu-budget-2028-2034_en)

<sup>11</sup>

<https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-slashes-eu-farm-budget-cap-declaration-war-ursula-von-der-leyen-agriculture/>



from investing in Chinese technology and infrastructure products. Recent U.S. trade deals with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia emphasized similar policy priorities, while ensuring no one key competitor has a trade advantage over the others. ZeroFox assesses there is a roughly even chance this policy shift will be effective. Both EU and Japanese voters have already expressed negative sentiments regarding the trade agreements, which will likely be used by China to offer improved trade terms.

- **U.S.-China Trade Issues:** The U.S.-China tariff pause will likely be extended beyond August 12.<sup>12</sup> If President Trump approves the latest extension, U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will remain at 50 percent, down from the 145 percent announced in April, while Chinese tariffs on U.S. imports will remain around 30 percent.<sup>13</sup> A further pause makes it more likely there will be a meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping later in the year that will formalize a new trade agreement. Given how previous trade talks have gone down, the Trump-Xi meeting will likely be about cementing U.S. tariffs without incurring tariff retaliation from China. While tariffs could be lowered beyond these rates, they are unlikely to change significantly. The United States has placed 40 percent transshipment tariffs on countries like Vietnam, which are accused of serving as transshipment points for Chinese-made goods. Therefore, China's tariff rate is unlikely to drop below 40 percent. At this level, China will very likely maintain its tariffs.
- **Political and Secondary Tariffs:** The original argument for Liberation Day (April 2) tariffs was reducing trade deficits; however, Brazil, which the United States has a trade surplus with, reportedly received a 50 percent tariff rate because of a criminal case against former President Jair Bolsonaro. A secondary sanctions bill is making its way through U.S. Congress against nations that do business with Russia, further expanding the purpose of U.S. tariffs.
- **Economic Impact:** U.S. tariff policy after August 1 will likely be inflationary in the United States and deflationary elsewhere.
- **Everyone else:** The United States continues to add to the list of countries receiving last-minute tariff rates; those still awaiting a deal include all of Africa. India received a 25 percent rate, but there is a roughly even chance it negotiates a lower rate in the coming weeks after offering similar concessions. Meanwhile, Thailand, Cambodia, and other Southeast Asian manufacturing hubs can expect rates similar to those given to Vietnam. Rates for Mexico, Canada, and South Africa remain the most uncertain.

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<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> [hXXps://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-china-tariff-truce-holds-now-us-says-trump-has-final-say-2025-07-29/](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-china-tariff-truce-holds-now-us-says-trump-has-final-say-2025-07-29/)

<sup>13</sup> [hXXps://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/28/chinese-trade-to-us-could-drop-by-485-billion-tariff-simulator.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/28/chinese-trade-to-us-could-drop-by-485-billion-tariff-simulator.html)



## **Bolivia: Presidential Elections Likely Headed to a Runoff**

On August 17, 2025, Bolivia will hold general elections for president and congress, with a likely runoff scheduled for October 19, 2025, if no presidential candidate achieves a majority. Candidates will then assume office on November 8. The elections are predicted to be highly contested due to significant polarization within the Bolivian population, driven by a 24 percent annual inflation rate, fuel and dollar shortages, and decreased natural gas revenues, as well as divisions within the ruling party Movement for Socialism (MAS).<sup>14</sup>

The long-time political dominance of MAS has been significantly undermined by a high-profile feud between former allies President Luis Arce and his predecessor, Evo Morales. Arce has decided not to run for a second term amid declining popularity, while Morales has been barred from running due to several legal and procedural rulings. Perceived economic mismanagement has diminished the incumbent party's chances of remaining in power, propping up several opposition figures that have gained appeal.<sup>15</sup> Despite remaining a polarizing figure among Bolivians, Morales still retains popular support; his supporters have been staging disruptive protests throughout 2025. Violent unrest caused by his supporters to protest his absence from the ballot is likely to persist pre- and post- elections.<sup>16</sup>

- **A rightward shift:** Samuel Doria Medina, a former Minister of Planning, and former President Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga are leading in tight polls. However, no candidate appears to exceed the 25 percent mark, and the high level of undecided voters makes predicting who will make the second round difficult. Both opposition candidates advocate for more market-friendly, pro-business policies, contrasting with the left-leaning status quo that has characterized Bolivia under MAS. Further, the economic turmoil in Bolivia will likely lead any election winner to push for austerity measures that trigger social unrest such as roadblock protests—particularly if these policies cut subsidies, devalue the boliviano currency, and worsen unemployment rates.<sup>17</sup>
- **Social Unrest:** Bolivia has a lengthy history of protest movements removing the president from office. During the last election, Morales fled the country after being accused of fraud, with protesters reaching the presidential palace.<sup>18</sup> However, Morales' supporters then staged even larger protests, forcing the transitional government to call early elections, which were won overwhelmingly by Arce. More violent unrest will likely ensue following the election in the short-to-mid term, bolstered by key figures like Morales and inspired by austerity measures. There is a roughly even chance the election winner anticipates this, which could soften their market-friendly proposals to avoid likely street protests.

<sup>14</sup> <https://americasquarterly.org/article/bolivia-enters-contentious-new-political-landscape/>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/poll-tracker-bolivas-2025-presidential-election>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/12/antigovernment-protests-in-bolivia-leave-multiple-people-dead>

<sup>17</sup> <https://americasquarterly.org/article/escape-economic-crisis-bolivia/>

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/former-president-evo-morales-returns-to-bolivia-ending-year-in-exile>





- Geopolitical shift:** A major political shift may also shake up Bolivia's geopolitical alignments. Under Arce, Bolivia has relied on its relationships with China and Russia, particularly with its lithium exports. For context, key lithium extraction agreements between Bolivia and these allies include a USD 970 million deal with Russia and USD 1 billion-plus contracts with China.<sup>19</sup> An opposition party winner will likely choose to align closer to U.S. and Western allies, which could cause friction with China and Russia, jeopardizing the economic lifeline provided by the aforementioned lithium deals.

## **| Middle East**

### **Ceasefire Talks Collapse Amid Worsening Humanitarian Situation in Gaza**

On July 24, 2025, after weeks of optimism, ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas collapsed. In explaining the failure, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated that Hamas' latest demands had been "selfish" and that the group "does not appear to be coordinated or acting in good faith."<sup>20</sup> Specifically, the talks reportedly broke down over details related to aid distribution and the withdrawal of Israeli's military forces.<sup>21</sup> Hamas officials blamed Israel, claiming that the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu left the talks in order to "prolong the war."<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, increasing international pressure surrounding worsening food insecurity in the Gaza Strip has forced the Israeli government to agree to "daily pauses" in the fighting to allow for increased food distribution.<sup>23</sup> However, at the same time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are in the midst of an offensive in Deir al-Balah.<sup>24</sup>

In Lebanon, Israel has continued near-daily strikes against what it says are Hezbollah forces, in a supposed effort to prevent the group from "reestablishing itself" in southern Lebanon. At the same time, domestic efforts to disarm Hezbollah, led by President Joseph Aoun and U.S. Ambassador to

<sup>19</sup> [hXXps://fundacionandresbello\[.\]org/en/news/bolivia](https://fundacionandresbello.org/en/news/bolivia)

<sup>20</sup>

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/israel-us-recall-negotiators-from-doha-after-selfish-hamas-response-to-truce-offer/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-us-recall-negotiators-from-doha-after-selfish-hamas-response-to-truce-offer/)

<sup>21</sup>

[hXXps://www.middleeasteye\[.\]net/news/hamas-responds-ceasefire-draft-demands-changes-israeli-armys-position-gaza](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-responds-ceasefire-draft-demands-changes-israeli-armys-position-gaza)

<sup>22</sup> [hXXps://en.royanews\[.\]tv/news/61640](https://en.royanews.tv/news/61640)

<sup>23</sup>

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/israel-announces-daily-pauses-gaza-fighting-aid-airdrops-begin-2025-07-27/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-announces-daily-pauses-gaza-fighting-aid-airdrops-begin-2025-07-27/)

<sup>24</sup> [hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2025/07/21/middleeast/israel-military-deir-al-balah-gaza-intl](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/21/middleeast/israel-military-deir-al-balah-gaza-intl)



Türkiye Tom Barrack, have floundered in recent weeks, with senior officials from the militant group stating both privately and publicly that Hezbollah will not give up its weapons.<sup>2526</sup>

- **Looking forward in Gaza:** Despite growing international pressure to end the war in the Gaza Strip—including a United Nations conference headed by France and Saudi Arabia (on July 28–30, 2025) aimed at reinvigorating the two-state solution and recognition of a Palestinian state—the war is likely to continue into the near-to-medium term. Hamas may be counting on the increasing international criticism toward Israel to give the group some leverage in negotiations. Meanwhile, recent polling still suggests that Netanyahu’s coalition would lose a new election if his extreme right-wing allies collapse the government in protest against a deal to end the war.<sup>27</sup>
- **Outlook in Lebanon:** The United States and Lebanese governments possess little leverage over Hezbollah. Any attempt to force the group to disarm would likely trigger armed conflict and potentially a civil war, something which all parties are keen to avoid. Israel’s continued military presence at five outposts in Lebanon also complicates the issue, as it highlights the weakness of Lebanon’s central government and allows Hezbollah to claim that it is still “resisting” Israeli occupation.

## **Asia**

### **Increase in U.S. Nationals Being Held in China**

On July 21, 2025, China’s Foreign Ministry stated that a U.S.-based Wells Fargo banker was prohibited from leaving China due to her alleged involvement in a criminal case. The Shanghai-born Chenyue Mao, an Atlanta-based managing director at Wells Fargo, recently entered China for Wells Fargo’s international factoring business. The case was being investigated, and Mao was obliged to cooperate with the probe. Wells Fargo suspended all travel to China after Mao’s exit ban and began searching for solutions to ensure other employees can return to the United States as soon as possible. China has also recently placed an exit ban on a naturalized U.S. citizen working for the U.S. Department of Commerce and sentenced a Japanese businessman from the pharmaceutical company Astellas Pharma Inc. to three and a half years in prison for spying.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup>

<sup>26</sup> [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/7/18/hezbollah-chief-rejects-us-proposals-on-group-giving-up-weapons](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/18/hezbollah-chief-rejects-us-proposals-on-group-giving-up-weapons)

<sup>27</sup> [hXXps://www.naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/314341-report-aoun-salam-to-press-on-with-arms-monopoly-decision-despite-hezbollah-s-rejection](https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/314341-report-aoun-salam-to-press-on-with-arms-monopoly-decision-despite-hezbollah-s-rejection)

<sup>28</sup> [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-860710](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-860710)

<sup>28</sup> [hXXps://www.nbcnews\[.\]com/world/asia/china-says-wells-fargo-banker-exit-ban-involved-criminal-case-rcna219943](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/asia/china-says-wells-fargo-banker-exit-ban-involved-criminal-case-rcna219943)



- **Looking Forward:** It is unclear why there has been an uptick in arrests. China has used exit bans on both Chinese and foreign nationals in connection with civil disputes, regulatory investigations, or criminal investigations in the past. However, U.S. citizens are rarely the victims; instead, these are more typically Chinese nationals working for U.S. companies. It is possible the arrests are linked to U.S.-China trade talks, with China likely increasing arrests to pressure the United States into trade concessions. However, trade relations have been relatively positive in recent weeks, and both sides have held several meetings de-escalating trade tensions. Further, while China has repeatedly protested Taiwanese presidents visiting the United States, the United States reportedly prohibited Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te from stopping in the country during a visit to Central America, likely to ensure trade talks with China proceed calmly.

## **Pakistan: Nationwide Protests for the Release of Former PM Khan on and Around August 5, 2025**

Supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan are planning massive protests on the second anniversary of his imprisonment on August 5, 2025. Details of the protests are still unclear, with some members of his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party calling for as many as 90 days of protests. The government is establishing a new paramilitary force ahead of the August 5 protests, anticipating nationwide protests that will cause major transportation disruptions.<sup>29</sup>

- **Looking Forward:** Khan has a history of orchestrating large protests, and this could be one of the largest. Expect a major military crackdown if the protests escalate, which is likely. Khan remains popular, while the incumbent government is unpopular.

## **Thailand: Period of Military Rule Likely After Cambodia Clashes**

Thailand and Cambodia agreed to a ceasefire at the end of July 2025, ending the worst bout of cross-border violence in years. Military leaders are planning a meeting on August 4 to further discuss the tensions. The July clashes are an extension of a previous round of fighting in May, which led the military to suspend President Paetongtarn Shinawatra from office after she allegedly secretly criticized the Thai military on a phone call with Cambodia's former leader Hun Sen,<sup>30</sup> who remains Cambodia's most important political figure.

- **Looking Forward:** Fighting after Shinawatra's suspension indicates she is unlikely to return to office. A period of military rule is likely while Thailand focuses on either appointing a new president or holding new elections entirely. Thailand's military-monarchy coalition is the most powerful force in politics, and any new governments have to be approved by them.

<sup>29</sup> [hXXps://tribune\[.\]com\[.\]pk/story/2556032/pti-faces-internal-rift-over-august-5-protest-plans](https://tribune.com.pk/story/2556032/pti-faces-internal-rift-over-august-5-protest-plans)

<sup>30</sup>

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-returns-some-cambodian-soldiers-ahead-key-border-talks-2025-08-01/](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-returns-some-cambodian-soldiers-ahead-key-border-talks-2025-08-01/)



- Military and Monarchy Dominance:** Thailand's Senate is dominated by parties with close ties to the military. Shinawatra's Pheu Thai Party was only allowed to govern in 2023 after the Senate rejected the Move Forward Party, which secured more votes than the former but was openly critical of the military and Thai monarchy.<sup>31</sup> Large protests against military rule and the Thai monarchy were held in 2020, 2021, and 2023.<sup>32</sup> The military's effort to slow the formation of a military-approved government now is likely an effort to avoid further protest movements.
- Economic Risks:** This threatens Thailand's social stability and its ability to navigate trade issues with the United States. Thailand is a key export- and tourism-based economy, but it trails its neighbors in terms of economic growth, likely because of the military influence over politics and the economy. Recent border tensions will likely negatively impact its economy by putting it at a disadvantage when negotiating with the United States and harming its cross-border economy, which relies on trade with its neighbors.

## **| Africa**

### **Sudan: Fragmentation After Militia Announces Parallel Government**

On July 26, 2025, the Rapid Support Force (RSF) militia group formed a parallel government in areas it controls, primarily in western Sudan. The RSF declaration comes months after the military leaders of Sudan claimed their government, primarily in central and eastern Sudan.<sup>33</sup> The two former allies had earlier thwarted an attempt to form a civilian government in late 2022. However, a civil war broke out in early 2023 after the military attempted to absorb the RSF into its ranks.

- Government Collapse:** The consolidation into two power bases very likely means instability in Sudan will remain long-term and increases the risk of the country officially fracturing into two states with near-constant fighting, as seen in Libya. It presents refugee and insecurity risks to neighboring countries, including Egypt and Ethiopia.

<sup>31</sup>

[hXXps://www.straitstimes\[.\]com/asia/se-asia/thailands-srettha-to-become-pm-after-securing-endorsement-of-parliament](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailands-srettha-to-become-pm-after-securing-endorsement-of-parliament)

<sup>32</sup> [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2023/7/19/protests-in-thailand-as-rivals-derail-pitas-pm-bid](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/19/protests-in-thailand-as-rivals-derail-pitas-pm-bid)

<sup>33</sup> [hXXps://naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/314450-sudan-s-paramilitaries-announce-parallel-govt-deepening-crisis](https://naharnet.com/stories/en/314450-sudan-s-paramilitaries-announce-parallel-govt-deepening-crisis)



## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.  <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.





## Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

