



| Flash |

Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP

#11: March 6, 2026

F-2026-03-06b

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

March 6, 2026

Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 1:30 PM (EST) on March 6, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

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| Key Findings

- Aviation services resumed in some Middle Eastern hubs on March 6. However, flight diversions over active security threats occurred concurrently, and energy shipments remain at a standstill. Maintaining leverage over these key Middle Eastern industries is almost certainly part of Iran’s strategy to end the conflict on terms it finds acceptable.
- Despite reliable reports indicating Iranian offensive military capabilities are diminishing, Iran struck at least five countries across the Middle East today. If this low-level targeting can be maintained, it is very likely that energy and aviation services will be disinclined to resume operations. Enduring Iranian attacks will likely increase ceasefire pressure by worsening ongoing economic disruptions.
- On March 6, UK authorities arrested four individuals with alleged links to Iranian surveillance targeting Jewish communities. These arrests highlight the risk that, as Iran’s traditional military capabilities diminish, Iran is likely to encourage asymmetric tactics such as acts of terrorism or sabotage.

Latest Details

Iranian drone strikes hit at least five countries across the Middle East today. A section of Bahrain's Sitra refinery caught fire after being struck by a missile,¹ and Qatar thwarted an attack targeting Al Udeid Air Base, a U.S. military facility.² The U.S. embassy in Kuwait suspended its operations after another drone was intercepted there³, and Saudi Arabia reportedly intercepted multiple missiles and drones overnight.⁴

- Iranian official state media claims over 60 percent of Iran's strikes have been aimed at American targets.⁵ Many U.S. assets are located in the region, but much of Iran's targeting appears aimed at Gulf and civilian and commercial interests, including at least two data centers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).⁶

Iran's continued use of small-scale attacks is likely aimed at lengthening the conflict. Any uptick in Iranian attacks, particularly on Gulf critical infrastructure, would likely signal that interceptor stocks are running low, which would almost certainly exacerbate ongoing economic disruptions and increase ceasefire pressure.

- U.S. military assessments of Iran's weapons capabilities and its ability to cause economic disruptions will likely influence the length of the military campaign and the level of concessions the United States is willing to accept.
- The campaign would likely expand if Kurdish insurgents advanced or if endogenous opposition emerged. Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has denied reports that Kurdish militias are mobilizing to cross into Iran; it is

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[hXXps://oilprice\[.\]com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Drone-Strike-Hits-Bahrain-Refinery-as-Crack-Spreads-Surge.html](https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Drone-Strike-Hits-Bahrain-Refinery-as-Crack-Spreads-Surge.html)

² [hXXps://x\[.\]com/MofaQatar_AR/status/2029859887363002875](https://x.com/MofaQatar_AR/status/2029859887363002875)

³ [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/us-suspending-operations-embassy-kuwait-2026-03-05/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-suspending-operations-embassy-kuwait-2026-03-05/)

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[hXXps://www.wionews\[.\]com/videos/breaking-saudi-intercepts-iranian-cruise-missile-near-al-kharj-177281999199](https://www.wionews.com/videos/breaking-saudi-intercepts-iranian-cruise-missile-near-al-kharj-177281999199)

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[hXXps://www.bloomberg\[.\]com/news/articles/2026-03-05/iranian-barrage-sweeps-mideast-as-trump-weighs-in-on-next-leader](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/iranian-barrage-sweeps-mideast-as-trump-weighs-in-on-next-leader)

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[hXXps://www.bloomberg\[.\]com/news/articles/2026-03-03/drone-strikes-damage-amazon-data-centers-in-the-uae-and-bahrain](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/drone-strikes-damage-amazon-data-centers-in-the-uae-and-bahrain)

unclear whether Iraq-based Kurdish militias have the manpower, organization, and equipment to pursue such an undertaking. Uncertainty over the United States' war aims is also reportedly causing hesitation among Kurdish groups.⁷

Terror Threat

On March 6, 2026, one Iranian and three dual British-Iranian nationals were apprehended by UK counter-terrorism police on suspicion of providing assistance to a foreign intelligence service.⁸ This follows an earlier report from Qatar that an "Iranian sleeper cell" organization had been disrupted.⁹

- On March 6, 2026, federal and local authorities across the United States increased security patrols and counterterrorism monitoring amid concerns Iran or affiliated actors would target domestic locations. Authorities in New York, Los Angeles, and Miami deployed additional police around religious sites and cultural centers.¹⁰

On October 8, 2024, MI5 Director General Ken McCallum said the United Kingdom was facing a growing threat from criminal and terror groups linked to Iran. McCallum accused Iran of hiring assassins or kidnappers to target Israelis and Jewish people across Europe.¹¹

- In October 2024, there were a series of attacks in Nordic nations against Israeli interests.¹² In Stockholm, gunmen fired on the embassy; in Copenhagen, two grenades were detonated.¹³ A month earlier, a gunman was shot dead near the

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[hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2026/3/6/kurdish-opposition-mulls-whether-to-trust-trump-after-iran-uprising-call](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/6/kurdish-opposition-mulls-whether-to-trust-trump-after-iran-uprising-call)

⁸ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/cz6e7g96890o](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz6e7g96890o)

⁹ [hXXps://x\[.\]com/SkyNews/status/2028950639909228914](https://x.com/SkyNews/status/2028950639909228914)

¹⁰ [hXXps://www.theguardian\[.\]com/world/2026/mar/06/security-increase-iran-attack-us-israel-bombing](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/06/security-increase-iran-attack-us-israel-bombing)

¹¹ [hXXps://www.mi5\[.\]gov\[.\]uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update](https://www.mi5.gov.uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update)

¹² [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/](https://www.reuters.com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/)

¹³

[hXXps://www.naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/308418-police-probe-blasts-shooting-at-israeli-embassies-in-nordic-capitals](https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/308418-police-probe-blasts-shooting-at-israeli-embassies-in-nordic-capitals)

Israeli consulate in Munich, Germany. Iran was accused of paying local criminals to carry out these attacks.¹⁴

Iran and its proxies very likely pose a threat of external attacks on the United States and countries perceived as supporting the ongoing conflict. Iran and Hezbollah likely have robust networks across the West, including trained operatives, weapons caches, and developed target lists. It is unclear if a sufficient command and control system is in place to put these assets into action; however, as the conflict continues in the coming weeks, sleeper cells loyal to Iran are likely to activate and attempt terror attacks.

- The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that a large-scale, physical attack against allied nations is unlikely but that sleeper cell attacks “probably” pose a threat to the United States and its allies.¹⁵

Aviation Resumes, but Energy Remains Unmoved

Emirates and Etihad Airways resumed some flights from their UAE hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi on March 6.¹⁶ Israeli aviation officials announced that the country will “gradually reopen” its airspace to outbound flights beginning at 8:00 AM local time on March 8, 2026. According to reports, “two narrow-body aircraft will be permitted to depart per hour,” with a cap of 50 passengers per flight.¹⁷ Flydubai is expected to resume operations to and from Israel early next week. The service has been described as an “air bridge” between Ben Gurion Airport (TLV) and the UAE that will facilitate the return of Israelis.¹⁸

Oman has emerged as a key hub for repatriation flights. Qatar Airways, whose own services remain suspended domestically, is conducting flights from the capital, Muscat,

¹⁴

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/europe/large-police-operation-underway-near-munichs-nazi-documentation-center-2024-09-05/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/large-police-operation-underway-near-munichs-nazi-documentation-center-2024-09-05/)

¹⁵

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/intelligence-assessment-warns-iranian-attacks-us-following-khamenei-death-2026-03-02/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/intelligence-assessment-warns-iranian-attacks-us-following-khamenei-death-2026-03-02/)

¹⁶

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/gulf-carriers-resume-limited-flights-missile-fire-fuels-uncertainty-2026-03-06/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-carriers-resume-limited-flights-missile-fire-fuels-uncertainty-2026-03-06/)

¹⁷

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/liveblog_entry/two-flights-per-hour-50-passengers-a-piece-israels-airspace-to-reopen-gradually-from-sunday/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/two-flights-per-hour-50-passengers-a-piece-israels-airspace-to-reopen-gradually-from-sunday/)

¹⁸ [hXXps://www.ynetnews\[.\]com/article/xez8c07zw](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/xez8c07zw)

to get passengers to primarily European locations. Oman's airport is still operating almost 80 percent of its scheduled flights, with route suspensions only in countries where the airspace is closed.¹⁹

- Some flights are originating from Saudi Arabia but at a lower frequency since the country has been targeted more than Oman. Kuwait's low-cost airline, Jazeera Airways, will start operating out of Jeddah Airport in Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain's national carrier will fly out of Dammam.²⁰ However, these are smaller airports than regional hub competitors and are unlikely to serve as a long-term alternative.

On March 6, an Air France evacuation flight was forced to turn back because of missile fire, while German carrier Lufthansa diverted a jet en route to Riyadh from Cairo over safety fears.²¹ Most airspace in the region remains closed. Aviation and air freight service disruptions are likely to linger over carriers' aversion to risk.

Maritime

Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) remains at a near-complete halt, with no oil shipments going through in the past 24 hours. The Trump administration authorized several policy reversals to moderate oil price increases, led by granting India permission to increase its purchases of Russian oil until April—reversing months of pressure.

- In August 2025, the U.S. Commerce Department imposed a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods—very likely to pressure India into giving up its purchases of Russian oil. Within the last month, India has agreed to reduce Russian oil purchases in exchange for trade concessions.²² Allowing India—the world's third largest energy consumer—to resume purchases of sanctioned Russian oil will very likely help to absorb some of the demand for Middle Eastern oil.
- Further relaxation of U.S. energy sanction enforcement is almost certain during the duration of the conflict (and beyond) until energy prices return to pre-war lows.

¹⁹

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-05/private-jets-swarm-oman-as-muscat-becomes-ground-zero-for-escape>

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-carriers-resume-limited-flights-missile-fire-fuels-uncertainty-2026-03-06/>

²² <https://apnews.com/article/treasury-india-russia-oil-iran-war-c29383f5ceb25e768b1ad4095807dd6e>

The Trump administration is announcing a range of other options to address the spike in oil and gasoline prices. One such plan was announced on March 2, when the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (U.S. DFC) offered to provide insurance guarantees and naval escorts to ensure safe passage through the SoH.²³

- U.S. Naval escorts are unlikely while U.S. naval assets are needed for the conflict, and developing an insurance program acceptable to commercial vessels will likely take weeks.

Other possibilities to address price spikes include releasing crude from the U.S. emergency oil reserve (potentially in coordination with other nations to maximize effect), waiving fuel-blending requirements, and the U.S. Treasury trading oil futures. However, these measures will only help in the event of a short conflict or a scenario in which oil can resume shipping through the SoH in the short term.

- Qatar’s Energy Minister, Saad al-Kaabi, warned other Gulf energy exporters will very likely need to halt shipments within weeks if the conflict persists. Qatar has already suspended LNG production, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of global supply, and does not plan to resume until the conflict ends.²⁴

| Conclusion

The extent to which Iranian air strike capabilities have been diminished is uncertain. Some of Iran’s firepower is likely hidden underground, and achieving military goals such as destroying Iran’s nuclear program and navy and eliminating its ballistic missile and drone capabilities would likely necessitate ground forces. The elimination of all of Iran’s proxy groups in the region would further lengthen the conflict. In the meantime, Iran’s ability to threaten energy operations in the region is almost certainly key to its strategy to end the war on its terms, and Iranian authorities will likely utilize this leverage as the conflict dictates.

²³ <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-dfc-persian-gulf-ship-insurance-iran-war/>

²⁴

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-energy-minister-warns-war-will-force-gulf-stop-energy-exports-within-weeks-2026-03-06/>

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%