



# | Assessment |

## Monthly Geopolitical Report: July 2025

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## **| Table of Contents**

<b>Scope Note</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>  Key Findings</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>  Europe</b>	<b>3</b>
Russia Likely to Remain on the Attack	3
Serbia: Protest Escalation Likely as Political Instability Deepens	4
France: Budget Negotiations Could Bring Down Government	5
UEFA Women's Euro 2025	5
<b>  Americas</b>	<b>6</b>
Tariff Updates	6
Colombia: Wave of Attacks	7
<b>  Middle East</b>	<b>8</b>
Iran Unlikely to Resume Hostilities for Now	8
Israel Turns Attention to Gaza Strip Amid Ceasefire	10
<b>  Asia</b>	<b>10</b>
Social Unrest Very Likely After Thai PM Shinawatra Suspended	10
<b>  Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>  Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale</b>	<b>13</b>



## Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 12:40 PM (EDT) on July 2, 2025**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.<sup>1</sup>

# Assessment | Monthly Geopolitical Report: July 2025

## Key Findings

- The military escalation by Russia against Ukraine is likely to continue in July, making a diplomatic solution to the war less likely; European Union (EU) military support to Ukraine is therefore likely to increase as U.S. assistance remains muted.
- Despite a ceasefire between Israel-Iran, further military conflict is likely as Iranian threats to Israel remain, and U.S. assets in the region are more likely targets since their entrance into the conflict.
- The United States is likely to resume reciprocal tariffs globally following the expiration of the July 9 tariff suspension but at lower levels than initially proposed on April 2.
- Social and economic unrest is very likely in Thailand after the monarchy-military alliance stepped in to suspend Prime Minister Shinawatra.
- France is due to present its 2026 budget in mid-July; while unlikely, similar austerity budgets have brought down several recent governments, leading to political paralysis.

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<sup>1</sup> Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide monthly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain.



## **| Europe**

### **Russia Likely to Remain on the Attack**

The series of high-profile diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire in Ukraine—which defined March–May of this year—tapered off in June. Two trends likely hindered the push. First, the outbreak of fighting between Israel and Iran likely distracted world leaders, especially U.S. President Donald Trump, from the conflict in Ukraine. There is also evidence that weapons used to assist Israel came at the expense of supplies to Ukraine.<sup>2</sup> Second, the Trump administration has likely realized it will not achieve a swift agreement to end the conflict in the near future, as Russia has not meaningfully committed to diplomatic negotiations.

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, some of the most significant developments occurred on the aerial front. Since late May, Russia has been shifting its aerial targeting to include larger strike packages and increasing strikes on civilian areas in major cities, including Kyiv. According to Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko, Russia launched 285 drones and 65 missiles against Kyiv in June, compared to 35 drones and one missile in January.<sup>3</sup> In June, Russia set several new records for the largest airstrike assaults on Ukraine during the entirety of the conflict. By the end of the month, Russia was regularly launching strike packages with 400+ strike vehicles; the largest strike occurred on June 29, when Russia launched 537 missiles and drones, including 477 Shahed and decoy drones and 60 missiles.<sup>4</sup> This heightened rate of strikes likely seeks to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, while also sowing fear among the civilian population.

- **U.S. Aid Concerns:** Though Ukraine requires additional air defense support from its allies, international media outlets reported on July 1 that the United States halted supplies of several air defense missiles and other precision munitions to Ukraine over fears of dwindling U.S. stockpiles, much of which was used in defending Israel from Iranian attacks.<sup>5</sup> A continued U.S. halt on air defense missiles—especially Patriot missiles—will likely degrade Ukraine’s ability to shoot down Russian drones and missiles.
- **Operation Spiderweb:** Ukraine also continued to target military installations deep within Russian territory throughout June. Ukraine’s most notable success came as a result of Operation Spiderweb, launched on June 1. In preparation for the operation, Ukrainian security services smuggled 117 drones into Russia over an 18-month period, which were then fired at the same time to strike four different airbases up to 4,000 kilometers away

<sup>2</sup> [hXXps://www.dw\[.\]com/en/ukraine-updates-us-halts-some-missile-deliveries-to-kyiv/live-73113610](https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-us-halts-some-missile-deliveries-to-kyiv/live-73113610)

<sup>3</sup> [hXXps://understandingwar\[.\]org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025](https://understandingwar[.]org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2025)

<sup>4</sup> [hXXps://www.rferl\[.\]org/a/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy--airstrikes-war-invasion/33458314.html](https://www.rferl[.]org/a/russia-ukraine-zelenskyy--airstrikes-war-invasion/33458314.html)

<sup>5</sup> [hXXps://www.politico\[.\]com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048](https://www.politico[.]com/news/2025/07/01/pentagon-munitions-ukraine-halt-00436048)



from Ukraine.<sup>6</sup> As a result, Ukraine damaged or destroyed 41 Russian bombers, representing 34 percent of Russia's cruise missile carriers.<sup>7</sup>

- **Battlefield Gains:** Russian forces also continued heightened rates of physical operations along all areas of the front line in June. This heightened pace of offensive attacks, observed since at least April, led to modest Russian advances in Sumy, Donetsk, and Luhansk.<sup>8</sup>

## Serbia: Protest Escalation Likely as Political Instability Deepens

On June 28, 2025, tens of thousands of university students, operating under the decentralized "Students in Blockade" initiative, led widespread protests in Serbia's capital, Belgrade. The protests came after the government ignored a formal ultimatum to dissolve the National Assembly and call for snap parliamentary elections.<sup>9</sup> The next day, thousands of protesters set up street blockades nationwide in response to the arrest of demonstrators the previous day. In Belgrade, protesters used metal fences and garbage containers to block roads and a key bridge over the Sava River. In Novi Sad, demonstrators threw eggs at the offices of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party. Protesters demanded the release of detained university students and others accused of attacking police or plotting to overthrow the government.<sup>10</sup>

- **Looking Forward:** The movement stems from ongoing anti-corruption protests triggered by the Novi Sad train station canopy collapse on November 1, 2024, which killed 16; it has since morphed into nationwide demands for government accountability. Since then, there have been nearly eight months of ongoing protests against President Aleksandar Vučić's administration. The protests, initially led by students, have grown to include various other groups such as teachers and farmers, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with alleged government corruption and mismanagement. Further protests in Serbia in July are very likely. Sustained protest could pressure the government into concessions or early elections, although the latter remains unlikely.
- **Regionwide unrest over government corruption:** The unrest in Serbia is reflected across the region. In March, a nightclub fire killed dozens in North Macedonia. Protesters have

<sup>6</sup> [hXXps://x.com/zelenskyyua/status/1929238023843012615](https://x.com/zelenskyyua/status/1929238023843012615)

<sup>7</sup>

[hXXps://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/02/ukraines-18-month-covert-spiderweb-operation-claimed-41-destroyed-or-damaged-russian-aircraft-used-for-strikes-on-civilians/](https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/02/ukraines-18-month-covert-spiderweb-operation-claimed-41-destroyed-or-damaged-russian-aircraft-used-for-strikes-on-civilians/)

<sup>8</sup> [hXXps://deepstatemap.com/live/en#6/48.4874865/37.0678711](https://deepstatemap.com/live/en#6/48.4874865/37.0678711)

<sup>9</sup> [hXXps://www.dw.com/en/serbias-students-plan-major-rally-after-issuing-ultimatum/a-73038449](https://www.dw.com/en/serbias-students-plan-major-rally-after-issuing-ultimatum/a-73038449)

<sup>10</sup>

[hXXps://apnews.com/article/serbia-protest-clashes-students-police-vucic-49344d1d6979473b8caa7f9fed0a462a](https://apnews.com/article/serbia-protest-clashes-students-police-vucic-49344d1d6979473b8caa7f9fed0a462a)





similarly tied the tragedy to political corruption.<sup>11</sup> Meanwhile, corruption remains a key issue in Bulgaria, where there have been six elections in three years.<sup>12</sup>

## France: Budget Negotiations Could Bring Down Government

Tensions are rising as the French government approaches budget negotiations; the conflicts that brought down former Prime Minister Michel Barnier's government and nearly toppled that of PM François Bayrou during Winter 2024–2025 can potentially reignite but are unlikely to do so for now. With the country's debt levels rising rapidly, Bayrou's government has explicitly stated that "the 2026 budget will contain unpopular austerity measures."<sup>13</sup>

- **Possible government collapse:** Disputes over retirement policy prompted the left to submit a no-confidence motion on July 1, though it fell well short of the support needed to eject Bayrou from the prime ministership. However, as budget negotiations heat up, the number of dissatisfied members of parliament could grow enough to make toppling the government a true threat. A budget is due to be proposed by mid-July, and while it appears unlikely that the government will collapse, it is not improbable.<sup>14</sup> In 2024, there appeared to be a stronger political appetite from opposition parties to bring down the government; in December 2024, Bayrou's predecessor, Michel Barnier, was removed via a no-confidence vote after only three months in office.<sup>15</sup> The failed July 1 no-confidence vote, which attracted lackluster support, indicates that the Bayrou government is more likely than not to remain in office. However, the series of short-lived governments that France has had in recent years means that budget talks pose a serious risk of government collapse. Were Bayrou to be removed from office, there is a roughly even chance President Emmanuel Macron will call no elections rather than identify a new PM candidate.

## UEFA Women's Euro 2025

From July 2–27, Switzerland will host the UEFA European Women's Championship soccer tournament (Euro 2025). A total of 16 teams from across Europe will be competing in the tournament in eight cities.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>

[hXXps://www.euronews.com/2025/03/25/thousands-of-protesters-in-north-macedonia-demand-justice-over-nightclub-fire](https://www.euronews.com/2025/03/25/thousands-of-protesters-in-north-macedonia-demand-justice-over-nightclub-fire)

<sup>12</sup> [hXXps://www.politico.eu/article/six-general-elections-three-years-bulgaria-polls/](https://www.politico.eu/article/six-general-elections-three-years-bulgaria-polls/)

<sup>13</sup>

[hXXps://www.ouest-france.fr/economie/budget-collectivites-etat/la-dette-publique-de-la-france-bat-des-reCORDS-des-mesures-impopulaires-attendues-pour-2026-909ecd02-526c-11f0-9865-cae506d28d23](https://www.ouest-france.fr/economie/budget-collectivites-etat/la-dette-publique-de-la-france-bat-des-reCORDS-des-mesures-impopulaires-attendues-pour-2026-909ecd02-526c-11f0-9865-cae506d28d23)

<sup>14</sup>

[hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-25/france-s-government-gets-a-lifeline-from-le-pen-s-far-right](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-25/france-s-government-gets-a-lifeline-from-le-pen-s-far-right)

<sup>15</sup> ZeroFox Intelligence Brief - How Unrest in France and Europe Benefits its Adversaries from December 13, 2024

<sup>16</sup> [hXXps://www.uefa.com/womenseuro/](https://www.uefa.com/womenseuro/)



- Risks:** The tournament has similar logistical issues as the men's tournament, which took place last year in Germany. Public transportation, accommodation, tourism, and security services will all face added stresses with the larger than normal influx of tourists. An ongoing heatwave may exacerbate transportation issues in particular. Similar to the men's tournament in 2024, there is a terrorism threat posed by supporters of terror groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, given ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hamas and Israel and Iran. While it is unlikely, security forces may be concerned about the risk of lone wolves hitting soft targets, such as fans assembling outside stadiums or fan zone activities that take place during Euro 2025. Euro 2025 attendees may also experience issues related to crime, public drunkenness, and cyber scams targeting spectators at the matches and related events. There is a roughly even chance of protests against the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), the event organizer, particularly related to the discrepancy in prize money between the men's and women's events. However, these protests are likely to be small and unlikely to interrupt matches.

## **Americas**

### **Further Tariffs Likely in July**

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that trade negotiations that are not finished by July 9—the date when April 2 country-based tariffs are set to kick back in—could be extended to Labor Day. Bessent also said those deals would only be for 10 or 12 important trade deals, suggesting that most countries will not receive deals.<sup>17</sup> This contrasts with certain statements made by U.S. President Donald Trump indicating that new tariff rates will be announced by July 9, with some rates even announced beforehand.

- Going Forward:** By July, there will likely be a mix of tariff outcomes. There is a roughly even chance some countries will see a return to Liberation Day (April 2) rates, but most will likely be subject to the 10 percent rate that exists today. A few other major trading partners—led by large Asian economies such as Vietnam, India, Indonesia, and possibly Japan, as well as the European Union (EU)—will have trade frameworks like those agreed upon between the United States and United Kingdom that will very likely see their tariff rates lowered from April 2 but remain at 10 percent or above. The agreements with the United Kingdom, as well as the agreement with China, suggest that new U.S. tariffs will be cemented, rather than removed entirely. Even with the United Kingdom, while there were some agreements on sectoral tariffs like autos, the 10 percent tariff rate remains. Any other country that gets a framework agreed to will likely see a similar outcome: a 10 percent tariff rate with sectoral exemptions, either higher or lower than 10 percent. The most common sectoral tariffs are on goods such as semiconductors, autos, pharmaceuticals, and rare-earth metals.

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.axios.com/2025/06/27/trump-tariffs-labor-day>



- Flexible Deals:** As these trade deals are being negotiated quickly and across countless countries, they will likely be flexible with few guarantees. Even the trade deals negotiated so far with the United Kingdom and China have already been rewritten, and certain aspects remain unclear. For example, the initial U.S.-UK trade saw UK steel and aluminum exports tariffed at 0 percent. However, that has since changed to 25 percent, as tariff rates for global steel and aluminum were doubled from 25 to 50 percent.<sup>18</sup> For example, a trade agreement between the United States and China from the first Trump administration did not continue after his administration. This presents problems for business continuity. If businesses believe the tariffs will not remain in place, they are unlikely to change the dynamics of their operations. The investments required to move operations from Asia to the United States would not be worth it without a formal trade agreement agreed to by Congress. For example, the U.S.-UK trade deal can be ended by either side at any time, for any reason.<sup>19</sup>
- China and Rare Earths:** China is the exception to the July 9 date, as their deadline is August 12. China is the one country likely to see substantially higher tariffs, potentially rising to as high as 145 percent—where they were from April 9 to May 9—before being dropped by 115 percent. China is also the likeliest country to retaliate against U.S. tariffs. This additional month's delay adds further uncertainty for global trade. In the weeks since April 2, China has also shown its willingness to restrict exports of rare-earth metals as a form of retaliation.<sup>20</sup> China dominates the production of rare-earth metals, which are vital across sectors including autos, weapons production, and most appliances. China's immediate restriction of metals exports after April 2 was very likely an instigator in bringing the United States into negotiations. China is very likely to place non-tariff barriers to trade on rare earths again in the future if trade tensions with the United States persist. China is also unlikely to allow companies, especially those in the defense industry, to build up inventories of the metals. In the long run, this will lead countries to develop alternative supply chains for rare-earth magnets in particular, so they can reduce China's leverage. However, these new supply chains will take years to come online, and China's dominance of the sector is very likely to continue for years.

## Colombia: Wave of Attacks

On June 10, 2025, seven people were killed in a series of attacks in and around the southwestern city of Cali. Dissidents from the disbanded Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel

<sup>18</sup>

[hXXps://www.bloomberg\[.\]com/news/articles/2025-06-29/trump-deals-poised-to-fall-short-of-sweeping-global-trade-reform](https://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/articles/2025-06-29/trump-deals-poised-to-fall-short-of-sweeping-global-trade-reform)

<sup>19</sup>

[hXXps://www.whitehouse\[.\]gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-implementing-the-general-terms-of-the-u-s-uk-economic-prosperity-deal/](https://www.whitehouse[.]gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-implementing-the-general-terms-of-the-u-s-uk-economic-prosperity-deal/)

<sup>20</sup> [hXXps://www.wsj\[.\]com/world/asia/trump-china-rare-earths-0cbf3f3c](https://www.wsj[.]com/world/asia/trump-china-rare-earths-0cbf3f3c)





group were reportedly behind the attacks, which included improvised explosive devices attached to cars and drones. A total of 19 attacks occurred, targeting both the police and civilians.<sup>21</sup> Since the FARC disbanded in 2016, remnants of the group have continued fighting while also engaging in other criminal operations like drug trafficking. Fighting between groups has recently expanded and caused a nationwide security crisis.

On June 9, 2025, opposition senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot and seriously injured during a campaign rally in the capital, Bogotá. The assassination attempt is likely linked to Uribe's tough-on-crime policies during the campaign season to replace unpopular outgoing President Gustavo Petro. The shooting comes as drug gangs control a greater share of territory and revenue streams in Colombia.<sup>22</sup>

- **Regional Crime Wave:** A similar rise in crime is taking place across the region, notably in Peru and Ecuador. Political assassinations are common across the region, and violence against politicians usually hardens the resolve of existing candidates. After the 2026 elections, expect a more conservative president who focuses on lowering the crime rate.
- **Domestic Political Issues:** The ongoing security issue is worsening unrelated domestic political issues surrounding President Gustavo Petro. Petro is pushing for a national referendum to bypass Congress regarding key labor and pension reforms. To drum up support for the vote, supporters have been holding periodic protests. Expect continued political unrest in Colombia that will likely be exacerbated by the security crisis through the election period in mid-2026.

## **| Middle East**

### **Iran Unlikely to Resume Hostilities for Now**

The ceasefire between Israel and Iran is likely to hold for now, though its long-term prospects are more uncertain. From June 13–24, Iran and Israel exchanged missiles and airstrikes following a surprise Israeli attack targeting Iran's air defenses, nuclear facilities, and political and military leadership. The United States entered the conflict on June 22 with strikes on Iran's fortified nuclear facilities.<sup>23</sup> In response, Iran launched missiles at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the forward operating base for U.S. Central Command. Iran alerted the United States before the attack, indicating that it sought to show force without further escalation.<sup>24</sup> Israel and Iran signed a ceasefire on June 24.

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<sup>21</sup> [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/cdd2vn0j3gvo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdd2vn0j3gvo)

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[hXXps://www.infobae\[.\]com/colombia/2025/06/08/centro-democratico-exige-medidas-urgentes-de-proteccion-contras-atentado-contramiguel-uribe-resultado-inaudito-e-incomprensible/](https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2025/06/08/centro-democratico-exige-medidas-urgentes-de-proteccion-contras-atentado-contramiguel-uribe-resultado-inaudito-e-incomprensible/)

<sup>23</sup> [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/6/22/us-bombs-irans-nuclear-sites-what-we-know-so-far](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/22/us-bombs-irans-nuclear-sites-what-we-know-so-far)

<sup>24</sup> [hXXps://dohaneews\[.\]co/why-did-iran-give-prior-warning-before-attacking-the-u-s-air-base-in-qatar/](https://dohaneews.co/why-did-iran-give-prior-warning-before-attacking-the-u-s-air-base-in-qatar/)



Iran, with its military capabilities and power projection damaged by the conflict, is unlikely to take unprovoked action against Israel or the United States in the medium term. Iran's leaders are all but certainly aware that the government would not survive a prolonged war with Israel and the United States and have very likely prioritized dialing down tensions. Furthermore, Iran's regional network of proxy militias—led by Hamas and Hezbollah, with assistance from Syria's former Assad government—has been weakened in the past year by conflict with Israel and can no longer deter Israeli attacks.<sup>25</sup> In the short term, Iranian leadership will very likely work to strengthen its domestic base—including by repressing internal dissent—rather than pursue further conflict.<sup>26</sup>

- **Resumption of Nuclear Talks:** For the reasons above, Iran is likely to return to discussions with the United States on the future of its nuclear program. While no new talks have yet been announced, both sides have indicated their openness to diplomacy.<sup>27</sup> On July 2, Iran suspended its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog, which it has also done during previous negotiations to strengthen its leverage.<sup>28</sup> The last round of discussions stalled in June over the United States demanding a total stop to Iran's uranium enrichment and Iran refusing. The success of new talks will all but certainly hinge on this same topic, though it is unclear if Iran's relative weakness following the conflict will be enough to soften Tehran's position.
- **Probability of Further Military Escalations:** Despite the ceasefire, resumption of military hostilities between Israel and Iran is likely in the longer term, unless the latter agrees to end its nuclear program. Iran's nuclear program, while damaged, very likely retains sufficient material, equipment, and expertise to resume uranium enrichment and/or weapon production in the long term. At the same time, the severe degradation of Iran's air defenses reduces the risk to future missions targeting Iranian territory. Since Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023, Israel has agreed to numerous temporary ceasefires, both against Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon; however, Israel resumed military operations later on, likely indicating a willingness to do so again with Iran. Furthermore, the United States has now set the precedent that it will support Israeli attacks on Iran's nuclear program, further strengthening the likelihood that Israel will resume strikes if deemed necessary.
- **Iranian Retaliation:** Iran is very likely to pressure its proxy militias in the region to avoid targeting Western and Israeli assets for the time being; though low, there is a likelihood that these orders will be disobeyed. Western and Israeli physical assets in the region are at risk of being targeted in asymmetric attacks by proxy groups. Such attacks could take the form of bombings, shootings, or missile attacks. Embassies, military installations, international organizations, and companies in the region are all potential targets. In addition, the assets of oil companies, financial services, and telecommunications are likely

<sup>25</sup> [hXXps://agisi.org/analysis/the-decline-of-irans-proxy-network/](https://agisi.org/analysis/the-decline-of-irans-proxy-network/)

<sup>26</sup> [hXXps://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/latest-news/iran-government-crackdown/](https://www.opendoorsuk.org/news/latest-news/iran-government-crackdown/)

<sup>27</sup> [hXXps://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-foreign-minister-interview-nuclear-talks/](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iran-foreign-minister-interview-nuclear-talks/)

<sup>28</sup> [hXXps://thehill.com/policy/international/5381101-iran-suspends-cooperation-iaea/](https://thehill.com/policy/international/5381101-iran-suspends-cooperation-iaea/)



targets for cyberattacks, which allows Iran plausible deniability. The Middle Eastern oil industry is particularly vulnerable, as Iran has demonstrated an ability to impact the industry's operations; there is a roughly even chance Iran will try to block oil supply through the strategic Strait of Hormuz if conflict breaks out again.

## Israel Turns Attention to Gaza Strip Amid Ceasefire

Following the tentative ceasefire between Iran and Israel on June 24, 2025, Israel has turned its attention toward continuing operations on the Gaza Strip. Since Israel and the United States have claimed a "victory" over the offensive in Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump noted the victory may facilitate a breakthrough in negotiating a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel and indicated that a ceasefire may take place within a week.<sup>2930</sup> However, Hamas and Israeli officials contend that negotiations for a ceasefire have stalled due to major disagreements.<sup>31</sup>

- Looking Forward:** Following the Israel-Iran ceasefire, some sources reported that U.S. President Donald Trump is increasingly pressuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas conflict, but reports over the progress in negotiating a ceasefire were conflicting. Some news reports claimed that President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed to end the conflict in two weeks by releasing hostages on both sides, exiling Hamas officials, and contracting multiple Arab countries to aid in governing the Gaza Strip. However, Hamas officials have stated that they will not agree to go into exile, and some Israeli officials have cited continued major disagreements. It is possible that major disagreements remain between both parties and that any breakthrough in the ceasefire will require additional time to reconcile. Moreover, heightened pressure from the Trump administration may facilitate negotiations.<sup>32</sup>

## Asia

### Social Unrest Very Likely After Thai PM Shinawatra Suspended

On July 1, 2025, Thailand's Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from duty; she could face dismissal pending an ethics probe over a leaked phone call with Cambodia's former leader Hun Sen. Shinawatra has faced increasing calls to resign over her handling of the border disputes with Cambodia, with anti-government protesters taking to the streets after the leaked phone call. The scandal also prompted the Bhumjaithai party, a major

<sup>29</sup> [hXXps://www.dw\[.\]com/en/trump-says-great-progress-made-on-gaza-ceasefire-talks/live-73028690](https://www.dw.com/en/trump-says-great-progress-made-on-gaza-ceasefire-talks/live-73028690)

<sup>30</sup>

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/israeli-attacks-kill-least-21-people-gaza-medics-say-2025-06-26/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-attacks-kill-least-21-people-gaza-medics-say-2025-06-26/)

<sup>31</sup> [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/clylzl9lpro](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clylzl9lpro)

<sup>32</sup>

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/netanyahu-trump-said-working-on-plan-to-end-gaza-war-and-expand-abraham-accords/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-trump-said-working-on-plan-to-end-gaza-war-and-expand-abraham-accords/)



partner of the PM's government, to withdraw from the coalition.<sup>33</sup> Shinawatra's suspension adds to the possibility of renewed instability and the power struggles between popularly elected politicians and the conservative parties backed by the army-monarchy in Thailand.

- **Looking Forward:** While Shinawatra remains in office officially, she is likely to be dismissed from her role in the short term, based on previous actions by the court, which is largely seen as backed by the army-monarchy. If this happens, she would be the second Pheu Thai Party prime minister to be removed in less than a year via a similar process. She would also be the third member of her family removed from office by the military after her father and aunt were removed from office in 2004 and 2016, respectively, via military coups, also over border disputes.<sup>34</sup>
- **Government Collapse:** While the court reaches its decision on Shinawatra, Phumtham Wechayachai will operate in a caretaker capacity. Whether Phumtham remains in office long term likely depends on his ability to convince the military-monarchy alliance of his stability. His reputation as a close confidant of the Shinawatra family makes it more likely that, after the court likely rules against Paetongtarn Shinawatra, a combination of street protests and the collapse of the ruling government will lead to new elections.
- **Military and Monarchy Dominance:** Thailand's Senate is dominated by conservative parties with close ties to the military. The Pheu Thai Party was only allowed to govern in 2023 after the Senate rejected the more radical Move Forward Party, which secured more votes than the Pheu Thai Party but was openly critical of the military and Thai monarchy.<sup>35</sup> Large protests against military rule and the Thai monarchy were held in 2020, 2021, and 2023.<sup>36</sup> The dismissal of Shinawatra makes violent and indefinite protests more likely, which will very likely prompt a military crackdown. This threatens Thailand's social stability and its ability to navigate trade issues with the United States. Thailand is a key export- and tourism-based economy, but social unrest will likely negatively impact its economy by putting it at a disadvantage when negotiating with the United States; the border issues will harm its intricate cross-border economy that relies on trade with its neighbors.

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<sup>33</sup>

[hXXps://apnews\[.\]com/article/thailand-cabinet-paetongtarn-leak-call-cambodia-f44701c7e21a99f894fa94981a79ee8d](https://apnews.com/article/thailand-cabinet-paetongtarn-leak-call-cambodia-f44701c7e21a99f894fa94981a79ee8d)

<sup>34</sup> [hXXps://www.cfr\[.\]org/blog/last-days-thailands-shinawatra-dynasty](https://www.cfr.org/blog/last-days-thailands-shinawatra-dynasty)

<sup>35</sup>

[hXXps://www.straitstimes\[.\]com/asia/se-asia/thailands-srettha-to-become-pm-after-securing-endorsement-of-parliament](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailands-srettha-to-become-pm-after-securing-endorsement-of-parliament)

<sup>36</sup> [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2023/7/19/protests-in-thailand-as-rivals-derail-pitas-pm-bid](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/19/protests-in-thailand-as-rivals-derail-pitas-pm-bid)



## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.  <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.





## Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

