



| Flash |

Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP

#16: March 10, 2026

F-2026-03-10a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

March 10, 2026

Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 4.00 AM (EST) on March 10, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

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| Key Findings

- The Iranian regime appears to be coalescing behind newly appointed Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a statement of support for Mojtaba and said their forces will “fully obey and sacrifice for the divine commands” of the new Supreme Leader.
- Israel confirmed strikes against three missile launchers in unspecified locations. With missile forces severely degraded, combined force targeting by U.S. and Israeli militaries will very likely focus on drone production in the coming days.
- Israel continues its attacks on Lebanese Hezbollah, striking a financial institution in Beirut they claim is part of Hezbollah’s charitable funding. The Lebanese government has asked for direct talks with Israel, in an effort to end hostilities. Lebanon is seeking a lasting peace agreement with Israel and has accused Hezbollah of betraying the country.
- President Trump indicated a willingness to ease U.S. sanctions on Russian oil—which would likely reduce the price of oil by allowing more supply into the market.

| Latest Details

Supreme Leader Reactions

The Iranian regime appears to be coalescing behind newly appointed Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite military defenders of the Islamic Revolution, issued a statement of support for Mojtaba and said their forces will “fully obey and sacrifice for the divine commands” of the new Supreme Leader.¹

- Statements of support were also issued by the Iranian Army, the Defence Council, Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib, and the Guardian Council.
- The pledges of support for Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei suggest the Iranian government is likely unified and maintaining operations. The new administration is very likely to continue the policies of Ali Khamenei and are unlikely to make concessions to the U.S. and Israel to end hostilities.

Reactions from Iranian citizens were mixed. Pro-regime rallies were held across the country on Monday March 9—including thousands of citizens in Tehran. The regime supporters held signs saying “Death to America,” as well as photos of slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that read “Your path will continue.”² In the past, rallies of this nature have been highly choreographed by IRGC and serve to present an image of unity both domestically and across the region.

There have not been notable anti-government protests since the beginning of hostilities; however, videos circulated on social media Sunday with Iranian citizens chanting “Death to Mojtaba.”³ Prior to his appointment as Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei was well known among Iranian citizens for his role in crackdowns following anti-regime protests, most recently in January 2026—for that reason it is very likely his ascension to the highest post in Iran will be unpopular with most Iranian citizens.

¹

¹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/irans-authorities-showcase-continuity-as-they-back-new-leader-during-war>

² <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3dzy4nede0o>

³ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/09/divided-iranians-react-to-new-supreme-leader>

- The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader will almost certainly be seen by citizens as a continuation of the repressive policies of his father and will not be popular. However, the support of the regime's security apparatus, especially the IRGC, will very likely allow him to maintain his grip on power.

Oil

Oil prices fell below USD 100 per barrel, with Brent Crude settling around USD 92 as of writing.⁴ The price reduction is likely in response to G7 leaders suggesting measures to ease prices. Most notably, President Trump indicated a willingness to ease U.S. sanctions on Russian oil—which would likely reduce the price of oil by allowing more supply into the market.⁵


U.S. and Israeli Strikes

Combined U.S. and Israeli forces have likely severely degraded Iran's missile capability, and likely inflicted significant damage to drone capability. Israel confirmed on March 9 strikes against three missile launchers in unspecified locations. Additionally, combined forces likely struck targets in the Esfahan Missile Complex.⁶ These strikes are in addition to the likely destruction of over half of Iran's missile launchers.

⁴ [hXXps://oilprice\[.\]com/](https://oilprice.com/)
⁵

[hXXps://www\[.\]theguardian\[.\]com/world/2026/mar/10/ukraine-war-briefing-trump-set-to-ease-oil-related-sanctions-following-putin-call](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/10/ukraine-war-briefing-trump-set-to-ease-oil-related-sanctions-following-putin-call)

⁶ [hXXps://understandingwar\[.\]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/)



U.S. and Israeli Strikes on Drone Production Facilities as of March 9, 2026

Source: Institute for the Study of War

Separately, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed a March 8, 2026 strike on IRGC drone command headquarters.⁷ With missile forces severely degraded, Iran has likely been firing more drones to make up for the shortfall—combined force targeting by U.S. and Israeli militaries will very likely focus on drone production in the coming days.

- Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel and Gulf states have declined nearly every day since hostilities began—suggesting that targeting of missile launchers and

⁷ Ibid

drone production has likely been successful thus far and will almost certainly continue.⁸

Strikes were also conducted against a company, Sahab Pardaz Company, involved in the filtering of Iranian internet. The company was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2022 for providing espionage and censorship services to the Iranian government.⁹ Striking the company is in keeping with the combined forces ongoing efforts to degrade internal security apparatus—and is very likely intended to meet President Trump’s stated objective of fostering popular uprising among Iranian citizens.

Lebanon

Israel continues its attacks on Lebanese Hezbollah, striking a financial institution in Beirut they claim is part of Hezbollah’s charitable funding.¹⁰ Israel is almost certainly looking to degrade Hezbollah’s overall support network and is likely to continue targeting financial infrastructure that provides funding to the Shia militia.

The Lebanese government has asked for direct talks with Israel, in an effort to end hostilities. Lebanon is seeking a lasting peace agreement with Israel and has accused Hezbollah of betraying the country.¹¹ The government making such open statements against Hezbollah indicates they are likely tired of frequent wars with Israel—and they very likely blame Hezbollah for the current situation.

- Historically, the Lebanese government has given some deference to Hezbollah—the Shia group is a political party in parliament and maintains a large armed force that some in Beirut likely fear could spark civil war.

⁸ [hXXps://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2030149125451219049](https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/2030149125451219049)

⁹ [hXXps://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-9-2026/)

¹⁰ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/9/israel-strikes-hezbollah-financial-institutions-as-lebanon-calls-for-talks>

¹¹ [hXXps://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/09/middleeast/lebanon-president-israel-talks-hezbollah-latam-intl](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/09/middleeast/lebanon-president-israel-talks-hezbollah-latam-intl)

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%