



| Assessment |

Group of Seven (G7) Summit

A-2026-06-11a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: Low

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitical, Threat Actor, Physical Security

June 11, 2026

Scope Note

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| Assessment | Group of Seven (G7) Summit

| Executive Summary

The 2026 G7 summit returns to Évian-les-Bains, France, which hosted the 2003 G8. The threat picture is shaped by the active conflict in Iran and Ukraine, persistent domestic unrest in France, and the venue's unique cross-border geography, with the nearest international airport situated in Switzerland and outside French jurisdiction. France's security services have a strong track record at G7-class events (including its most recent G7 in 2019 and the 2024 Summer Olympics). Therefore, the principal physical risk to the 2026 G7 summit is not the venue itself; rather, it stems from anti-G7 mobilization nearby, lone-actor terrorism, and spillover effects of the Iran conflict.

The cyber risk to the summit is almost certainly elevated. Iranian-aligned actors have been targeting G7 members since March, and pro-Russian collectives have been targeting the event since Russia was removed from the group in 2014. Russian-aligned actors have frequently targeted the government, banking, and transportation infrastructures of G7 members in retaliation for their support of Ukraine. Cyberattacks against G7 infrastructure, sponsors, and delegations—including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), website defacement, credential theft, and event-themed phishing—are very likely. Russian-linked disinformation operations targeting France's information environment are almost certain.

Event Details

Conference Structure

The G7 Summit brings together leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The European Union (EU), represented by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, will participate in all discussions as a permanent guest. The French Presidency is expected to invite outreach partners from African, Indo-Pacific, and Gulf states but confirmed invitees will likely not be announced until just ahead of the summit.¹

The summit's main negotiating sessions will take place from June 15–17. The 2026 agenda is expected to center on the wars in Iran and Ukraine, artificial intelligence (AI) governance, and economic-security policy toward China.²

Venue: Hôtel Royal, Évian Resort

Évian-les-Bains sits on the southern shore of Lake Geneva (Lac Léman) in the Haute-Savoie region of France, directly opposite Lausanne, Switzerland. The town has a population of roughly 9,000.³ The 2003 G8 was also held at the Hôtel Royal, a gated estate elevated above the town center. The estate's elevation, single access road, and limited approach corridors likely offer favorable perimeter security compared to previous summits.⁴

Key venue-driven risk features include:

- **Lake-front exposure:** Lake Geneva forms the entire northern boundary of the venue's perimeter. France and Switzerland share lake jurisdiction; coordinated maritime security between the French Maritime Gendarmerie, the Swiss Cantonal Police (Vaud and Geneva), and the Swiss Border Guard Corps will almost certainly be required.

¹ [hXXps://onu.delegfrance\[.\]org/what-is-the-g7](https://onu.delegfrance[.]org/what-is-the-g7)

² [hXXps://focus2030\[.\]org/en/lesagendas/agenda-of-the-g7-and-g20-summits/](https://focus2030[.]org/en/lesagendas/agenda-of-the-g7-and-g20-summits/)

³ [hXXps://www.evianresort\[.\]com/en/evian-les-bains-discover-the-destination](https://www.evianresort[.]com/en/evian-les-bains-discover-the-destination)

⁴ [hXXps://hotel-royal.evianresort\[.\]com](https://hotel-royal.evianresort[.]com)

- **Single road corridor:** Évian-les-Bains is served by one main road (the D1005) along the lakeshore and by feeder roads in Thonon-les-Bains to the A40 motorway.⁵
- **Cross-border logistics:** Most delegations and almost all international media will transit through Geneva Airport (GVA) in Switzerland, requiring border crossings before reaching the venue.⁶

Transit Considerations

- GVA is the primary entry point. Annecy-Haute-Savoie-Mont Blanc Airport (NCY) offers a secondary domestic option for smaller aircraft, and Lyon-Saint-Exupéry Airport (LYS) is a fallback option. GVA-to-Évian transit is approximately 50 kilometers via the Swiss shore (through Lausanne and the Saint-Gingolph crossing) or 60+ kilometers via the French shore (through Villard and Thonon-les-Bains). Transit times on both routes will very likely extend during the summit window.
- Border control will likely cause delays. France has periodically reinstated border checks since the 2024 Olympics, and there is a roughly even chance they will do so again.⁷ Delegations should expect document checks at Saint-Gingolph and Villard and prepare for additional transit time.
- Heliports at Évian and dedicated VIP rail transfers from Geneva via CFF or SNCF are likely to offset road delays. The summit window will almost certainly include localized airspace restrictions over the eastern lake basin in coordination with Swiss authorities. Trains from Paris are also an option.

Accommodation Footprint

Évian-les-Bains and the immediate Évian Resort estate (Hôtel Royal and Hôtel Ermitage) can likely accommodate the bulk of heads of delegation but likely cannot absorb the full press, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and observer footfall. Overflow will likely fall to:

⁵ [hXXps://www.evian-tourisme\[.\]com/en/useful-information/getting-to-evian/](https://www.evian-tourisme[.]com/en/useful-information/getting-to-evian/)

⁶ [hXXps://casino.evianresort\[.\]com/en/come-to-the-casino](https://casino.evianresort[.]com/en/come-to-the-casino)

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[hXXps://www.fragomen\[.\]com/insights/european-unionschengen-area-internal-schengen-border-checks-further-extended.html](https://www.fragomen[.]com/insights/european-unionschengen-area-internal-schengen-border-checks-further-extended.html)

- **Thonon-les-Bains** (10 kilometers west): This town features mid-tier hotels and serviced apartments and has direct rail and road links to Évian. Tourist police presence is moderate; central protest exposure is higher than in Évian itself.⁸
- **Lausanne and Montreux** (across the lake in Switzerland): These towns situated on the Swiss Riviera feature five-star properties and are the likely choices for delegations who prefer Swiss security guarantees. They are connected to Évian by Lake Geneva General Navigation Company (CGN) ferry services and by road via Geneva.⁹
- **Geneva** (Switzerland): The city will be the hub for press and United Nations (UN) delegations choosing to commute.

ZeroFox recommends that VIP-level delegates prioritize accommodation inside the Évian perimeter, both for protective convoy efficiency and to limit urban protest exposure in Geneva and its French suburbs.

Other Crime and Opportunistic Risk

The Lake Geneva corridor has a low violent crime rate. Pickpocketing, theft, and credit card skimming occur in standard tourist concentrations on both sides of the border. Geneva's Pâquis district and the Cornavin station area carry elevated petty crime risk after dark.¹⁰ The influx of high-net-worth attendees, executive protection details, and lobbying delegations will likely result in increased opportunistic crime targeting visitors in Geneva, Lausanne, and the Annemasse rail corridor.

Physical Security Threats

French authorities are prioritizing the G7 as a major international event.¹¹ Security protocols are expected to mirror those of the 2019 G7 summit in Biarritz, which deployed roughly 13,000 security personnel, established a kilometers-wide exclusion zone in and around the venue, and used multi-layered access controls coordinated with Spanish

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[hXXps://www.thononlesbains\[.\]com/en/commerce-et-service/office-de-tourisme-de-thonon-les-bains-thonon-les-bains/](https://www.thononlesbains.com/en/commerce-et-service/office-de-tourisme-de-thonon-les-bains-thonon-les-bains/)

⁹ [hXXps://www.geneve\[.\]com/en/companies/compagnie-generale-de-navigation-sur-le-lac-leman-cgn](https://www.geneve.com/en/companies/compagnie-generale-de-navigation-sur-le-lac-leman-cgn)

¹⁰ [hXXps://www.bfs.admin\[.\]ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/crime-criminal-justice/police.assetdetail.36388116.html](https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/crime-criminal-justice/police.assetdetail.36388116.html)

¹¹ [hXXps://us.diplomatie.gouv\[.\]fr/en/g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-vaux-de-cernay](https://us.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-vaux-de-cernay)

authorities across the nearby border.¹²¹³ The 2024 Summer Olympics in Paris likely further refined French security protocols for high-profile events.

ZeroFox assesses that the Hôtel Royal perimeter will be similarly secured. However, the structural features of the venue introduce threat from across the border in Switzerland. The Swiss shore includes the towns and cities of Lausanne, Montreux, and Geneva, which are roughly 13 kilometers from Évian across Lake Geneva and not subject to French Prefecture restrictions.

Drone and Aerial Threats

Commercial drone capabilities have changed materially since France last hosted the summit. Single-operator drones can now carry small payloads at standoff distances of five to 10 kilometers, and first-person view (FPV) drone tactics used in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran conflicts have likely been studied by hacktivist and extremist communities. French and Swiss authorities will likely impose a coordinated drone exclusion zone covering both shores of the eastern lake basin. ZeroFox assesses that detection radar, Radio Frequency (RF)-jamming kits, and counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) interception teams will very likely be positioned at the Hôtel Royal estate and adjacent ridgelines, similar to French anti-drone protocols used during the 2024 Summer Olympics.¹⁴

The risk to delegate accommodations along the open lakeshore is likely more difficult to mitigate than the risk to the main venue itself. ZeroFox assesses that aerial threats originating from the Swiss shore likely present a coordination problem, as cross-border interception is legally and operationally complex.

Iran Conflict Spillover

ZeroFox assesses that an Iranian state-directed or proxy-actor incident is unlikely in Évian during the summit window. Indirect disruptions elsewhere in France during the same period are also unlikely but not improbable. However, the conflict shapes the summit threat picture in other ways:

- France hosts substantial Iranian diaspora and exile communities. Iranian intelligence services have a documented operational history in France, including

¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/24/biarritz-lockdown-g7-summit-descends-french-resort>

¹³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49416326>

¹⁴ https://www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/03/cahier-le-bourget-2017-en.pdf

the 2018 Villepinte bomb plot targeting an Iranian opposition rally near Paris.¹⁵

While unlikely, Iran may seek to leverage the G7 window for surveillance, intimidation, or attacks against dissidents.

- If Israeli officials attend in an outreach capacity or via bilateral programming, the Israeli delegation will very likely be a focal threat target. France-Israel diplomatic issues since the Israel-Hamas war likely complicate attendance but do not eliminate the risk of Iranian state-directed or proxy attacks.
- Continued Iranian missile activity in the broader theater will likely force commercial airline rerouting that compresses arrival schedules at GVA, LYS, and Paris Charles de Gaulle International Airport (CDG).

Terrorism

Évian itself has no recent record of jihadist attacks; other French cities such as Paris, Lyon, Marseille, and Nice remain higher-probability locations. However, the G7 is a likely aspirational target due to its high visibility, international attendees, and hosting of Western heads of state during a period of active U.S.-Israel and Iran hostilities.

ZeroFox assesses the threat of an organized terror attack at the Hôtel Royal estate is very unlikely. A lone-actor incident in central Évian or Thonon-les-Bains, at cross-border transit points, or in Geneva or Lausanne over the summit window is more probable. The primary concern for G7 security planners is likely radicalized lone actors who have been indoctrinated online rather than individuals or groups who have received formal training. A lone-wolf terrorist attack would most likely involve the use of easily accessible materials, such as bladed weapons, firearms, or rudimentary improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Vehicles will also likely be used as weapons to target spectators or related events that are not protected by road closures.

Since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, authorities have issued several security warnings over the heightened risk of a terror attack on large gatherings. Groups such as al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) almost certainly continue to use conflicts in the Middle East to increase calls for violence against Western targets.

¹⁵ <https://edm.parliament.uk/early-day-motion/51996/attempted-bombing-of-iranian-opposition-in-paris>

- IS almost certainly still welcomes and encourages lone-wolf attacks in its name. Knife or small arms attacks and vehicular assaults require little instruction. Additionally, attackers can learn to build unsophisticated IEDs online. Lone-wolf attacks are difficult to identify and mitigate due to the limited circle that has knowledge of the attack planning.
- Following such attacks, terrorist organizations frequently claim them as their own to garner additional publicity and outwardly portray their strength. Further investigations often later call into question the claimed affiliation.

France remains under a standing "Urgence attentat" (Attack Emergency) posture, which has been continuously active since the October 2023 Arras school stabbing just days after the Hamas attack in Israel.¹⁶ Then, on December 2, 2023, one person was killed and two others injured during a knife and hammer attack in central Paris.¹⁸ In both cases within France, police classified the incidents as "acts of terrorism" and believed that they are related, at least in part, to events in the Middle East.

The principal terror threat profile relevant to the G7 includes:

- **Jihadist lone actors:** IS-inspired knife, vehicle-ramming, and arson attacks have continued at a low but steady tempo across France since 2023.¹⁹ While France's bigger cities remain higher-probability theaters, tourist-rich locations along Lake Geneva are likely aspirational targets during the summit window.
- **Political Extremism:** France's General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) has flagged sustained activity from political extremist groups in recent years.²⁰ Lone-actor violence remains a documented threat to political gatherings and minority-community sites.^{21,22}

¹⁶ [hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2023/10/13/europe/arras-france-school-knife-attack-intl/index.html](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/10/13/europe/arras-france-school-knife-attack-intl/index.html)

¹⁷ [hXXps://www.oise.gouv\[.\]fr/Actions-de-l-Etat/Securites/Vigipirate/La-posture-actuelle-niveau-urgence-attentat](https://www.oise.gouv.fr/Actions-de-l-Etat/Securites/Vigipirate/La-posture-actuelle-niveau-urgence-attentat)

¹⁸

[hXXps://www.lemonde\[.\]fr/societe/live/2023/12/03/en-direct-attentat-a-paris-le-point-sur-les-dernieres-informations_6203619_3224.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/live/2023/12/03/en-direct-attentat-a-paris-le-point-sur-les-dernieres-informations_6203619_3224.html)

¹⁹ [hXXps://www.terrorism-info\[.\]org\[.\]il/en/summary-of-isis-activity-around-the-globe-in-2023/](https://www.terrorism-info[.]org[.]il/en/summary-of-isis-activity-around-the-globe-in-2023/)

²⁰

[hXXps://www.dgsi.interieur.gouv\[.\]fr/decouvrir-dgsi/nos-missions/lutte-contre-terrorisme-et-extremismes-violents/lemergence-de](https://www.dgsi.interieur.gouv.fr/decouvrir-dgsi/nos-missions/lutte-contre-terrorisme-et-extremismes-violents/lemergence-de)

²¹ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/world-europe-67548173](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67548173)

²² ZeroFox Intelligence Brief: Holiday Season Terror Threat Raises Global Alarm, December 8, 2023

Iranian-Aligned Terrorism

Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right Hand, or HAYI) is a new group mirroring techniques utilized by AQ- and IS-inspired attackers that emerged in March 2026 after the U.S.-Israel and Iran war began. The group has claimed at least 17 attacks across Europe through late April 2026, with the latest being a stabbing attack against two Jewish individuals in London, United Kingdom, on April 29. While the group is reportedly linked to Iran, it also allegedly recruits and pays individuals online to carry out attacks against Jewish or Israeli targets in Europe.²³

- The group likely adopts tactics utilized by AQ and IS, including the use of radicalized lone actors. Elements of HAYI's operational model are also likely copied from incidents of Russian sabotage across Europe, where would-be attackers are allegedly recruited and paid anonymously online to carry out attacks. A spate of HAYI-claimed arson attacks against London synagogues appear to be modeled on Russia-aligned attacks against supporters of Ukraine.²⁴
- This operational model allows the sponsors to maintain plausible deniability. The continuation of the war in Iran will almost certainly lead the Iranian government to seek new avenues of hybrid warfare—likely including the creation of front groups in Europe and the United States to claim attacks by lone actors. The activity attributed to HAYI is very likely repeatable across other regions of the world—especially in countries where individuals from disaffected, Muslim immigrant communities can likely be recruited.

France is likely an appealing operating environment for HAYI-style operations given:

- The country's large North African and diaspora populations, from which Iranian intelligence has historically recruited
- France's substantial Jewish community, the largest in Europe²⁵

²³ ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report: Pro-Iran Terrorism in Europe – SITREP #36, May 5, 2026

²⁴

[hXXps://www.theguardian\[.\]com/uk-news/2025/oct/24/six-britons-jailed-for-1m-arson-attack-on-warehouse-holding-aid-for-ukraine](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/oct/24/six-britons-jailed-for-1m-arson-attack-on-warehouse-holding-aid-for-ukraine)

²⁵ [hXXps://www.worldjewishcongress\[.\]org/en/about/communities/FR](https://www.worldjewishcongress[.]org/en/about/communities/FR)

- France's support for Israeli security and its participation in sanctions against Iran's nuclear program²⁶

ZeroFox assesses there is a roughly even chance HAYI or HAYI-aligned lone actors attempt at least one attack in France during the broader summit window, though the most probable targets remain Jewish community sites in Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg, or Marseille rather than the Évian perimeter itself. Additionally, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) almost certainly retains the ability to conduct direct, terrorist-style attacks against targets associated with any nation Iran views as enabling the war.

Protest Activity and Civil Unrest

France's protest culture is among the most active in Europe.

- Attac France, the Confédération Paysanne, and various autonomist networks have coordinated G7 counter-summits since 2003. The 2019 G7 in Biarritz saw these groups stage an anti-G7 counter-summit in Hendaye and Irun and clash with police in Bayonne.²⁷²⁸²⁹ Attac France is spreading awareness about other anti-G7 events in Geneva in 2026.³⁰
- Anti-globalization protests during the 2003 G8 produced violent clashes in Geneva and Lausanne, including the destruction of property in Geneva's Pâquis district and high-profile attacks on retail and fuel-station infrastructure.³¹ Organizers staging from the Swiss side can almost certainly mobilize without needing French authorization.
- The 2003 summit drew anti-G8 encampments to Annemasse and to villages on the Swiss side of the border.³² Comparable mobilization is likely in 2026, and both Annemasse and Thonon-les-Bains are within easy commuting distance.

²⁶ [hXXps://uk.diplomatie.gouv\[.\]fr/en/france-germany-and-uk-welcome-reimposition-iran-sanctions](https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-germany-and-uk-welcome-reimposition-iran-sanctions)

²⁷ [hXXps://www.confederationpaysanne\[.\]fr/actu.php](https://www.confederationpaysanne[.]fr/actu.php)

²⁸ [hXXps://www.cnews\[.\]fr/france/2019-08-20/pres-de-biarritz-un-contre-sommet-pour-sopposer-au-g7-870812](https://www.cnews[.]fr/france/2019-08-20/pres-de-biarritz-un-contre-sommet-pour-sopposer-au-g7-870812)

²⁹ [hXXps://www.confederationpaysanne\[.\]fr/rp_article.php?id=9157](https://www.confederationpaysanne[.]fr/rp_article.php?id=9157)

³⁰

[hXXps://france.attac\[.\]org/actus-et-medias/le-flux/article/du-13-au-17-juin-2026-mobilisons-nous-contre-le-g7-d-evian-et-son-monde](https://france.attac[.]org/actus-et-medias/le-flux/article/du-13-au-17-juin-2026-mobilisons-nous-contre-le-g7-d-evian-et-son-monde)

³¹

[hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2003/06/01/international/europe/switzerland-usually-calm-erupts-in-protest-of-g8-talks.html](https://www.nytimes[.]com/2003/06/01/international/europe/switzerland-usually-calm-erupts-in-protest-of-g8-talks.html)

³² [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2003/6/1/protesters-block-roads-near-g8-summit](https://www.aljazeera[.]com/news/2003/6/1/protesters-block-roads-near-g8-summit)

This G7 summit will almost certainly draw mobilization from multiple movement coalitions. However, protesting in Évian-les-Bains, France, is prohibited; accordingly, mobilization in Geneva, Annemasse, Thonon-les-Bains, and across the lake in Lausanne is more likely.³³

- NO G7, a counter-G7 coalition, lists its purpose as rejecting the “imperalist/extractivist/capitalist” system, particularly focusing on French and Swiss entities. The group claims to be organizing a multi-day demonstration against the G7 from June 13–17, with June 14 being the “big mobilization.” These activists plan to demonstrate in Geneva, Switzerland.³⁴

ZeroFox observed multiple groups disseminating content published by NO G7 on platforms such as Instagram and Telegram, indicating probable overlap and coordination between them. ZeroFox was unable to confirm a definite relationship linking these activist organizations, but these groups will likely participate, wholly or partially, in the planned mobilizations. Other groups that are likely to target the summit include BDS Genève,³⁵ NO G7 France,³⁶ Grève Féministe Genève,³⁷ Syndicat SSP Genève,³⁸ solidaritéS Genève,³⁹ Organisierte Autonomie Zürich,⁴⁰ Antifa Zuerich,⁴¹ Jeunesse Solidaire Genève,⁴² and Solidarité Tattes.⁴³

- **Pro-Palestinian movements:** Sustained, large-scale demonstrations across France since October 2023 have intensified following the February 2026 outbreak of war in Iran.⁴⁴ Protesters’ use of banners targeting G7 leaders perceived as enabling Israeli operations is very likely.

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[hXXps://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/g-7-summit-under-tight-security-on-both-sides-of-lake-geneva-a-head-of-expected-protest?ref=latest-headlines](https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/g-7-summit-under-tight-security-on-both-sides-of-lake-geneva-a-head-of-expected-protest?ref=latest-headlines)

³⁴ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/nog7_2026/](https://www.instagram.com/nog7_2026/)

³⁵ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/bdsgeneve/](https://www.instagram.com/bdsgeneve/)

³⁶ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/nog7france/](https://www.instagram.com/nog7france/)

³⁷ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/grevefeministegeneve/](https://www.instagram.com/grevefeministegeneve/)

³⁸ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/ssp_geneve/](https://www.instagram.com/ssp_geneve/)

³⁹ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/solidaritesge/](https://www.instagram.com/solidaritesge/)

⁴⁰ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/organisierte_autonomie_zh/](https://www.instagram.com/organisierte_autonomie_zh/)

⁴¹ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/antifa_zuerich/](https://www.instagram.com/antifa_zuerich/)

⁴² [hXXps://www.instagram.com/jeunesse_solidairege/](https://www.instagram.com/jeunesse_solidairege/)

⁴³ [hXXps://www.instagram.com/solidarite_tattes/](https://www.instagram.com/solidarite_tattes/)

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[hXXps://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/3/15/thousands-in-paris-protest-military-actions-in-iran-lebanon-and-palestine](https://www.aljazeera.com/video/newsfeed/2026/3/15/thousands-in-paris-protest-military-actions-in-iran-lebanon-and-palestine)

- **Climate movements** such as Extinction Rebellion France, Dernière Rénovation, Soulèvements de la Terre, and youth-led Fridays for Future networks will likely target the summit's climate agenda.
 - Air travel infrastructure has been a common target for environmentalist groups during previous summits. Groups such as Extinction Rebellion argue that the CO₂-emitting flights required to transport summit attendees flout the conference's stated climate commitments. Previous years have seen protesters block private jet terminals in multiple countries.⁴⁵ Geneva Airport's private aviation terminals and the Annecy and Lyon fixed-base operators are likely targets.

Domestic Political Opposition

Overall, France has experienced significant political unrest and polarization in recent years that has been attributed to government spending plans.

- In September 2025, an internet-based protest movement called “Bloquons Tout” (“block everything together”), reminiscent of the Gilets Jaunes (“Yellow Vests”), was referenced in nationwide protests.⁴⁶
 - The Yellow Vests protests began in 2018 when President Emmanuel Macron instituted a scheme to increase fuel taxes, sparking months of protests that morphed into wider protests over economic inequality and the cost of living.⁴⁷ Yellow Vests demonstrations still occur regularly, including during protests against raising the retirement age and in support of farm workers.⁴⁸
- In early January 2024, farmers in the south of France began a series of demonstrations and road blockades to protest against environmental regulations and cuts to agricultural subsidies. These actions gradually spread to the rest of

⁴⁵ [hXXps://www.dw\[.\]com/en/extinction-rebellion-climate-protesters-march-at-g7-summit/a-57861557](https://www.dw.com/en/extinction-rebellion-climate-protesters-march-at-g7-summit/a-57861557)

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[hXXps://www.connexionfrance\[.\]com/news/france-total-blockade-call-for-september-10-how-much-support-does-it-have/741189](https://www.connexionfrance.com/news/france-total-blockade-call-for-september-10-how-much-support-does-it-have/741189)

⁴⁷

[hXXps://www.bfmtv\[.\]com/auto/d-ou-vient-le-gilet-jaune-devenu-symbole-de-contestation_AN-201812140062.html](https://www.bfmtv.com/auto/d-ou-vient-le-gilet-jaune-devenu-symbole-de-contestation_AN-201812140062.html)

⁴⁸ [hXXps://reporterre\[.\]net/Reforme-des-retraites-et-ecologie-les-Gilets-jaunes-font-leur-rentree](https://reporterre.net/Reforme-des-retraites-et-ecologie-les-Gilets-jaunes-font-leur-rentree)

the country, culminating in a “siege” of Paris, with farmers blocking major motorways leading into the capital between January 29 and February 1, 2024.⁴⁹⁵⁰

- During the first half of 2023, the country witnessed at least 14 rounds of nationwide strikes and protests against President Macron’s centerpiece domestic reform, which raised the retirement age from 62 to 64 years. Large-scale demonstrations brought between 500,000 and 1.3 million people out onto the streets from January to June 2023 and turned violent in mid-March.⁵¹
 - The General Confederation of Labour (CGT), Force Ouvrière (FO), and other major union federations have continued post-2023 mobilization against pension reform implementation. Strike action timed to embarrass the French government during the high-profile summit is a documented pattern among protest leaders.

France’s parliament has had fragmented coalitions since the snap legislative elections of June–July 2024 produced no clear majority. The country has cycled through multiple prime ministers since, with budget and pension debates triggering recurring motions of no confidence. While unlikely, it is possible the G7 summit window will overlap with a confidence vote, a budget cycle, or a politically charged court decision involving senior figures.

- The Rassemblement National (RN) and La France Insoumise (LFI) opposition blocs will both likely use the G7 platform for political messaging, including via parliamentary procedural delay and counter-summit appearances.

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[hXXps://www.theguardian\[.\]com/world/2024/jan/29/french-farmers-drive-tractors-towards-paris-in-blockade-threat](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/29/french-farmers-drive-tractors-towards-paris-in-blockade-threat)

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[hXXps://www.rfi\[.\]fr/en/france/20240213-leading-french-farmers-union-warns-motorway-blockades-could-resume](https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240213-leading-french-farmers-union-warns-motorway-blockades-could-resume)

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[hXXps://www.lemonde\[.\]fr/politique/live/2023/01/10/reforme-des-retraites-en-direct-le-gouvernement-propose-de-decaler-l-age-legal-de-depart-a-64-ans-en-2030_6157310_823448.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/live/2023/01/10/reforme-des-retraites-en-direct-le-gouvernement-propose-de-decaler-l-age-legal-de-depart-a-64-ans-en-2030_6157310_823448.html)

Cyber Threats

ZeroFox assesses cyber risk to the G7 summit is the most likely disruptive vector. As of writing, ZeroFox has not identified any direct threats against the Hôtel Royal estate or French summit infrastructure on the deep and dark web (DDW); however, we have observed sustained threat activity against French and Swiss targets that is relevant to the summit. The G7 converges multiple threat actor motivations: nation-state intelligence collection against attending governments, ideologically motivated hacktivism against host and Western targets, opportunistic cybercrime against the lodging and travel ecosystem, and disinformation operations aimed at shaping narratives around the Iran war, Ukraine support, and U.S. economic policy toward China.

Pro-Iranian Threat Actors

The pro-Iranian cyber ecosystem that mobilized in response to the outbreak of war in Iran on February 28, 2026, remains one of the most active threats targeting governments attending the 2026 G7 Summit. Throughout the conflict, ZeroFox has observed a coordinated coalition operating under the "Cyber Islamic Resistance" banner made up of approximately 60 individual hacktivist groups, including Iranian state-aligned personas, pro-Russian groups, and other Middle Eastern or Asian sympathizer groups. Between February 28 and March 5, 2026, the coalition claimed DDoS attacks on at least 110 organizations across 16 countries.⁵² Activity has remained sustained through May 2026.

Groups previously documented targeting NATO members and likely to engage during the G7 include:

- **Handala Hack Team** – The most prominent collective observed to date during the Iran conflict, with reported links to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The group combines data exfiltration with ransomware, typically against Israeli and Western targets, and has issued direct death threats to Iranian dissidents.⁵³ France's substantial Iranian dissident population is a plausible target set.
- **FAD Team (Fatemiyoun Cyber Team)** – This group specializes in attacks on industrial control systems and media organizations. It has claimed Structured

⁵² ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report: Military Strikes on Iran – Cyber SITREP #4, March 13, 2026

⁵³ ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report: U.S. Military Strikes on Iran – Cyber SITREP #2, March 6, 2026

Query Language (SQL) injection and data leak operations against European outlets.⁵⁴

- **DieNet, RipperSec, Cyb3r Drag0nz, 313 Team, Sylhet Gang, and Evil Markhors** – These groups are DDoS- and defacement-focused hacktivists with documented Western targeting.⁵⁵⁵⁶

Pro-Russian Threat Actors

France's continued material support to Ukraine, the G7's leadership of backing for Ukraine, and France's public posture on long-range weapons transfers almost certainly make French targets a perennial focus for pro-Russian collectives.⁵⁷ Activity has often accelerated whenever French officials make high-profile statements on Ukraine.

- **NoName057(16)** – This group is a long-running DDoS collective that has repeatedly targeted French banking, transportation, and ministerial websites. Activity has correlated tightly with French aid announcements and Senate and National Assembly votes on Ukraine support packages.⁵⁸
- **KillNet and successor brands** – These collectives conduct persistent, low-sophistication DDoS attacks that are often coordinated with broader pro-Russian campaigns. Having emerged in 2022, KillNet targeted Western governments throughout 2022–2024 and has periodically conducted attacks against G7 countries.⁵⁹

The convergence of pro-Russian and pro-Iranian threat actor operational tempos almost certainly creates a denser cyber threat environment for the 2026 G7 than for any G7 summit since 2022.

⁵⁴ ZeroFox Needle: Cyber Operations Driven by U.S./Israel–Iran Tensions #4

⁵⁵ ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report: Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #23, March 14, 2026

⁵⁶ ZeroFox Needle: Cyber Operations Driven by U.S./Israel–Iran Tensions #4

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[hXXps://www.diplomatie.gouv\[.\]fr/en/the-ministry-in-action/action-for-peace-and-respect-for-human-rights/emergency-humanitarian-action/french-humanitarian-assistance-to-ukraine](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/the-ministry-in-action/action-for-peace-and-respect-for-human-rights/emergency-humanitarian-action/french-humanitarian-assistance-to-ukraine)

⁵⁸ ZeroFox Needle: Pro-Russian Threat Group Targets Undisclosed Water Supply System in France (NoName057(16)), December 25, 2025

⁵⁹ ZeroFox Needle: Pro-Russian Threat Groups Form New Alliance; Announcement of Potential Cyberattacks Targeting Ukraine-Based Entities, December 29, 2026

Disinformation and Influence Operations

France is almost certainly one of the most consistently targeted countries in Europe for state-sponsored influence operations. Russian-linked operations—including Doppelganger, Reliable Recent News (RRN), and Storm-1516—have repeatedly impersonated French newspapers *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération*, as well as French government websites, to seed fabricated narratives.⁶⁰ France has documented persistent campaigns since the war in Ukraine began.⁶¹ Iran, Russia, and domestic political factions all likely have motives to shape the G7 narrative.

Likely misinformation themes include:

- Fabricated leaks of G7 communiqué drafts intended to embarrass leaders
- Deepfake or doctored audio and video of leaders—particularly U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Macron—speaking about Ukraine, Iran, or economic policy toward China
- Amplification of authentic protest incidents to portray France as politically unstable
- Iranian narrative pressure tying G7 leaders to Israeli operations in the Iran conflict

⁶⁰

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2023/06/13/doppelganger-the-russian-disinformation-campaign-denied-by-france_6031227_13.html

⁶¹ <https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/>

Social Engineering, Phishing, and Brand Abuse

Every major international summit has the potential to attract a host of opportunistic threat actors in event-themed phishing, fraudulent registration sites, fake hotel booking platforms, and impersonations of accredited partners. Expect:

- Look-alike domains using the names "g7," "g7france," "elysee," "evian," "sommet," and "presidence."
- Fake accommodation and visa-processing portals targeting delegates routing around the French Presidency's official travel partners. Brand abuse targeting major event sponsors; hotel chains in Évian, Thonon-les-Bains, Annecy, Geneva, and Lausanne; and airline carriers serving GVA and LYS.
- Spear phishing against accredited journalists, NGO researchers, and country negotiators using stolen Élysée Palace and Quai d'Orsay document templates and forged correspondence from the G7 Presidency. SMS-based smishing campaigns leveraging French and Swiss mobile network infrastructure with French-language lures.

ZeroFox assesses with high confidence that G7-themed social engineering will begin no later than 90 days before the event and will continue at elevated volumes for 60 days after, as threat actors recycle harvested credentials and stolen personal data.

Recommendations

- Avoid third-party booking sites likely impersonating event partners. Treat any unsolicited communication referencing G7 logistics, accreditation, or accommodation as suspicious until verified through known channels. Spear phishing campaigns will likely use legitimate-looking Élysée Palace, Quai d'Orsay, and G7 Presidency templates.
- The NO G7 coalition has announced a multi-day Geneva mobilization from June 13–17, with June 14 designated as the "big mobilization" the day before the summit opens. Therefore, VIP-level delegates should prioritize accommodations inside the Évian perimeter (the Hôtel Royal estate or adjacent Évian Resort properties) rather

than overflow accommodations in Lausanne, Geneva, or Annemasse, both for perimeter security and to limit urban protest exposure.

- Plan cross-border transit with explicit border-check time buffers. Carry summit accreditation and government identification at all times on both sides of the French-Swiss border.
- Configure ZeroFox monitoring for G7-themed lookalike domains, executive impersonations, and brand abuse from threat actor groups such as Handala Hack Team and NoName057(16). Look-alike domains abusing "g7," "g7france," "elysee," and "evian," are very likely; watch for G7-themed posts across the DDW and Telegram.
- Enable multi-factor authentication on all delegate, sponsor, and partner accounts.
- On-the-ground attendees should use a known, reputable Virtual Private Network (VPN), avoid public Wi-Fi for sensitive work, and use burner devices for high-sensitivity engagements.
- Assume spear phishing payloads will reuse legitimate Élysée, Quai d'Orsay, and G7 Presidency templates; accredited journalists, NGO researchers, and country-negotiator personas are likely priority targets.

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%