



**| Flash |**

# **U.S. Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #8: March 5, 2026**

**F-2026-03-05a**

**Classification: TLP:CLEAR**

**Criticality: High**

**Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics**

**March 5, 2026**

## Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 4:00 AM (EST) on March 5, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

# | Flash | U.S. Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #8: March 5, 2026

## | Key Findings

- Israel continues to expand its presence in Lebanon, following a ground incursion in the south of the country. This is very likely the forward vanguard of a more robust ground invasion to establish a security zone.
- Iran reportedly attempted to bomb a U.S. military base in Qatar using two Su-25 bomber jets. This marks the first reported deployment of fixed-wing aircraft in offensive operations by Iran.
- The Strait of Hormuz (SoH) likely remains effectively closed. Although no official Iranian order to close the SoH has been made, threats against shipping have rendered the waterway closed, with only minimal traffic crossing the Strait.
- On March 4, 2026, the U.S. Senate voted against a bipartisan resolution to curb President Trump's war powers. The resolution, which was defeated largely along party lines, would have called a halt to U.S. operations against Iran without congressional approval.
- Iran is likely to continue striking its Arab neighbors, while also seeking a strategic alternative that can bypass regional interceptors. Iran likely has the stockpiles to

outlast regional defenses—which are much more expensive than Iran’s offensive options.

## **| Latest Details**

Israel continues to expand its presence in Lebanon, following a ground incursion in the south of the country.<sup>1</sup> While Israeli military leaders have referred to the current operations as defensive maneuvers, it is very likely the forward vanguard of a more robust ground invasion to establish a security zone. Israel has issued warning orders to residents in southern Lebanon, asking them to move north of the Litani River ahead of the incursion.<sup>2</sup> The area included in Israel’s warning order represents roughly 20 percent of Lebanese territory and indicates the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is likely planning to push further into Lebanon.

- While the IDF is unlikely to advance north of the Litani River, it will likely seek to establish a security zone deep into Lebanese territory.

Additionally, the Israeli Home Front Command issued updated guidelines on public gatherings and announced an easing of restrictions put in place following the onset of the war. The new guidelines are set to take effect at noon on March 5 and will allow gatherings of up to 50 people as long as shelters can be accessed quickly.<sup>3</sup> The easing of restrictions—and the fact that they also apply in the north—suggests the IDF very likely believes it has mitigated the majority of the imminent threat from both Iran and Hezbollah. While attacks are still likely, the slowing of Iranian missile attacks and the ground incursion into Lebanon likely give the Israeli government confidence in its ability to protect citizens.

Iran reportedly attempted to bomb a U.S. military base in Qatar using two Su-25 bomber jets. Qatari air defenses shot the planes down mere minutes before they were in range to

---

<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/3/israel-strikes-lebanons-beirut-again-hezbollah-launches-drones-at-israel>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg11pne0rro>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-eases-restrictions-on-public-as-rate-of-iranian-fire-declines/>

strike Al Udeid Air Base near the capital city of Doha.<sup>4</sup> This marks the first reported deployment of fixed-wing aircraft in offensive operations by Iran and likely demonstrates Iran's desire to find an attack strategy that can bypass interceptor systems.

Iran's strategy over the past few days has been to fire heavy volleys of drones, likely withholding its remaining ballistic missiles for a time when the United States and Gulf states deplete their interceptor stockpiles. The deployment of fixed-wing bombers suggests that, while Iran likely retains a relatively large number of ballistic missiles, there is a roughly even chance it is running lower on stockpiles than previously assessed.

- Using fixed-wing bombers is a riskier military tactic than firing drones or missiles, as they are more likely to be intercepted by regional air defenses.

Hundreds of Kurdish fighters have reportedly begun ground operations in Iran, staging from areas near the Iraqi border.<sup>5</sup> This comes one day after reports that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is arming Kurdish nationalists to incite a rebellion inside Iran. If confirmed, Iranian Kurds conducting ground operations would almost certainly support President Trump's stated aims of supporting an uprising of Iranians against the Islamic Republic.

The SoH likely remains effectively closed. Although no official Iranian order to close the SoH has been made, threats against shipping have rendered the waterway closed, with only minimal traffic crossing the Strait.

- At least 200 ships carrying oil, liquified natural gas (LNG), and various cargo are sitting at anchor off the coasts of producing nations in the Persian Gulf region.
- Hundreds of other vessels are stranded on the other side of the SoH in the Gulf of Oman.


The ships stranded on both sides of the SoH are very likely to create a strain on supply chains and lead to higher shipping costs globally. Given the size of Iran's assessed

---

<sup>4</sup> [hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2026/03/04/middleeast/qatar-downs-iran-bombers-us-base-intl](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/04/middleeast/qatar-downs-iran-bombers-us-base-intl)

<sup>5</sup> [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/middle-east/iran-news/article-888881](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-888881)

pre-war drone and anti-ship cruise missile stockpiles, Tehran can likely cause minor disruptions in SoH shipping for months, if hostilities persist that long.



**Shipping traffic in the SoH**

Source:

[https://news\[.\]sky\[.\]com/story/trumps-solutions-to-iranian-shipping-threat-leave-insurance-ector-unimpressed-13515171](https://news.sky.com/story/trumps-solutions-to-iranian-shipping-threat-leave-insurance-ector-unimpressed-13515171)

On March 4, 2026, the U.S. Senate voted against a bipartisan resolution to curb President Trump’s war powers.<sup>6</sup> The resolution, which was defeated largely along party lines, would have called a halt to U.S. operations against Iran without congressional approval. The vote suggests that, for the time being, Trump has the support of his own party (which represents a majority in the Senate); however, as the war continues, the president will likely face increasing political pressure to bring operations to a conclusion.

The logjam of stranded passengers in the region appears to be easing slightly.<sup>7</sup> Temporary airspace openings by civil aviation authorities, intermittent flights by airlines, and Western governments chartering flights to repatriate their citizens are likely all

---

6


<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/mar/04/us-israeli-iran-war-senate-vote-congress-prevent-trump>  
<sup>7</sup> <https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/04/travel/travel-advisories-middle-east-air-disruptions>

contributing to slightly reduce the number of civilians in Gulf states as Iran continues strikes against its Arab neighbors.

## **| Emerging Cyber Threats**

ZeroFox has continued to observe coordinated cyberattacks directed at Israel, the United States, and Western-aligned nations' infrastructure and private sector entities—primarily by pro-Iranian, pro-Islamic, and pro-Russian threat collectives. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and other countries perceived as supporting Israeli-American actions in Iran are being targeted by threat actors supporting the Iranian government. These cyber operations are not exclusively conducted by Iranian hackers; rather, it is a coalition of multinational actors that include Arab and Russian-linked groups. Statements by these actors frequently cite religious solidarity and a broader uniting opposition to Western countries as motivating factors.

- Pro-Iran ransomware collective Handala Hack claimed to have breached the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Israeli strategic think tank associated with the University of Tel Aviv.
- Threat collective Cyber Islamic Resistance claimed to have infiltrated the camera systems of the Meuhedet Insurance and Health Services Company in Tel Aviv, Israel. The pro-Iran hacktivist collective posted what appear to be screenshots of CCTV footage on its Telegram channel.



**Screenshot from Cyber Islamic Resistance Telegram channel**

*Source: ZeroFox Intelligence*

## **Conclusion**

U.S. military strategy has likely shifted to a focus on easing the shipping traffic stoppages across the SoH. The U.S. Navy has reportedly decimated the Iranian Navy, almost certainly in an effort to reduce threats to ships in the SoH area. Both the United States and Israel are also very likely to continue their strategic targeting of Iranian leadership, including attempts to locate and target potential successors to the slain former Supreme Leader.

Iran will almost certainly continue to conduct retaliatory attacks against Arab neighbors. It will very likely seek alternative attack strategies to bypass interceptor systems. However, Iran very likely has the stockpiles to outlast the region's defenses—which are much more expensive than Iran's offensive options.

## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

## **Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale**

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%