ZEROFOX **INTELLIGENCE**

| Flash |

Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #13: March 8, 2026

F-2026-03-08a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality:HIGH

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics, Hacktivism, Cyberattacks

March 8, 2026

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 07:45 AM (EST) on March 8, 2026; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

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| Key Findings

- Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian backtracked from his Saturday apology to regional neighbors for missile and drone attacks–clarifying that Tehran won't strike countries unless they support U.S. efforts to attack Iran; hardliners in the regime were reportedly upset over the president's apology, suggesting a likely rift among the governing elite.

- Iran is almost certainly seeking to degrade air defense capabilities across the region in an effort to force Gulf states to put pressure on the U.S. to end hostilities; radar sites associated with the U.S.-built Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems have been targeted by Iranian attacks in recent days–sites in Jordan and Saudi Arabia have reportedly been struck.

- Israel targeted Iranian oil facilities for the first time in the current conflict; strikes were conducted against at least three oil storage facilities–two in the Tehran area and one in Alborz province.

- Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) began cutting oil production on Saturday and declared force majeure–adding to cuts in oil production across the region–

additionally, both Iran and the combined U.S. and Israeli forces have struck desalination plants across the region.

- Iran is reportedly set to announce a new Supreme Leader later on Sunday (March 8). Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain Ali Khamenei, is the likely successor to his father–an indicator of regime stability and Tehran's willingness to prolong the conflict.

| Latest Details

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian backtracked from his Saturday apology to regional neighbors for missile and drone attacks–clarifying that Iran won't strike countries unless they support U.S. efforts to strike Iran.[1] Pezeshian's initial comments were in line with established Iranian policy–which maintains a desire for peaceful coexistence with its Arab neighbors–and his clarification is likely the result of struggles within Iranian leadership.

- Hardliners in the regime were reportedly upset over the president's apology,[2] suggesting a likely rift between officials that want to deescalate the conflict and those committed to a more defiant stance in the face of ongoing U.S. and Israeli airstrikes.

Despite the initial apology from President Pezeshkian, Iran continued to conduct strikes across the region. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have reported missile and drone interceptions.[345] In Kuwait City, the headquarters of the Public Institution for Social Security was struck–likely by an Iranian drone–leaving the high rise tower engulfed in flames on Sunday morning.[6]

Iran is almost certainly seeking to degrade air defense capabilities across the region in an effort to force Gulf states to put pressure on the U.S. to end hostilities. Radar sites

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[1] hXXps://edition[.]cnn[.]com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-07-26
[2] hXXps://understandingwar[.]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-7-2026/
[3] hXXps://x[.]com/AFP/status/2030507953418047541
[4] hXXps://x[.]com/moi_bahrain/status/2030520644455022983
[5] hXXps://x[.]com/moiuae/status/2030502212326305853
[6] hXXps://www[.]independent[.]co[.]uk/bulletin/news/kuwait-city-tower-fire-iran-israel-us-trump-b2934191.html

associated with the U.S.-built Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system have been targeted by Iranian attacks in recent days.

- Sites in Jordan and Saudi Arabia have reportedly been struck,[7] likely rendering those radars inoperable at this time.

- The THAAD system is not entirely dependent on these radars, but the strikes will almost certainly make the overall interceptor system less effective—at least until repairs get the radars back online.

## Strikes on Iranian Oil Infrastructure

Israel targeted Iranian oil facilities for the first time in the current conflict; strikes were conducted against at least three oil storage facilities—two in the Tehran area and one in Alborz province.[8] Iran likely generates about 50-75 percent of government income from oil sales—Israeli strikes against these facilities is almost certainly an effort to choke off Iran's revenue and limit their ability to rearm.

The expansion of targeting to oil infrastructure is also indicative of the U.S. and Israel progressing into a new phase of operations—with a likely shift of emphasis from air defenses and ballistic missile launchers to prevent reconstitution of Iran's damaged capabilities. There is a roughly even chance that both countries will further expand targeting to include industrial targets—such as those used in the manufacture of missiles and drones.

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[7] *Ibid.*

[8] hXXps://www[.]aljazeera[.]com/news/2026/3/8/israel-strikes-irans-oil-facilities-for-first-time-as-war-enters-ninth-day

U.S. and Israeli Strikes on Iran as of March 7, 2026
Source: Institute for the Study of War

Energy

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) began cutting oil production on Saturday and declared force majeure–adding to cuts in oil production across the region.[9] This development is almost certainly in response to Iran's open threats against oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), as well as the growing shortage of oil storage facilities due to the lack of exports since the beginning of the conflict.

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[9]

hXXps://www[.]reuters[.]com/business/energy/kuwait-cuts-oil-production-precaution-amid-iran-tensions-kpc-says-2026-03-07/

- Force majeure refers to a clause in most oil contracts that allows producers to suspend contractual obligations when events outside of their control prevent them from fulfilling their responsibilities.[10]

- Other oil producers in the region are likely to declare force majeure in the next two days, as exports continue to be disrupted by the effective closure of the SoH.

Desalination Plants

The conflict has further expanded into the realm of fresh water. In a region where 40-90 percent of drinking water comes from desalination plants,[11] targeting of these resources will likely present fresh challenges for countries across the region. Iran accused the United States of striking a desalination plant that supplied drinking water to 30 villages.[12]

- Additionally, Bahrain claimed an Iranian drone attack on one of its water desalination plants.[13]

- There are reportedly about 400 desalination plants in the Gulf region converting seawater into drinking water to roughly 100 million people.

There is a roughly even chance that further attacks against desalination plants–both in Iran and neighboring countries–will increase over the next few days. There is also a roughly even chance that the targeting of these plants, as well as disruption to the oil production that powers them, will lead to a drinking water shortage in the region.

| Cyber Landscape

Ideologically and politically motivated hacktivist groups aligned with Tehran continue DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) and other cyber attacks against perceived enemies of the current Iran regime and supporters of U.S. and Israeli military operations– "Handala Hack Team" and the "Cyber Islamic Resistance" continue to be the most vocal

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[10] hXXps://www[.]newsweek[.]com/what-is-force-majeure-gulf-companies-shut-down-oil-production-11637203

[11] hXXps://abcnews[.]com/International/wireStory/oil-built-persian-gulf-desalinated-water-alive-war-130871867

[12] hXXps://www.theguardian[.]com/world/live/2026/mar/07/middle-east-crisis-live-tehran-explosions-beirut-trump-israel-iran-war-second-week?CMP=share_btn_url&page=with%3Ablock-69ac81cd8f089ad2051867cb#block-69ac81cd8f089ad2051867cb

[13] hXXps://x[.]com/moi_bahrain/status/2030524895033962661

and active threat collectives promoting and conducting cyber attacks. On March 7, Handala Hack Team claimed to have conducted "an unprecedented and sophisticated cyber operation" targeting Jerusalems's water supply infrastructure as a response to the attack against Iran's Qeshm desalination plant; the collective claimed to exfiltrate 423 GB of allegedly "highly classified and sensitive data", and disrupt its core infrastructure.

- "Cyber Islamic Resistance" claimed to attack Prima Park Hotel in Tel Aviv, Israel, gaining access to the hotel's control systems and locked its doors, disrupting electricity and water supply; the group also claimed to access the control systems connected Haifa's power station – such claims have not been independently verified and are likely fabricated or exaggerated.

- Threat collective "DieNet" claimed to target the official log in portal of an Israeli government's website and also claimed to target entities in Azerbaijan; the collective previously stated that it would attack Azerbaijan by citing its "excessive and ongoing cooperation with Israel and America."

DieNet's Telegram Post Regarding their Targeting of Azerbaijan Entities
Source: ZeroFox Intelligence

- Threat collective "BD Anonymous Team" claimed to have targeted the official site of a Qatari government employment platform and the website of Israel's Aromadia Israel (a dynamic content company) in DDoS attacks.

Although attacks against Iranian entities have also been observed to be lesser in volume, there is a roughly even chance that Iran's continuing internet blackout is responsible for the comparatively lower volume of attacks targeting entities in Iran and originating from threat actors based out of Iran.

ZeroFox assesses that the digital front in this conflict is likely to continue experiencing an abundance of exaggerated claims, such as DDoS attacks, breaches, and critical infrastructure network disruptions. Threat collectives are very likely to expand their targeting scope as different countries either align with Western and Israeli military efforts or condemn the attacks against Iran.

| New Leader to be Announced

Iran is reportedly set to announce a new Supreme Leader later on Sunday (March 8). Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain Ali Khamenei, is the likely successor to his father—an indicator of regime stability and Tehran's willingness to prolong the conflict. Mojtaba Khamenei is likely the choice of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and his appointment would indicate hardliners have successfully consolidated power in the Iranian regime.

- Alternatively, the appointment of a more moderate candidate—such as Hasaan Khomeini, grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic—would likely indicate a desire among Iran's governing elite to deescalate and seek an end to hostilities.

The U.S. and Israel will almost certainly continue to escalate their strikes against Iranian industrial and oil infrastructure. These escalations are likely an effort to put pressure on the Iranian government to appoint a moderate Supreme Leader and begin negotiations

to end the war–following President Trump's calls on Saturday for Iran's "unconditional surrender."

- Iran will likely continue striking Gulf states in an effort to force pressure on the U.S. to end hostilities as Gulf states continue to express displeasure with Iran and solidarity with U.S. operations against Tehran.

- Despite deescalatory rhetoric, Iran's targeting strategy–including interceptor radars and desalination plants–suggests Tehran is likely settling in for a prolonged conflict.

| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

Red

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may NOT share

TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

Amber

Sources may use

TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

Recipients may ONLY share

TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that

TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

Green

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may share

TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

Clear

Sources may use

TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

Recipients may share

TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%