



NATO Summit

| Event Assessment |

Introduction

The 2023 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit will be held in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023. This key annual meeting brings together heads of state and government from the 31 member countries of the alliance. The summit is expected to mark a crucial juncture in NATO's ongoing evolution and expansion following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

During a preliminary meeting in Bratislava on June 6, 2023, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg outlined several main items that NATO members plan to discuss next month: stronger commitment to increased defense spending, Sweden's successful inclusion in the alliance, and a multi-year assistance package for Kiev, as well as next steps in the NATO-Ukraine political relationship.

The Russian government represents the main potential threat to this event. The government of Russian President Vladimir Putin views the NATO alliance as its primary geopolitical adversary and is likely to deploy a variety of "hybrid warfare" tools and techniques in an effort to disrupt the summit. This includes astroturfed protests and disruptive acts, hacktivist campaigns by Kremlin-affiliated groups, cyberattacks from threat actors linked to Russian intelligence services, and aggressive maneuvers by military forces stationed in the region.

While Lithuania is considered overall to be a safe country—and major acts of terrorism or violence are unlikely—there are still physical security concerns. Vilnius has never hosted an international event of this scale and importance, raising the possibility of unexpected organizational and logistical issues. It is also a relatively small city, both in terms of population level and size of the central metropolitan area. The high number of visitors could put a strain on the limited accommodations and modest transportation infrastructure within the capital.



Source:
[hXXps://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/200295772/](https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Photos/igphoto/200295772/)

Key Threats



Disruptive activity by members of Russian minority or security services operatives is likely.



Summit accommodations are inadequate.



Expect an escalation of tensions between Russian Federation and NATO countries.



Hacktivism campaigns by Kremlin-affiliated groups are possible.



Russian threat actors are the most likely source for a nation-state cyberattack.



No terroristic threats have currently been observed in association with the event.

Key Findings

- Protests and other forms of disruptive activity by Russian-affiliated actors and groups are likely.
- A further deterioration of diplomatic relations between NATO members and the Russian government is expected due to the summit's location and agenda.
- Accommodations are limited and expensive. The transportation system and hospitality sector in Vilnius will be strained for the duration of the NATO meeting.
- There is a moderate risk of cyberattack or hacking operations by threat actors linked to Russian intelligence agencies.
- Politically-motivated hacktivism is also expected in the lead up to and during the NATO meeting.
- The threat of terrorism to the summit is currently considered low. Nevertheless, the risk can never be completely ruled out given the visibility and significance of this international event.





Broader Geopolitical Context

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 revitalized an alliance that was considered moribund or even “brain dead” following the disintegration of the USSR.[1] At the 2022 Summit in Madrid, NATO leaders issued a “strategic concept” declaration for the first time in decades and pledged to increase the number of high-readiness forces stationed in eastern Europe from 40,000 to 300,000.[2] The war in the East also pushed Sweden and Finland to want to join the alliance, reversing a decades-long policy of neutrality vis-à-vis Russia. Despite its unexpected growth and renewed sense of purpose, NATO still faces considerable challenges. The upcoming summit will seek to address some of the serious issues confronting the alliance, particularly with regards to defense spending levels, continued opposition to Sweden’s accession, and disagreements over Ukraine’s eventual membership.

Despite the growing threats to global peace, most NATO members did not significantly improve their military capabilities in the past year. In 2022, only seven countries within the alliance spent the target 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.[3] This has been a chronic problem since the end of the Cold War and continues to cause friction between the United States and many of its European allies. Moreover, even larger, more economically developed NATO countries such as Great Britain, Germany, and France are struggling to modernize their armed forces and ramp up weapons.[4]

Finland and Sweden’s recent efforts to join NATO have led to significant tensions within the alliance. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey delayed the membership bids of both nations, claiming that they harbored alleged terrorists from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In addition, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban raised objections to Sweden’s accession due to prior disagreements between the two countries over the issue of democratic backsliding in eastern Europe. Following concessions from Helsinki, the Turkish Parliament voted in favor of Finnish membership in March 2023.[5] However, neither Turkey nor Hungary have ratified Sweden’s application.[6] While there is considerable speculation that the two countries will withdraw their objections at the upcoming Vilnius meeting, nothing definitive has been confirmed. Finland’s accession into the alliance was officially approved by all NATO countries on April 4, 2023.[7]

Finally, the 2023 summit will seek to address the difficult question of Ukraine’s future role in the alliance. Although many NATO countries have provided Kiev with significant military aid, there is no consensus regarding the evolution of this relationship going forward. In recent weeks, leaders of France, Poland, and the Baltic states have expressed support for stronger “security guarantees” and a concrete roadmap for Ukraine’s eventual membership. In contrast, Germany and other countries still advocate for a more cautious approach, especially in light of the ongoing conflict.[8]

Geographic Location

The selection of Vilnius, Lithuania, as the host city for this summit is significant for several reasons. This is the first time the annual NATO meeting has been held in a former Soviet republic and only the second time NATO leadership has collectively gathered in eastern Europe since the 2016 NATO Summit in Poland.

In addition, Lithuania shares a border with both Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, making it one of the states that is most vulnerable to broader Russian aggression in the region. The choice of venue is meant to reaffirm NATO’s lasting commitment to protecting the Baltic states and eastern Europe more broadly.

However, the decision to hold this event in Vilnius will likely be interpreted by Russia as a deliberate provocation. President Vladimir Putin and many of his close associates have repeatedly characterized the war in Ukraine as part of a larger conflict between Russia and NATO.[9] Witnessing the leaders of this hostile military alliance gather together on Russia’s “doorstep” will only reaffirm this narrative.



Source: CIA.gov

Assessment:

- Since 2014, Russia has taken an increasingly aggressive military stance in the Baltic region, repeatedly testing the defenses of NATO countries. This includes frequent violations of national airspace, numerous close encounters at sea, and even the cross-border abduction of an Estonian security service agent.[10] In 2022, NATO countries in the region registered a significant escalation of incidents involving Russian bombers and fighter planes. In response, NATO jets were scrambled 570 times during the last year, which constitutes roughly double the number of intercepts that took place in 2021.[11]
- In addition, on June 17, 2023, President Putin confirmed that Russian tactical nuclear weapons are now stationed in Belarus, marking the first such deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to a neighboring country since 1991.[12]
- There is also a possibility of Russian incursions into Lithuanian airspace or territorial waters as well as other threatening military maneuvers in the larger Baltic region during the NATO meeting.

Recommendations:

- In case of emergency, follow alerts and instructions from summit organizers.

FOOTNOTES

[1] <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead>
[2] <https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/08/26/nato-holds-its-most-important-summit-for-decades>
[3] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/oe-39-allies-met-nato-military-spending-target-2022-stoltenberg-2023-03-21/>
[4] <https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/05/07/europe-is-struggling-to-rebuild-its-military-clout>
[5] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/after-finland-joins-nato-why-is-turkey-making-sweden-wait-2023-04-04/>

[6] <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/29/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-sweden-nato.html>
[7] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213448.htm
[8] <https://www.political.eu/article/olaf-scholz-emmanuel-macron-andrzej-duda-ukraine-in-paris-to-discuss-security-guarantees/>
[9] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29956277>
[10] <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-nato-intercepts-2022/32264186.html>
[11] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65932700>



Physical Safety

This is the first time Lithuania will host a NATO summit. Government officials describe the upcoming international gathering as the “biggest and most important event” in the country’s history.[13] This meeting promises to bring together an estimated 3,000 governmental visitors from 50 official delegations as well as 2,000 non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives and members of the press.[14] Several prominent world leaders have announced plans to attend, including U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, French President Emmanuel Macron, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Given these factors, organizers have implemented a number of enhanced security measures.

Lithuania’s Chief of Defense Valdemaras Rupšys has allocated more than 3,000 soldiers to protect venues and attendees during the summit.[15] The Lithuanian military will coordinate this effort with allied security agencies and armed forces. This includes the deployment of a Patriot long-range air defense system by the German Army, which will be transferred from Slovakia to Lithuania for the duration of the event.[16] The Lithuanian Interior Ministry also announced that it will temporarily suspend Schengen Area free-movement provisions and reinstate border controls at checkpoints between Latvia and Poland, as well as at airports and seaports, between 8:00 AM on July 7 and 8:00 AM on July 13, 2023 (local time).[17]

The Lithuanian Exhibition and Congress Centre (LITEXPO) is the main venue for the 2023 NATO Summit. The facility is located within the Lazdynai Eldership, a neighborhood on the western periphery of the capital. The Vilnius municipal government has announced traffic and mobility restrictions in the area surrounding the conference center as well as in Old Town and the Naujamiestis Eldership.[18]

A number of measures will be enacted to protect Lithuanian airspace for the duration of the summit. All flights over Vilnius will be prohibited from 12:00 PM on July 11 to 2:00 PM on July 12, 2023 (local time). Due to these restrictions, Lithuanian authorities anticipate a higher number of disruptions and delays at the Vilnius and Kaunas airports in the days preceding and following the NATO meeting. In addition, all flights of small aircraft, balloons, and drones over Lithuanian territory will be prohibited between July 7 and July 13, 2023.[19]

Accommodation Issues

With a population of just over 500,000, Vilnius is a relatively small city and is unaccustomed to hosting international events of this scale. According to Evalda Šiškauskienė, President of the Association of Hotels and Restaurants, the existing lodging within the capital itself might not be sufficient to accommodate all the expected guests. This may potentially force some members of delegations to make reservations in adjacent towns.[20] Given the substantially increased level of demand, visitors should also expect to pay higher rates for hotel stays during these days.

Attendees can get around Vilnius using public transportation, which will be free from July 10–13 and primarily consists of a municipal bus system.[22] Only vehicles with special permits will be granted entry into the restricted zones. All other forms of transport, including taxis, bicycles, and scooters, will not be allowed in these areas of the city.[22]

The decision to seal off Old Town Vilnius during the summit may present another challenge. Most bars and restaurants are concentrated in this neighborhood, raising concerns regarding the difficulty of transporting necessary supplies or possible barriers to entry for staff traveling from other parts of the city.

Lastly, the official map showing all of the mobility and transportation restrictions within the capital has thus far only been published in Lithuanian, complicating advance planning for non-native visitors.[23]

Terrorism

Although Lithuania deployed military forces in both the Afghan and Iraq wars, the country has not historically been a target for radical Islamic terrorist organizations (or extremist groups of any other affiliation). ZeroFox has identified no evidence of terrorist threats made against the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius. However, international meetings of this nature with a global audience and mass-gathering of prominent government officials represent an attractive target for terrorist actors.

Assessment:

- Vilnius, particularly the city center, is generally considered a low-crime area.
- Heavy security investment from the Lithuanian government and international partners will make it difficult for terror groups to conduct attacks.

Recommendations:

- Keep personal belongings, including passports, somewhere that they cannot be easily pickpocketed.
- If suspicious activity is observed, report it to law enforcement officials.

FOOTNOTES

[13] <https://vilnius.lt/en/2023/05/29/ahead-of-the-nato-summit-in-vilnius-what-vilnius-residents-and-visitors-need-to-know/>
[14] <https://t.usembassy.gov/message-for-u-s-citizens-nato-summit-in-vilnius-july-11-12-2023/>
[15] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1965786/over-2-000-troops-will-ensure-security-during-vilnius-nato-summit>
[16] <https://www.reuters.com/world/germany-move-slovakia-based-patriot-system-lithuania-protect-nato-summit-2023-05-26/>
[17] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2002054/lithuania-to-reinstate-checks-on-borders-with-poland-latvia-for-nato-summit>
[18] <https://nato.vilnius.lt/en/>
[19] <https://www.vilnius-airport.lt/en/before-the-flight/nato#:~:text=How%3F-On%2011%2D12%20July%2C%20during%20the%20NATO%20summit%20in%20Lithuania,2%20pm%20on%2012%2D13%20July>


[20] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1965786/roadblocks-and-no-fly-zone-vilnius-braces-for-nato-summit-disruptions>
[21] <https://vilnius.lt/en/2023/06/12/during-the-nato-summit-everyone-will-travel-free-of-charge-on-public-transport-in-vilnius/>
[22] <https://vilnius.lt/en/2023/06/29/ahead-of-the-nato-summit-in-vilnius-what-vilnius-residents-and-visitors-need-to-know/>
[23] <https://nato.vilnius.lt/en/traffic-restrictions/>



Protests and Disruptive Activity

The main threat of protests during the upcoming NATO summit comes from Russian-affiliated actors. The Putin government has a long history of deliberately fomenting discontent in neighboring countries to advance its geopolitical goals, especially in former Soviet republics with significant Russian-speaking minorities. The first known instance of this practice occurred in 2007, when Estonia was rocked by a series of violent protests surrounding the removal of a WWII memorial from the Tallinn city center.[24] Widespread demonstrations by pro-Russian groups in Ukraine presaged the 2014 annexation of Crimea and began armed clashes in the east of the country.[25] More recently, in June 2023, the U.S. State Department sanctioned seven Russian citizens linked to exiled Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor. These individuals are accused of engaging in a variety of efforts to spark mass unrest in Moldova and destabilize its pro-Western government.[26] Russian security services involvement is strongly suspected in all of these incidents. More broadly, hybrid operations of this type constitute part of the Putin regime's larger covert effort to influence politics in eastern Europe and other regions.

Russia may have also played a role in orchestrating an international scandal that jeopardized Sweden's bid to join NATO. In January 2023, far-right politician and anti-Islam provocateur Rasmus Paludan publicly burned a Qur'an in front of Turkey's embassy in Stockholm. It was later revealed that Chang Frick, a former contributor for the Moscow-run propaganda channel Russia Today (RT), paid for the official permit required for public demonstrations of this kind.[27] In the following days, President Erdogan strongly condemned the Qur'an burning and stated that countries that "allow such blasphemy in front of our embassy can no longer expect our support for their Nato membership." [28]



Rasmus Paludan burning Qur'an in front of Turkish Embassy in Stockholm
Source: Getty

As of 2023, ethnic Russians comprise just 5 percent of Lithuania's population.[29] This is a significantly smaller proportion than in Estonia and Latvia, where a quarter of the inhabitants are of Russian descent.[30] In addition, an estimated 3,000 Russian citizens have established residency in Lithuania over the past year, despite visa restrictions passed by the government in May 2022.[31] Members of this national minority have reported frequent expressions of animosity and suspicion on the part of the larger Lithuanian population, particularly in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[32]

Unlike Estonia, Lithuania has not experienced widespread unrest on the part of its Russian community in the past. However, this does not mean that such disturbances will not occur going forward, especially during a key event like the upcoming NATO summit. Aside from deploying operatives to foment discontent, the Putin regime has also adeptly used state propaganda to exacerbate existing social tensions in neighboring countries. Although Lithuania blocked cable access to Russian television channels in late February 2022, online viewing of these media sources remained possible until further censorship measures were enacted on March 16, 2023.[33]

Lastly, since the start of the year, several NATO countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany have witnessed protests criticizing the alliance—especially its continued military assistance to Ukraine. These have been relatively small-scale events bringing together between several hundred to a few thousand participants, with the largest gathering occurring in Berlin in February 2023.[34] Given the overwhelming support for NATO in the Baltic states, it is highly unlikely that members of the majority Lithuanian population will engage in any demonstrations against the alliance during the summit.

Assessment:

- Demonstrations by disaffected members of the Russian minority population or provocations involving Moscow-linked operatives are possible.

Recommendations:

- Avoid public areas where disruptions or protests are occurring, as such actions could draw a response from security personnel or counter-protestors and lead to scuffles or greater violence.

FOOTNOTES

[24] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/27/russia>
[25] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/pro-russian-separatists-in-eastern-ukraine-were-nobodies-until-now/2014/04/30/c504e687-c7a7-40c3-a8bb-7c1b9cf718ac_story.html
[26] <https://www.reuters.com/world/us-sanctions-target-russian-influence-campaign-moldova-2023-06-05/>
[27] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/27/burning-of-quran-in-stockholm-funded-by-journalist-with-kremlin-ties-sweden-nato-russia>
[28] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/24/sweden-can-not-expect-turkeys-support-for-nato-membership-erdogan-warns>
[29] <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/lithuania/#people-and-society>
[30] <https://www.ncb.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7329269/>


[31] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1967918/despite-visa-bans-russian-residents-in-lithuania-on-the-rise>
[32] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1285073/lithuania-s-russians-torn-between-two-countries-i-need-to-prove-that-i-belong-here>
[33] <https://www.irt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1939384/lithuania-blocks-online-access-of-sanctioned-russian-media>
[34] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/protest-berlin-over-arming-ukraine-against-russia-draws-thousands-2023-02-25/>



Hacktivism

ZeroFox Intelligence assesses with high confidence that politically-motivated hacktivists will attempt to disrupt the 2023 NATO summit. Over the past few weeks, pro-Kremlin collectives such as KillNet, NoName, and other groups have intensified their operations against government websites and critical infrastructure in Western countries.


This includes cyberattacks targeting four Dutch ports, as well as the armed forces and railways of Switzerland—both of which took place in mid-June 2023 after the Netherlands announced it was purchasing arms from Switzerland to send to Ukraine.[35] In addition, France's foreign minister recently accused Moscow-linked threat actors of engaging in a covert effort to manipulate French and German digital media sources.[36] Each of these cyber incidents constitutes part of an ongoing effort to punish Western countries for providing material and diplomatic assistance to Ukraine.



Source:
[hXXps://nl.times.nl/2023/06/14/dutch-ports-websites-offline-hours-days-due-pro-russian-cyber-attacks](https://nl.times.nl/2023/06/14/dutch-ports-websites-offline-hours-days-due-pro-russian-cyber-attacks)

In the past, hacktivist groups such as KillNet have mostly employed relatively low-grade cyber tools and tactics such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and website defacements. While these incidents receive significant media attention, they usually have limited impact, causing short service outages and briefly disrupting access to information. Killnet almost exclusively utilizes DDoS attacks but claimed to have disrupted NATO aircraft in early 2023, when NATO was assisting with earthquake relief in Turkey.[37]

Since Ukraine began its counteroffensive to reclaim territory lost to Russia, ZeroFox has observed an uptick in cyber activity by pro-Russian groups like NoName and KillNet. These groups have mainly targeted the public and private sectors of countries that have demonstrated support for Ukraine either through financial or military aid.[38] Given the NATO summit will likely include further announcement of aid for Ukraine, the probability of cyberattacks targeting summit attendees or those who make pledges of support are highly likely.



Source: ZeroFox Intelligence

Kremlin-affiliated hacktivists typically announce their intended targets in advance. Moreover, the subsequent attacks are often not as disruptive as initially threatened. For instance, on June 14, 2023, KillNet and several affiliated collectives published videos and posts on Telegram in which they threatened to unleash a “destructive campaign” against the European financial system within the next 48 hours.[39] This was followed by a standard DDoS attack against websites belonging to the European Investment Bank (EIB) on June 19, 2023.[40]

As of the latest reporting, the best known pro-Russian groups have not posted any threats against the upcoming NATO summit. This does not mean that they will not do so as the date of the event approaches.

FOOTNOTES

- [35] [hXXps://www.swisinfo.ch/eng/pro-russian-hackers-step-up-attacks-against-swiss-targets/46588976](https://www.swisinfo.ch/eng/pro-russian-hackers-step-up-attacks-against-swiss-targets/46588976)
- [36] [hXXps://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-la-france-denonce-une-campagne-de-desinformation-en-provenance-de-russie-20230613](https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-la-france-denonce-une-campagne-de-desinformation-en-provenance-de-russie-20230613)
- [37] ZeroFox Internal Collections
- [38] ZeroFox Internal Collections
- [39] [hXXps://technomonitor.lu/technology/cybersecurity/killnet-revil-and-anonymous-threaten-swift-with-destructive-attack-in-48-hours](https://technomonitor.lu/technology/cybersecurity/killnet-revil-and-anonymous-threaten-swift-with-destructive-attack-in-48-hours)
- [40] [hXXps://www.luxtimes.lu/luxembourg/cyberattack-targets-european-investment-bank/1698606.html](https://www.luxtimes.lu/luxembourg/cyberattack-targets-european-investment-bank/1698606.html)



Cybersecurity Threats

Cyber espionage units affiliated with Russian intelligence agencies represent the most significant threat to the upcoming NATO meeting. Since the mid-2000s, Western experts have identified several particularly dangerous Russia-based Active Persistent Threat (APT) groups. This includes APT28 (known as “Fancy Bear”), a cyber espionage unit linked to Russia’s General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and APT29 (known as “Cozy Bear”), which is believed to be run by either the Federal Security Service (FSB) or the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[41]

Both entities have repeatedly targeted NATO servers, websites, officials, military personnel, and diplomats. Most recently, in April 2023, hackers linked to Russian intelligence services launched a series of wide-ranging phishing and malware attacks against NATO and European Union (EU) countries. The threat actors are believed to have exploited vulnerabilities in HTML files and Windows systems to gain access to a number of sensitive email accounts within the alliance.[42]

While Russian cyberattacks declined in scale and sophistication in the months following the invasion of Ukraine, many analysts now fear that Kremlin-aligned hacking groups have successfully restored or improved many of their capabilities.[43] It is therefore likely that cyber espionage units like APT28 and APT29 will engage in renewed efforts to target Western governments and institutions, especially during an important gathering like the 2023 NATO Summit.

> Assessment:

- Kremlin-linked APTs may use this opportunity to launch phishing, malware, or other cyber operations against NATO officials or networks.

> Recommendations:

- Summit attendees are advised to take every possible precaution to minimize risk.
- This includes requiring multi-factor authentication to access systems, installing up-to-date security programs, consulting with cybersecurity professionals regarding potential vulnerabilities, creating offline backups of sensitive data, and training personnel to practice proper cyber hygiene.

APPENDIX:

Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

TLP: RED

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party’s privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may NOT share TLP: RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

TLP: AMBER

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may ONLY share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that
TLP: AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

TLP: GREEN

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

TLP: CLEAR

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may share TLP: CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

About ZeroFox

ZeroFox (Nasdaq: ZFOX), an enterprise software-as-a-service leader in external cybersecurity, has redefined security outside the corporate perimeter on the internet, where businesses operate and threat actors thrive. The ZeroFox platform combines advanced AI analytics, digital risk and privacy protection, full-spectrum threat intelligence, and a robust portfolio of breach, incident, and takedown response capabilities to expose and disrupt phishing and fraud campaigns, botnet exposures, credential theft, impersonations, data breaches, and physical threats that target your brands, domains, people, and assets. Join thousands of customers—including some of the largest public-sector organizations, as well as finance, media, technology, and retail companies—to stay ahead of adversaries and address the entire lifecycle of external cyber risks.

See ZeroFox in action

zerofox.com/demo | zerofox.com

Get in touch with us today

sales@zerofox.com | 855.736.1400

FOOTNOTES

[41] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, *The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia’s Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries* (New York: Public Affairs, 2015)

[42] <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-hackers-linked-to-widespread-attacks-targeting-nato-and-eu/>

[43] <https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/03/29/russian-hackers-are-preparing-for-a-new-campaign-in-ukraine>