



| Flash |

Israel and Hamas Agree to Parts of New Ceasefire

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Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitical

October 9, 2025

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 10:15 AM (EDT) on October 9, 2025; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

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| Key Findings

- Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of a ceasefire, which will see the remaining Israeli hostages held in Gaza freed by October 13, 2025. While this phase is likely to proceed as planned, there is only a roughly even chance that the remainder of the deal will go forward.
- The remaining parts of the deal contain likely unpalatable elements for both Israel and Hamas, including Hamas' disarmament and the delineation of a pathway to the creation of a Palestinian state.

| Analyst Commentary

On October 8, 2025, Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire which will see the remaining hostages held in Gaza—including the 20 believed to be alive—released in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. Although bombing has continued in Gaza, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to approve the accord later today.¹

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[hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/cabinet-to-vote-on-gaza-deal-at-6-p-m-hostage-release-timeline-still-unclear/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/cabinet-to-vote-on-gaza-deal-at-6-p-m-hostage-release-timeline-still-unclear/)

- According to several sources, Hamas will then release the hostages over the next 72–96 hours.²³ The agreement also stipulates that Israeli forces will withdraw from a number of positions in Gaza, while leaving the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) still in control of approximately half of the territory.⁴
- According to senior Hezbollah officials, Israeli forces are expected to begin to withdraw from Gaza City, Rafah, and Khan Younis on October 10, 2025.⁵
 - Further withdrawals will be based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to the demilitarization of Hamas.⁶

| Conclusion

Although the agreement is based on the 20-point plan presented by the Trump administration last week, it represents only “phase one.” During talks, negotiators refrained from discussing the more difficult and likely contentious portions of the proposal, including the disarmament of Hamas, the future government of Gaza, and the creation and deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force to the enclave. The timing of future negotiations and the potential initialization of those steps is also unclear at the timing of writing.

While most of Netanyahu’s government is supportive of the ceasefire, far-right Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich announced that he will vote against the agreement and threatened to pull his party from the governing coalition, potentially leaving the Israeli government without a majority as it moves forward with the process. Similarly, reports indicate that Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir may also vote against the ceasefire.⁷⁸ A defection from either party leader could eliminate Netanyahu’s

² [hXXps://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/2025-10-09/live-updates-869844](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/2025-10-09/live-updates-869844)

³ [hXXps://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/415999](https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/415999)

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[hXXps://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/10/09/israel-and-hamas-agree-to-the-first-phase-of-donald-trump-s-peace-plan](https://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/10/09/israel-and-hamas-agree-to-the-first-phase-of-donald-trump-s-peace-plan)

⁵ [hXXps://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-agreement-10-09-25](https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-hamas-gaza-ceasefire-agreement-10-09-25)

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[hXXps://news.sky.com/story/gaza-peace-deal-netanyahu-hails-critical-turning-point-as-hamas-agrees-to-release-hostages-13447225](https://news.sky.com/story/gaza-peace-deal-netanyahu-hails-critical-turning-point-as-hamas-agrees-to-release-hostages-13447225)

⁷ [hXXps://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-869883](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-869883)

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[hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-he-will-oppose-hostage-deal-as-his-party-weighs-quitting-the-government/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-he-will-oppose-hostage-deal-as-his-party-weighs-quitting-the-government/)

parliamentary majority and force new elections that polling suggests he would lose.⁹ However, opposition parties have offered to step in and maintain Netanyahu's majority, thus nullifying the threat from far-right parties for the time being.

Moreover, in agreeing to release the hostages, Hamas has surrendered nearly all of its leverage to force further Israeli concessions. This leaves the international community, and in particular the United States, as the only force pushing Israel to move forward to the next phases, which include a pathway to a Palestinian state—something the Israeli government and public is very likely loath to accept.¹⁰

Therefore, there remains a roughly even chance that the parties to the ceasefire agreement will reach an impasse, leading to the resumption of the war in the medium term.

- Speaking ahead of the deal, Netanyahu reportedly stated that in the agreement's second stage, "Hamas will be disarmed and the Strip demilitarized. This will happen either via a diplomatic route according to the Trump Plan – or via a military route by us."¹¹

⁹ [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/israel-news/article-869328](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-869328)

¹⁰ [hXXps://news.gallup\[.\]com/poll/695582/peace-distant-prospect-israelis-palestinians.aspx](https://news.gallup[.]com/poll/695582/peace-distant-prospect-israelis-palestinians.aspx)

¹¹ [hXXps://www.gov\[.\]il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-4-oct-2025](https://www.gov[.]il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-4-oct-2025)

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%