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# **U.S. Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #7: March 4, 2026**

**F-2026-03-04b**

**Classification: TLP:CLEAR**

**Criticality: High**

**Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics**

**March 4, 2026**

## Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were *identified prior to 2:00 PM (EST) on March 4, 2026*; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

# | Flash | U.S. Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #7: March 4, 2026

## | Key Findings

- U.S. President Donald Trump offered assurances to the commercial shipping sector in the Middle East. The U.S. State Department announced that it would send chartered planes to select Middle Eastern countries to transport U.S. citizens. Meanwhile, Iran continued to signal it is prepared for a lengthy conflict. To this end, Houthis in Yemen remain on the sidelines but likely retain the ability to expand the war's impacts on commercial shipping southward towards the Red Sea.
- Western efforts to mitigate the impacts of a drawn-out conflict will likely solidify Iranian resolve to reject hardline demands. Therefore, U.S. and Israeli military targeting will likely intensify, with a focus on depleting the Iranian arsenal and decapitating political leadership. This offensive strategy increases the short-term risk of an escalation by Iran as it becomes more fearful it faces an existential risk.
- Pro-Iran cyber threat actors are almost certainly implementing similar proxy targeting to propagate ideological messaging, apply political pressure on Gulf states, and supplement Iran's military actions and are likely seeking to disrupt and destroy oppositional forces' operational readiness and critical infrastructure.

## Latest Details

### Continued Iranian Operations

Iranian strikes on U.S. sites in neighboring Arab states continued today, led by a drone attack on the U.S. consulate in Dubai.<sup>1</sup> Saudi defense forces reportedly intercepted two cruise missiles in an area that houses Prince Sultan Air Base, a U.S. facility outside the capital of Riyadh,<sup>23</sup> and destroyed nine drones that entered Saudi airspace. A drone was intercepted on March 4 targeting Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura complex, a world-leading oil-production facility, but caused no damage, marking a second attack on the compound since the start of the conflict.<sup>4</sup>

- Iranian projectiles were also downed in Bahrain, home to a U.S. Navy site. In Qatar, one Iranian missile struck the U.S. airbase Al Udeid while a second was intercepted.<sup>56</sup>
- NATO air defense systems destroyed a ballistic missile fired from Iran toward Turkey's Incirlik airbase, which hosts U.S. troops.<sup>7</sup> ZeroFox assesses the risk of NATO entering the conflict remains low at this time.
- Qatari authorities reportedly arrested 10 suspects working for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who were allegedly spying on military facilities in the country and tasked with carrying out sabotage.<sup>8</sup>

Iran's repeated small-scale attacks aimed at an array of targets are likely designed to conserve weapons for a lengthy conflict while maintaining military pressure on the Gulf states by depleting their air defense systems and maintaining sustained economic pressure.

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<sup>1</sup>[hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-03-26?post-id=cmmmb0hdf00003b6rocjb4zlm](https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-03-26?post-id=cmmmb0hdf00003b6rocjb4zlm)

<sup>2</sup>[hXXps://www.aa\[.\]com\[.\]tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-5-hostile-drones-intercepted-near-prince-sultan-air-base/3846557](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/saudi-arabia-says-5-hostile-drones-intercepted-near-prince-sultan-air-base/3846557)

<sup>3</sup>[hXXps://www.washingtonpost\[.\]com/national-security/2026/03/03/cia-saudi-arabia-drone-attack-iran/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/03/cia-saudi-arabia-drone-attack-iran/)

<sup>4</sup>[hXXps://www.egyptindependent\[.\]com/second-attack-in-48-hours-hits-saudi-aramcos-ras-tanura-worlds-largest-oil-export-hub/](https://www.egyptindependent.com/second-attack-in-48-hours-hits-saudi-aramcos-ras-tanura-worlds-largest-oil-export-hub/)

<sup>5</sup>[hXXps://x\[.\]com/AJEnglish/status/2029142310005383390?s=20](https://x.com/AJEnglish/status/2029142310005383390?s=20)

<sup>6</sup>[hXXps://x\[.\]com/MOD\\_Qatar/status/2028945288782635139?s=20](https://x.com/MOD_Qatar/status/2028945288782635139?s=20)

<sup>7</sup>[hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2026/3/4/nato-defences-destroy-missile-fired-from-iran-over-mediterranean-turkiye](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/4/nato-defences-destroy-missile-fired-from-iran-over-mediterranean-turkiye)

<sup>8</sup>[hXXps://x\[.\]com/SkyNews/status/2028950639909228914](https://x.com/SkyNews/status/2028950639909228914)

- Continued penetration of their air defenses will very likely increase pressure on Gulf nations to respond by either pushing for an end to the conflict or joining Operation Epic Fury.
- The Trump administration is planning to meet executives from the biggest defense contractors on March 6 to discuss accelerating weapons production in order to replenish supplies after the strikes on Iran.<sup>9</sup> While President Trump has publicly stated there is no risk of munition shortages,<sup>10</sup> particularly for interceptors, this meeting likely suggests the issue is an emerging concern.

Targeting by Iran-aligned groups in Iraq and Lebanon is similarly limited and likely an attempt to stretch U.S. and Israeli forces.

- On March 4, 2026, Hezbollah claimed a number of attacks on Israeli tanks, including in Tell en Nhas and Houla, Lebanon.<sup>11</sup> Subsequently, Israeli military officials announced that two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) tank soldiers were wounded in southern Lebanon, marking the first Israeli casualties since the beginning of the expanded ground operation against Hezbollah.<sup>13</sup>
- The IRGC claimed to have launched a wave of drone attacks on a U.S. military base in Erbil in northern Iraq, while also attacking two U.S. military bases in Kuwait.

## Operation Epic Fury

U.S. military targeting strategy indicates the United States is seeking to deplete Iran's arsenal and military infrastructure and also suggests there is some uncertainty over its size and dispersal.<sup>14</sup>

- Recent U.S. targeting included a facility used for the storage, production, and launch of ballistic missiles, including Ghadr missiles, in Isfahan in western Iran.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>9</sup><https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/defense-executives-plan-meet-white-house-strikes-iran-diminish-stockpiles-2026-03-04/>

<sup>10</sup> <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116163464520215003>

<sup>11</sup> <https://t.me/rasedal3ado138e/315300>

<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/rasedal3ado138e/315151>

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-888827>

<sup>14</sup> <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2028911877133062256>

<sup>15</sup> <https://x.com/IDF/status/2029129175953482217?s=20>

- U.S. CENTCOM has confirmed the deployment of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers in the conflict.<sup>16</sup> This likely indicates Iranian air defenses are completely destroyed. U.S. air doctrine typically calls for slow moving B-52s to only enter enemy airspace when air defenses are incapable of shooting them down.

Meanwhile, Israeli targeting appears aimed at the Iranian political and military establishment, with continued targeting of domestic political and security institutions such as IRGC bases, intelligence ministries, and political meetings.

Following reports that Mojtaba Khamenei, former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's son, has been anointed heir to his father, Israel's Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that "any leader selected by the Iranian terror regime to continue leading the plan for Israel's destruction ... will be a certain target for assassination, no matter his name or where he hides."<sup>17</sup>

- This threat aligns within Israel's established strategy of targeting Iranian leaders it views as a threat to its security.

During afternoon hours local time on March 4, 2026, Gholam Hosseini Mohseni Ejehei, the head of Iran's judiciary, stated that "those who say or do anything" that could be perceived as supporting the war against Iran will be "dealt with on revolutionary, Islamic principles and in accordance with the time of war."<sup>18</sup>

- Ejehei's threat is almost certainly an effort to suppress the type of domestic popular unrest that President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have been urging since the beginning of the conflict.

## Energy Crisis

President Trump stated that the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (US DFC) would offer insurance "at a very reasonable price" to help ensure the flow of energy

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<sup>16</sup> <https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2028983418801803741?s=20>

<sup>17</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/03/04/any-successor-to-iran-s-khamenei-target-for-assassination-israeli-defense-minister-says>

<sup>18</sup> <https://apnews.com/live/iran-war-israel-trump-lebanon-march-04-2026#0000019c-b808-ddac-ad9f-bfff7e830000>

and other commercial trade in the Gulf, claiming that the U.S. Navy will escort tankers through the strategic Strait of Hormuz (SoH) if necessary.<sup>19</sup> U.S. air defenses designed to protect ships from incoming missiles would likely also be utilized.

- Insurance helps cover losses due to war and violence, but most of the primary private insurance providers have halted their insurance protections since the war broke out. While U.S. military protection and insurance coverage could assuage some shipowner concerns, it is unlikely to lead to a full reopening of the SoH.

Since the onset of the conflict on February 28, 2026, there has been a concerted military effort to destroy the Iranian navy—likely partially to preclude it from successfully blocking the SoH. To that end, one of the likely last remaining major ships in the Iranian navy was sunk off the coast of Sri Lanka on March 4, 2026.

- Iran very likely maintains the ability to strike ships in the SoH via small attack boats, mines, unmanned sea and aerial drones, and missiles. This will very likely prevent shipping from returning to normal, as the risk tolerance of shipowners will likely deter them from using the strait, despite U.S. protection.

Furthermore, Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have yet to enter the conflict, despite threatening to do so. Since October 7, 2023, the group has successfully blocked commercial shipping in the Red Sea, further south of the SoH. Were they to resume their targeting of commercial vessels, an additional 20 percent of global shipping would come under threat.

- Diverting cargoes away from the Red Sea or the entry of Arab states into the conflict are likely to lead to Houthi involvement.
- In 2024 and 2025, the U.S. Navy often struggled to shield commercial vessels in the Red Sea from attacks by the Houthis, who possess significantly fewer and less advanced missiles than Iran's military. The SoH is smaller than the Red Sea, and the United States now has a much larger grouping of military assets in the region; however, there remains a significant risk that Iranian missiles will breach air defenses and strike commercial ships.

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<sup>19</sup> [https://www.businessinsider\[.\]com/trump-iran-war-navy-escort-oil-tankers-strait-of-hormuz-2026-3](https://www.businessinsider[.]com/trump-iran-war-navy-escort-oil-tankers-strait-of-hormuz-2026-3)

Since Trump's announcement offering insurance, the top shipping container lines have reiterated their plans to avoid the area. MSC halted cargo bookings for the Middle East after war broke out,<sup>20</sup> and the second and third biggest carriers suspended all crossings in the SoH.<sup>21</sup>

## Travel

Airlines are suspending more flights to destinations across the Middle East as the war expands, with over 15,000 flights canceled.

- Qatar Airways extended its service halts until at least March 6.<sup>22</sup>
- The UAE is starting to establish safe air corridors that will allow for as many as 48 flights an hour.<sup>23</sup>

The U.S. State Department announced that it would send chartered planes to help Americans seeking to leave the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. It is also offering ground transport for U.S. citizens who want to get out of countries whose airspace has been closed.

## Emerging Cyber Threats

### Trends and Targeting

ZeroFox has continued to observe coordinated cyberattacks directed at Israel, the United States, and Western-aligned nations' infrastructure and private sector entities, which has primarily been conducted by pro-Iranian, pro-Islamic, and pro-Russian threat collectives. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and other countries perceived as supporting Israeli-American actions in Iran are being targeted by threat actors supporting the Iranian government. These cyber operations are not exclusively conducted by Iranian hackers; rather, it is a coalition of multinational actors that include

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<sup>20</sup><https://www.msc.com/en/newsroom/customer-advisories/2026/march/booking-suspension-for-worldwide-cargo-to-middle-east>

<sup>21</sup><https://www.cma-cgm.com/news/5339/advisory-1-middle-east-strait-of-hormuz-and-bab-el-mandeb-security-transits>

<sup>22</sup> <https://x.com/qatarairways/status/2029082522261311605?s=20>

<sup>23</sup><https://gulfnews.com/business/aviation/uae-opens-safe-air-corridors-airlines-to-operate-48-flights-per-hour-says-minister-1.500462109>

Arab and Russian-linked groups. Statements by these actors frequently cite religious solidarity and a broader uniting opposition to Western countries as motivating factors.

Pro-Iran cyber threat actors are almost certainly implementing similar proxy targeting strategies in order to propagate ideological messaging, apply political pressure on Gulf states, and supplement Iran's military actions and are likely seeking to disrupt and destroy oppositional forces' operational readiness and critical infrastructure. Iranian cyber actors are reportedly targeting military personnel in the region through phishing and social engineering attacks to map force movements and operational posture<sup>24</sup>—almost certainly in support of Iranian intelligence collection efforts.

- The use of social engineering, especially by cyber threat actors, to facilitate military intelligence collection in multinational conflicts underpins the significant convergence of physical security threats and cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
- The hybrid threat landscape is almost certain to accelerate the development of new cyber-based methods and increase physical security vulnerabilities in military operations globally.

### **Israeli Files on Dark Web Forum**

On March 3, 2026, a newly-registered and untested threat actor using the alias "Jax7" posted a download link for an .xlsx file containing mapping data of Israel's Municipality of Rishon LeZion on the dark web forum BreachForums. ZeroFox examined the contents of the file, which appears likely to be part of a larger collection of files regarding a mapping project for sports facilities in Israel.

- According to the information in the data sheets, the file was meant to be transferred to the Israeli Mapping Center to update existing national mapping networks, provide Israeli citizens with the facilities locations' nationwide, and supply access to the facilities via GPS systems and cellular devices. The nature of the data within the file did not appear to reveal sensitive locations, so it is unlikely to be considered useful military information; however, there is a roughly even

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<sup>24</sup> [hXXps://www.forcesnews\[.\]com/iran/while-iran-drops-bombs-its-spies-are-targeting-troops-inboxes](https://www.forcesnews.com/iran/while-iran-drops-bombs-its-spies-are-targeting-troops-inboxes)

chance that the actor intended to disclose Israeli mapping data in support of Iranian military responses.

## **Additional Findings**

ZeroFox observed the following notable cyber activity over the last 24 hours (not an exhaustive list):

- On March 4, 2026, pro-Russian threat actor “NoName057(16)” announced on their Russian-language Telegram channel that they had obtained full access to the pump control and water supply management system in Israel, including access to operational parameters and equipment controls.
- On March 3, 2026, Lebanese-linked threat actor group “Liwaa Mohammad”, which is affiliated with the broader network of Islamic threat actor groups known as “Cyber Islamic Resistance,” posted an .xlsx file on their Telegram channel allegedly containing doxxing information related to a Mossad agent. The post was followed by the sharing of a database allegedly containing Israeli military information.
- The threat collective known as “DieNet” claimed to have obtained access to several employee accounts at the Jordanian Electricity Distribution Company. The group also claimed to have disrupted online streaming channels by conducting a widespread attack on Jordan’s servers.
  - DieNet announced on its Telegram channel that it had conducted multiple attacks against VigilAir drone detection systems and Rafael advanced defense systems’ servers operating in Israel. The group stated that these cyber operations coincided with Lebanese and Iranian missile attacks targeting Israeli territory.

## **Conclusion**

Taken together, U.S. efforts to avoid the drawn-out implications of a lengthy conflict are coming up against Iranian efforts to prolong the conflict. Iran’s approach to the conflict is likely dependent on the size and effectiveness of its arsenal and the availability of acceptable political concessions. If Iran believes it is successfully challenging the cost-benefit-analysis of the United States, in particular, and Israel, it is likely to reject concessions that threaten its political and military establishment.

## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

## Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%