



**| Flash |**

# Pro-Iran Terrorism in Europe – SITREP #36: May 5, 2026

F-2026-05-05a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

**May 5, 2026**

**Scope Note**

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were *identified prior to 2:00 PM (EDT) on May 5, 2026*; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

# **| Flash | Pro-Iran Terrorism in Europe – SITREP #36 – May 5, 2026**

**| Key Findings**

- Since March 9, 2026, a group claiming to support Iran in its war against the United States and Israel has reportedly conducted a campaign of attacks against Jewish targets in Europe.
- Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) has claimed 17 attacks against Jewish communities, Israeli diplomatic missions, and Iranian dissident journalists across Europe—the most recent of which was the April 29, 2026, stabbing of two Jewish individuals in the Golders Green area of London.
- In the case of at least one claimed attack, HAYI likely recruited and paid criminal actors to conduct attacks on its behalf. Following an attack on a French branch of a U.S. bank, the detained suspect reportedly claimed to have been paid EUR 600 by an unidentified individual online to conduct the attack.
- While there is no direct connection to the Iranian government, it is likely that HAYI is operating as a Europe-based proxy for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Initially, HAYI made posts claiming responsibility on Telegram channels likely under its control; however, Telegram closed down

several channels associated with HAYI after March 9, leaving the group to post claims on channels associated with IRGC-QF controlled Iraqi Shia militias.

- HAYI is likely an identifiable group only online. HAYI likely operates as a function of Iranian hybrid warfare and recruits criminals and radicalized individuals via online forums to conduct attacks—almost certainly due to a combination of financial motives and ideological alignment with Iranian war aims.

## Details

Since March 9, 2026, a group claiming to support Iran in its war against the United States and Israel has reportedly conducted a campaign of attacks against Jewish targets in Europe.<sup>1</sup> However, there is a roughly even chance that the group, known as HAYI, has not conducted all of the attacks, but has, in at least one case, recruited criminals or radicalized individuals to conduct attacks on its behalf. In other cases, HAYI has likely opportunistically claimed responsibility for hate crimes against Jewish people in Europe. Both cases are likely part of an Iranian strategy of hybrid warfare in its ongoing conflict with the United States and Israel.

- HAYI has claimed 17 attacks against Jewish communities, Israeli diplomatic missions, and Iranian dissident journalists across Europe.<sup>2</sup>
- To date, two people have been injured in attacks claimed by HAYI—both as a result of the April 29, 2026, stabbing in the Golders Green area of London.
- A total of 17 individuals have been arrested in connection with the attacks claimed by HAYI since March 9, 2026.
- On May 1, 2026, UK authorities raised the National Threat Level from “SUBSTANTIAL” to “SEVERE” after the Golders Green stabbings.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>

[hXXps://www.isdglobal\[.\]org/digital-dispatch/islamic-movement-of-the-companions-of-the-right-the-gig-economy-proxy-group-attacking-europe/](https://www.isdglobal[.]org/digital-dispatch/islamic-movement-of-the-companions-of-the-right-the-gig-economy-proxy-group-attacking-europe/)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> [hXXps://www.gov\[.\]uk/government/news/uk-national-threat-level-raised-to-severe](https://www.gov[.]uk/government/news/uk-national-threat-level-raised-to-severe)

Most recently, one suspect stabbed two Jewish individuals in the Golders Green area of north London on April 29, 2026. The individual is in custody and has been identified as a 45-year-old who moved to the United Kingdom from Somalia as a child.<sup>4</sup> This attack is the first HAYI-claimed attack to result in casualties, as both victims were hospitalized from their injuries. To date, no HAYI-claimed attacks have resulted in fatalities.

- The Golders Green attack is also unlikely to have actually been conducted by HAYI. The group's claim of responsibility only contained a video from the news rather than the first-person point-of-view footage seen in previous claim posts. This suggests the claim by HAYI is very likely opportunistic and that the attack was not actually conducted or sponsored by the group.

In the case of at least one claimed attack, HAYI likely recruited and paid criminal actors to conduct attacks on its behalf. Following an attack on a French branch of a U.S. bank, the detained suspect reportedly claimed to have been paid EUR 600 by an unidentified individual online to conduct the attack.<sup>5</sup> This tactic is very likely intended to give Iran plausible deniability for attacks claimed by HAYI—likely allowing the Iranian government to distance itself from HAYI activities and characterizing HAYI as merely a like-minded group acting in solidarity with Iran.

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<sup>4</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3r2lr434wlo>

<sup>5</sup>

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/golders-green-stabbing-attack-london-harakat-hayi-b2967874.html>



**Video posted by HAYI on Telegram**

*Source: ZeroFox Intelligence*

In mid-March, the group told media outlets that its campaign would continue to attack U.S. and Israeli targets around the world in retaliation for military activities in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.<sup>6</sup> Though HAYI did not claim a direct connection to the government of Iran, its rhetoric is consistent with Iranian proxy groups (such as Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias), suggesting HAYI is likely conducting its campaign in coordination with Iranian entities, such as the IRGC-QF.

- IRGC-QF is the external operations branch of the IRGC. The QF is charged with “exporting the Revolution” and is the primary conduit for Iranian support to proxy groups around the world—especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi militia in Yemen, and numerous Iraqi Shia militias.<sup>7</sup>

It is likely that HAYI is operating as a Europe-based proxy for IRGC-QF. Initially, HAYI made posts claiming responsibility on Telegram channels likely under its control; however,

<sup>6</sup>

[hXXps://www.cbsnews\[.\]com/news/europe-antisemitism-attacks-group-threatens-us-israel-interests-worldwide/](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/europe-antisemitism-attacks-group-threatens-us-israel-interests-worldwide/)

<sup>7</sup> [hXXps://rewardsforjustice\[.\]net/rewards/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-qods-force-irgc-qf/](https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-qods-force-irgc-qf/)

Telegram closed down several channels associated with HAYI after March 9, leaving the group to post claims on channels associated with IRGC-QF controlled Iraqi Shia militias.<sup>8</sup>

- Additionally, in several of the posts claiming responsibility for attacks, HAYI has used variations of logos used by IRGC and its proxies.<sup>9</sup> The reuse of this logo style suggests that HAYI is likely associated with Iranian government agencies or their proxies.



**Logos used in HAYI Telegram posts**

Source: ZeroFox Intelligence



**IRGC logo (left) and Lebanese Hezbollah logo (right)**

Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue

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<sup>8</sup>

[hXXps://www.isdglobal\[.\]org/digital-dispatch/islamic-movement-of-the-companions-of-the-right-the-gig-economy-proxy-group-attacking-europe/](https://www.isdglobal.org/digital-dispatch/islamic-movement-of-the-companions-of-the-right-the-gig-economy-proxy-group-attacking-europe/)

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

conduct attacks—almost certainly due to a combination of financial motives and ideological alignment with Iranian war aims. There is a roughly even chance that the claims by HAYI have been made by IRGC-QF officers or associates, and the group as a whole is controlled by the Iranian security establishment.

## **| Conclusion**

The continuation of the war in Iran will almost certainly lead the Iranian government to seek new avenues of hybrid warfare—likely including the creation of front groups in Europe and the United States to claim attacks by otherwise lone actors. The activity attributed to HAYI is very likely repeatable across other regions of the world—especially in countries where individuals from disaffected, Muslim immigrant communities can likely be recruited.

The current conflict has very likely inflicted significant damage on Iran’s conventional warfighting capabilities, leaving the country with a pressing need to establish new vectors to attack U.S. and Israeli targets outside of the region. IRGC-QF activities, including the likely establishment of groups such as HAYI, almost certainly provide Iran with the ability to conduct attacks with plausible deniability.

Additionally, Iran very likely maintains robust networks that would be leveraged for more direct attacks. IRGC-QF and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) almost certainly have the ability to conduct direct, terrorist-style attacks against targets associated with the United States, Israel, or any nation Iran sees as enabling the war.

## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

## **Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale**

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%