ZEROFOX **INTELLIGENCE**

| Flash |

Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #22: March 13, 2026

F-2026-03-13a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

March 13, 2026

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 4:00 AM (EDT) on March 13, 2026; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

| Flash | Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #22: March 13, 2026

| Key Findings

- On March 12, 2026, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that vessels must coordinate with the Iranian Navy before transiting the Strait of Hormuz (SoH)—suggesting that, while Iran is unlikely to lay active naval mines in the SoH, it likely wants to maintain an effective closure of the Strait to force concessions from the United States and Israel.

- Israel continues to conduct strikes in Lebanon, targeting Iranian-backed Shia militia Lebanese Hezbollah—including targets associated with the unit responsible for finance—while Hezbollah is increasingly relying on drones for its claimed attacks against military bases and towns in northern Israel.

- Despite U.S.-Israeli targeting of Iran's internal security apparatus, and comments from both U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggesting a popular uprising and imminent collapse of the Iranian government, the clerical regime of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei very likely remains intact, unified, and functioning.

| Latest Details

Strait of Hormuz Remains Effectively Closed

On March 12, 2026, Iran's MFA announced that vessels must coordinate with the Iranian Navy before transiting the SoH—suggesting that, while Iran is unlikely to lay active naval mines in the SoH, it likely wants to maintain an effective closure of the Strait to force concessions from the United States and Israel.[1]

- Since the beginning of hostilities, Iran has attacked at least 16 oil tankers, cargo ships, and other vessels around the SoH—including vessels in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.[2]

- Additionally, Iranian strikes have targeted port facilities and oil terminals in at least the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.[3]

The MFA statement came after new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei issued statements calling for the continued closure of the SoH as military operations near the conclusion of their second week.[4] Iran is almost certainly willing to maintain the effective closure in an effort to get concessions from the United States and meet Tehran's objectives of a ceasefire deal that ensures the Islamic Republic's future safety.

On March 12, 2026, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that, although the U.S. Navy has plans to escort oil tankers through the SoH, it is currently "simply not ready."[5] Secretary Wright claimed the U.S. military is currently focusing on degrading Iran's offensive capabilities—including the ability to keep the SoH closed—and does not have the available assets to escort tankers.[6]

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[1] hXXps://www.reuters[.]com/world/ships-must-coordinate-with-irans-navy-pass-through-strait-hormuz-foreign-2026-03-12/

[2] hXXps://edition.cnn[.]com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-13-26?post-id=cmmodduix00003b6pcdg5kj8g

[3] hXXps://www.yakimaherald[.]com/news/nation_and_world/business/iran-targets-commercial-ships-dubai-airport-and-oil-facilities-as-concerns-grow-over-global-energy/article_dfa5d419-e84d-59b1-a58b-40beb5dd0f8d.html

[4] hXXps://www.cnbc[.]com/2026/03/12/strait-of-hormuz-closure-iran-oil-prices-mojtaba-khamenei.html

[5] hXXps://www.cnbc[.]com/2026/03/12/iran-war-us-navy-strait-of-hormuz-oil-bessent.html

[6] *Ibid.*

- The SoH will almost certainly remain effectively closed at least through the weekend. Iran is showing no signs of allowing the free flow of vessels through the narrow waterway, and the United States very likely lacks the available resources to effectively open the Strait militarily.

- The economic impacts of the closure are likely to worsen over the short term unless there is either a cessation of hostilities or if Iran stops attacking international shipping—both very unlikely scenarios in the next few days.

Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

Israel continues to conduct strikes in Lebanon, targeting Iranian-backed Shia militia Lebanese Hezbollah, including targets associated with the Hezbollah unit responsible for finance. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck targets in Beirut that Hezbollah reportedly used to hide millions of dollars to finance its operations.[7]

- The IDF is almost certainly attempting to prevent Hezbollah the financial means to reconstitute after hostilities end. Israel is likely taking the opportunity to cripple Hezbollah in the long term and very likely views damaging its financial infrastructure as an effective strategy to prevent Hezbollah from threatening Israel in the future.

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[7] hXXps://understandingwar[.]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/

Hezbollah-Claimed Attacks Between March 1, 2026 and March 11, 2026 By Type

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All data from the official Hezbollah media channel.
Note: There are some attacks, in which Hezbollah did not specify the type of weaponry used

Attacks claimed by Hezbollah between March 1 and 11, 2026
Source: Institute for the Study of War

In response, Hezbollah claimed attacks on 14 military bases and 20 towns in northern Israel, which is consistent with its targeting for most of the conflict.[8] Hezbollah is very likely maintaining its attack tempo in northern Israel in an effort to displace Israeli citizens in towns and villages near the Lebanese border. Hezbollah almost certainly views this strategy as an effective way to put pressure on the Israeli government to end the conflict and negotiate a ceasefire.

In recent days, Hezbollah has been relying more on drones for attacks into northern Israel—which is notable because Hezbollah did not use drones at all in the war with Israel in 2023–2024.[9] The drones Hezbollah deploys are produced in Lebanon and are likely different from the Shahed drones used by Iran; however, they are still very likely inexpensive to build and capable of inflicting significant damage on northern Israeli towns and villages.

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[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*

U.S.-Israeli Targets

The United States and Israel have continued to target Iran's internal security apparatus, likely in support of President Trump's statements on February 28, 2026, calling for regime change in Tehran.[1011] On March 12, 2026, the combined forces struck several targets associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including ground forces sites and regional headquarters, as well as an IRGC brigade headquarters likely involved in the suppression of anti-government protests.[12]

The U.S.-Israeli targeting of internal security is very likely in an effort to set conditions for a popular uprising against the Islamic Republic. However, despite 13 days of airstrikes against regime targets—including government officials, IRGC headquarters, and security forces used in the suppression of protests—the government of Iran appears to remain intact.

- Following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the constitutional process to appoint a successor was conducted, and a new Supreme Leader was appointed.

- A popular uprising has failed to materialize despite President Trump's calls for Iranians to "take back their country."[13] The lack of protests is likely the result of the regime maintaining internal control over the populace and a remaining fear of government repression.

Despite comments from Prime Minister Netanyahu suggesting the imminent collapse of the Iranian government, the clerical regime is very likely intact, unified, and functioning. There is currently no evidence to support a collapse of the government and a popular uprising—meaning any near-term end to the conflict will almost certainly require negotiations with the Mojtaba Khamenei regime.

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[10] *Ibid.*

[11] hXXps://edition.cnn[.]com/2026/02/28/politics/regime-change-iran-trump

[12] hXXps://understandingwar[.]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-evening-special-report-march-12-2026/

[13] hXXps://www.atlanticcouncil[.]org/blogs/menasource/trump-wants-iranians-to-take-back-their-country-from-the-regime-can-they/

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| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

Red

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may NOT share

TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

Amber

Sources may use

TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

Recipients may ONLY share

TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that

TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

Green

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may share

TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

Clear

Sources may use

TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

Recipients may share

TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%