



| Assessment |

Monthly Geopolitical Report: December 2025

A-2025-11-28a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

November 28, 2025

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Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 7:30 PM (EST) on November 25, 2025; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.¹

Assessment | Monthly Geopolitical Report: December 2025

Key Findings

- Little progress has been made in advancing the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas—increasing the risk of the ceasefire ultimately collapsing—while violence has escalated in Lebanon. Both trends are likely to continue in 2026.
- None of the major ceasefire proposals to end Russia’s war in Ukraine are likely to be accepted in the short term. However, a negotiated settlement partitioning Ukraine is likely.
- Taiwan, and related tensions between China and Japan over the island, have emerged as the biggest risk to the U.S.-China trade agreement.
- Military strikes and covert operations inside Venezuela against alleged government-sponsored drug trafficking targets remain likely in 2025. Given the government’s supposed role in drug trafficking, there is a roughly even chance the operations will be perceived as aiming to topple the Venezuelan government. Political dialogue aimed at decoupling the government from wider security threats against the United States are less likely.

¹ Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide monthly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain.



| Europe

Russia-Ukraine Conflict: United States Pushes for Peace Despite Unchanged Circumstances

In late November, the United States launched a renewed push for peace between Russia and Ukraine.² An initial draft of the Trump administration's 28-point peace plan was reportedly crafted by U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev in October 2025.³ Critics of the plan have argued it heavily favors Russia's war objectives, such as de facto recognition of Russian control over occupied territory, limits on Ukraine's military, and guarantees that Ukraine would not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukrainian and European leaders have expressed concerns that Ukraine would be forced into an unfavorable deal and launched diplomatic efforts to explore other options with the Trump administration. Following talks between U.S. and Ukrainian delegations in Geneva, Switzerland, officials announced that they have revised the peace plan down to 19 points, leaving the more sensitive components to be ironed out during future direct talks between Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky.⁴ On November 25, Ukrainian media outlets reported the United States and Ukraine had reached a "common understanding" on the terms but did not detail whether the more controversial aspects of the agreement have been ironed out.⁵ If the United States and Ukraine do agree to a new proposal, any signing is likely to be delayed until after the November 27 deadline.

However, battlefield conditions have not shifted enough to incentivize either side to sign a peace plan that finalizes territorial holdings.

- Ukrainian Position:** Though Russian forces have achieved persistent advances in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia over the past three months, these gains have seized limited territory at a high attrition rate. Ukraine still controls significant areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson and is highly unlikely to cede control of these regions to Russia. Zelensky very likely lacks the political mandate to cede territory to Russia, as there is no support around the issue among Ukrainians, and such a move is illegal under the Ukrainian constitution. Moreover, Russia has shown throughout the conflict that it is unable to quickly capture large population centers. Though Russian forces will likely seize Pokrovsk within the next few months, Russia launched its effort to take the city 21 months ago.⁶

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[hXXps://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-threatens-cut-intel-weapons-press-ukraine-into-peace-deal-source-2025-11-21/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-threatens-cut-intel-weapons-press-ukraine-into-peace-deal-source-2025-11-21/)

³ [hXXps://kyivindependent.com/28-points-later-why-trumps-latest-peace-plan-for-ukraine-is-different/](https://kyivindependent.com/28-points-later-why-trumps-latest-peace-plan-for-ukraine-is-different/)

⁴ [hXXps://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17023](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17023)

⁵ [hXXps://tvpworld.com/90208429/ukraine-reports-common-understanding-with-us-on-peace-plan](https://tvpworld.com/90208429/ukraine-reports-common-understanding-with-us-on-peace-plan)

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[hXXps://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/](https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/)



- **Corruption Scandal:** On November 10, Ukraine's top anti-corruption bodies, NABU and SAPO, released the results of "Operation Midas", a 15-month investigation into a kickback scheme involving high-ranking officials and a close business associate of President Zelensky. The fallout from the NABU allegations against Zelensky's inner circle has politically damaged the president and his administration. While Ukrainian media coverage of the Operation Midas developments has taken a backseat amid the U.S. push for Ukraine to sign Trump's peace proposal,⁷ the scandal is unlikely to disappear from public discussion and will likely continue to harm Zelensky's reputation. There is a roughly even chance of the scandal impacting the war, with European allies less likely to support a Ukrainian government credibly accused of corruption.
- **Russian Position:** Meanwhile, Russian officials and state media are setting conditions for Russia to reject the second proposal. Russia is unlikely to agree to a peace deal while its forces continue to advance in Ukraine. Despite Russia's high attrition rate, Russia likely aims to leverage its structural advantages over Ukraine—that is, manpower, resources, and military budget—to outlast Ukraine and gain more territory.

Americas

Pressure Builds on Venezuela as a Decision Point Approaches

As the United States establishes a more significant naval presence in the Caribbean, it has continued to ramp up pressure on Venezuela with the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford warships. On November 22, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) warned airlines about hazardous conditions over Venezuela due to "the worsening security situation and heightened military activity in or around Venezuela", leading to the cancellation of flights to Venezuela by multiple airlines. On November 24, the United States officially designated the Cartel de los Soles—as well as its supposed figurehead, Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro—as a terrorist organization. This designation helps to legalize military action against the government by connecting Venezuela's president to a terrorist group threatening the United States.⁸

Movements by top generals and security advisories regarding airspace are likely indicators of short-term escalations. Furthermore, since August 2025, the United States has been amassing a military presence in the Caribbean significantly above the levels seen in recent decades. There are more than a dozen major warships with over 10,000 U.S. Marines just off the coast of Venezuela,

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⁷ [hXXps://kyivindependent\[.\]com/us-peace-plan-pushes-corruption-scandal-aside-fails-to-contain-zelenskys-political-risks/](https://kyivindependent.com/us-peace-plan-pushes-corruption-scandal-aside-fails-to-contain-zelenskys-political-risks/)

⁸ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2025/11/23/us/politics/caribbean-trump-venezuela-military.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/23/us/politics/caribbean-trump-venezuela-military.html)



alongside U.S. bombers and military drones.⁹ While the stated goal of the deployment is to perform counter-narcotics operations, which has resulted in the targeting of drug boats over a dozen times,¹⁰ the military presence far exceeds what is required to combat drug smuggling, suggesting a larger operational goal at play.

- **Ambiguity:** However, conflicting narratives both from U.S. President Trump and officials speaking on anonymity, suggest a military escalation is less likely. President Trump has reportedly told his advisers he plans to speak directly with Maduro, with no clear timeline in sight.¹¹ However, Trump has also publicly authorized covert operations inside Venezuela, with the stated aim of targeting narcotrafficking.¹² Given the U.S. emphasis on connecting Maduro to drug trafficking, there is a roughly even chance of operations against drug trafficking including government targets.¹³
 - The current trajectory likely involves some military or covert action inside Venezuela, focused on narcotrafficking targets. However, the opening of talks will likely delay or alter that trajectory, especially if they prove productive. Venezuela has reportedly already offered major compromises in return for a reprieve from U.S. pressure.¹⁴ However, there are likely too many moving parts for a negotiated settlement to work, as financial and security assurances cannot be guaranteed to all the power brokers inside Venezuela.
 - A decision will likely be made before 2026, given the diplomatic and monetary costs of maintaining a naval operation of its size in the Caribbean, as well as the commercial and political impact of continued partial closure of airspace. The U.S. Gerald R. Ford warships will likely be moved across the globe by early 2026, thus reducing the possibility of a military escalation against land-based targets in Venezuela.
- **Less Likely Military Operation:** A military operation involving boots on the ground currently remains a highly unlikely scenario given the U.S. deployment's lack of land-based capabilities. The potential high cost to U.S. personnel, as well as the resulting power vacuum and collateral damage would strongly damage the Trump administration's domestic and international standing and likely run counter to its current strategic goals to control the rise of narcotrafficking in the region.

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[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/americas/us-military-deploy-aircraft-carrier-south-america-amid-soaring-tensions-with-2025-10-24/](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-military-deploy-aircraft-carrier-south-america-amid-soaring-tensions-with-2025-10-24/)

¹⁰ [hXXps://www.cnn\[.\]com/2025/10/28/politics/multiple-boats-us-military-strikes-pacific](https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/28/politics/multiple-boats-us-military-strikes-pacific)

¹¹ [hXXps://www.axios\[.\]com/2025/11/24/trump-maduro-talks-meeting-venezuela-boat-strikes](https://www.axios.com/2025/11/24/trump-maduro-talks-meeting-venezuela-boat-strikes)

¹² [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/americas/trump-confirms-cia-authorization-venezuela-2025-10-15/](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/trump-confirms-cia-authorization-venezuela-2025-10-15/)

¹³

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/americas/us-launch-new-phase-venezuela-operations-sources-say-2025-11-22/](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-launch-new-phase-venezuela-operations-sources-say-2025-11-22/)

¹⁴ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2025/10/10/world/americas/maduro-venezuela-us-oil.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/10/world/americas/maduro-venezuela-us-oil.html)



- Instead, the initial targets will likely be linked to alleged government-sponsored drug trafficking, such as in ports or airports, storage facilities, and transshipment points near the major drug-producing nation of Colombia. However, given the role reportedly played by the Venezuelan government in drug smuggling, targeting more traditional military sites such as navy and air force bases as part of the counter-narcotics operations is also likely.

Chile: Second Round of Presidential Elections on December 2025

The general election in Chile, held on November 16, 2025, saw no candidate win a majority. The two most voted candidates (Jeannette Jara from the Communist Party, who won a narrow victory, and José Antonio Kast from the Republican Party) will go to a runoff on December 14. Kast is expected to be the victor in the scheduled runoff against Jara, as he will very likely receive the bulk of the support from conservative voters who supported other conservative candidates (namely, Senator Evelyn Matthei and Congressman Johannes Kaiser) in the first round. Kast's security-focused reforms will likely receive popular support following an increase in voter concern of crime and immigration this year.

- **Communist Party Candidate:** Jara served as labor minister in President Boric's cabinet and won 60 percent of the vote in the primary earlier in June. She has campaigned on her working class background and promotes social welfare policies such as minimum wage increases, pension reform, a reduction in the workweek, cash transfers to workers, and subsidies to small business owners. However, her ties with sitting President Boric, whose ratings have been relatively low throughout 2025 due to perceptions of economic challenges, will likely impact voter intent.¹⁵
- **Republican Party Candidate:** Kast is a former member of the lower house of Congress and is running for president for the third time. He lost in the previous Chilean runoff against sitting President Boric. His proposed policies center on crime and immigration, which reportedly top Chilean voter concerns, and he speaks in favor of security reforms practiced by El Salvador President Nayib Bukele. Additionally, Kast has proposed economic reforms to resolve an "economic emergency."¹⁶ Kast is likely to win Chile's runoff by consolidating the conservative vote and capitalizing on security concerns; a recent poll shows him leading Jara by 12 points.¹⁷

¹⁵ <https://americasquarterly.org/article/chile-meet-the-candidates-2025/>

¹⁶ https://kast.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Programa_Jose_Antonio_Kast_R.pdf

¹⁷ <https://cadem.cl/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Track-PP-619-Noviembre-S3-VF.pdf>



| Middle East

Gaza Conflict Frozen Amid Escalation in Lebanon

Over the past several weeks, tensions in the Gaza Strip have remained high as Israel continues to strike targets within the enclave in response to what it claims are active threats and violations of the ceasefire. On November 22, 2025, local reports indicated that at least 24 people, including five Hamas officials, were killed when Israel launched a series of airstrikes following gunfire from Palestinian militants that targeted Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops.¹⁸¹⁹ A similar outbreak of violence also occurred on November 20, 2025.²⁰²¹ However, despite warnings from countries such as Qatar and Egypt that the Israeli “breaches” risk ending the truce, there has been no indication that widespread fighting is on the brink of resuming.²²²³

Meanwhile, there has been little meaningful progress in efforts to extend the current ceasefire to phase two of the agreement, which would ostensibly see Hamas disarm and Israel withdraw from Gaza, among other stipulations.²⁴ Recent talks between U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Hamas yielded no breakthroughs,²⁵ and a Hamas negotiation delegation in Cairo has focused primarily on highlighting Israeli ceasefire violations.²⁶

Amid weeks of increasing attacks in Lebanon, Israel recently launched its most significant operation since the beginning of the ceasefire with Hezbollah. On November 23, 2025, an airstrike in the Haret Hreik area of Beirut killed Haytham Ali Tabatabai, who has been described as

¹⁸ [hXXps://apnews\[.\]com/article/gaza-israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-535e21d36eea41fb9bba645ee7db014c](https://apnews.com/article/gaza-israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-535e21d36eea41fb9bba645ee7db014c)

¹⁹ [hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/israel-says-idf-strikes-kill-5-hamas-officials-as-terror-group-issues-threat-to-end-truce/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-idf-strikes-kill-5-hamas-officials-as-terror-group-issues-threat-to-end-truce/)

²⁰ [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/israeli-fire-kills-four-gaza-casting-further-doubt-ceasefire-2025-11-20/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-fire-kills-four-gaza-casting-further-doubt-ceasefire-2025-11-20/)

²¹ [hXXps://www.cnn\[.\]com/2025/11/19/middleeast/israel-strikes-gaza-escalation-latam-intl](https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/19/middleeast/israel-strikes-gaza-escalation-latam-intl)

²² [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-it-killed-hamas-commander-gaza-2025-11-23/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-it-killed-hamas-commander-gaza-2025-11-23/)

²³ [hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/qatar-warns-strikes-on-gaza-threaten-to-upend-ceasefire-five-said-killed-in-latest-violence/amp/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/qatar-warns-strikes-on-gaza-threaten-to-upend-ceasefire-five-said-killed-in-latest-violence/)

²⁴ [hXXps://www.haaretz\[.\]com/gaza/2025-11-24/ty-article/.premium/discussion-on-gazas-future-stalled-as-its-death-toll-again-rises/0000019a-b498-dd6e-a5fa-fffc399b0000](https://www.haaretz.com/gaza/2025-11-24/ty-article/.premium/discussion-on-gazas-future-stalled-as-its-death-toll-again-rises/0000019a-b498-dd6e-a5fa-fffc399b0000)

²⁵ [hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/witkoff-to-meet-again-with-senior-hamas-leader-for-talks-on-gaza-ceasefire-diplomat/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/witkoff-to-meet-again-with-senior-hamas-leader-for-talks-on-gaza-ceasefire-diplomat/)

²⁶ [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/11/24/hamas-meet-egypts-spy-chief-says-israels-attacks-on-gaza-threaten-truce](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/24/hamas-meet-egypts-spy-chief-says-israels-attacks-on-gaza-threaten-truce)



Hezbollah's Chief of Staff and second most senior official.²⁷ Following the assassination, Mahmoud Qmati, a senior Hezbollah official, stated that Israel had crossed a "red line" and the group is considering retaliation options. In turn, this resulted in Israel raising the "alert level" for its forces along the Lebanese border.^{28,29}

- **Looking Ahead in Gaza:** The conflict in Gaza is likely to remain frozen rather than resolved, as both sides have rejected major elements of the Trump Administration's 20-point plan. Furthermore, Israel may be setting the conditions for a more permanent partition of Gaza along the "Yellow Line," the point to where the IDF's troops withdrew at the commencement of the current ceasefire.³⁰ Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu likely views a quasi-occupation of the territory as advantageous, as it would appease the most politically extreme members of his coalition who seek to resettle the area and also allow him to escalate the conflict at will.
- **Lebanon:** Although Israeli officials claim these attacks in Lebanon are because of the Lebanese government's supposed unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah,³¹ Israeli political, intelligence, and military officials are almost certainly aware that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) cannot forcibly dispossess Hezbollah of its weapons without triggering a civil war, one which the state would lose. The Israeli security establishment also likely understands that Hezbollah is highly unlikely to disarm in response to direct Israeli military action. In fact, the prospect of any outside party forcing Hezbollah to disarm remains remote despite the Israeli or U.S. military very likely being the only options to disarm the group effectively. Therefore, Israel's actions in Lebanon, like those in Gaza, appear to be aimed more at setting the conditions for a low-intensity permanent conflict.

| Asia

Taiwan Emerges as Risk to U.S.-China Accord

On November 19, 2025, China suspended imports of Japanese seafood and halted approvals for new Japanese films. The seafood restriction came just weeks after China lifted a similar ban related to nuclear wastewater released by Japanese plants. Just prior to this, on November 17,

²⁷

[hXXps://www.naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/316714-5-dead-28-hurt-as-israel-targets-hezbollah-chief-of-staff-in-har-et-hreik](https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/316714-5-dead-28-hurt-as-israel-targets-hezbollah-chief-of-staff-in-har-et-hreik)

²⁸ [hXXps://www.newarab\[.\]com/news/hezbollah-israel-crossed-red-line-after-tabatabai-assassination?amp](https://www.newarab.com/news/hezbollah-israel-crossed-red-line-after-tabatabai-assassination?amp)

²⁹ [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/israel-news/defense-news/article-874984](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-874984)

³⁰

[hXXps://today.lorientlejour\[.\]com/article/1485677/in-maps-how-israels-yellow-line-could-permanently-divide-gaza.html](https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1485677/in-maps-how-israels-yellow-line-could-permanently-divide-gaza.html)

³¹

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/after-weeks-of-warnings-over-slow-hezbollah-disarmament-israel-shows-its-ready-to-escalate/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-weeks-of-warnings-over-slow-hezbollah-disarmament-israel-shows-its-ready-to-escalate/)



China also suspended talks on resuming beef imports from Japan and warned Chinese citizens against traveling to Japan. The tensions are very likely related to new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's comments suggesting that Chinese military movement around Taiwan could trigger a Japanese military response.³² On November 24, 2025, U.S. President Trump held private phone calls with Chinese President Xi Jinping and then Sanae Takaichi.³³

- **Targeting of Food Trade:** China is known to target food trade during periods of geopolitical tension, having done so with Japan, Australia, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union (EU) in recent years. The strategy is very likely aimed at hurting rural farming communities that have political sway. Farm products make good targets, as they spoil quickly, incentivizing governments with large agricultural sectors to resolve the disputes quickly.
 - In mid-2024, China began targeting agricultural products such as pork and brandy in the EU, canola in Canada, and soybeans in the United States—all in response to tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles.³⁴
 - In 2018, China levied a 178 percent tariff on U.S. sorghum after the United States imposed tariffs on Chinese solar panels.³⁵ In 2020, Australian wine and barley faced over 200 percent and 80 percent tariffs, respectively, after Australia called for a COVID-19 investigation.³⁶
- **Risk to U.S.-China Trade Agreement:** In late October 2025, China and the United States agreed on a framework for a potential trade deal that would avoid restarting 100 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, while delaying Chinese rare-earth export curbs for one year. At the time, ZeroFox assessed that, even with this relatively peaceful resolution, the long-term trajectory of U.S.-China relations is very likely to be acrimonious. Japan's dispute with China over Taiwan likely represents a key risk to this trade deal and very likely explains why President Trump made the two phone calls. Were the United States to be perceived as siding with Japan or Taiwan, China would very likely reinstitute rare-earth export curbs, thus imperiling the entire deal.

³²

[hXXps://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-suspend-imports-japanese-seafood-amid-diplomatic-dispute-kyodo-reports-2025-11-19/](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-suspend-imports-japanese-seafood-amid-diplomatic-dispute-kyodo-reports-2025-11-19/)

³³

[hXXps://www.reuters.com/world/china/japan-pm-takaichi-speak-with-donald-trump-by-phone-tuesday-fnn-says-2025-11-25/](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/japan-pm-takaichi-speak-with-donald-trump-by-phone-tuesday-fnn-says-2025-11-25/)

³⁴ [hXXps://restofworld.org/2025/china-ev-tariffs-agriculture-sanctions-us-eu/](https://restofworld.org/2025/china-ev-tariffs-agriculture-sanctions-us-eu/)

³⁵

[hXXps://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/17/603103680/in-latest-trade-salvo-china-imposes-179-percent-tariff-on-u-s-sorghum](https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/17/603103680/in-latest-trade-salvo-china-imposes-179-percent-tariff-on-u-s-sorghum)

³⁶ [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/68682550](https://www.bbc.com/news/68682550)



Africa

Morocco: Generation Z Protest Risk During AFCON

The 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON 2025) is scheduled to take place from 21 December, 2025, to 18 January, 2026, in Morocco. The tournament is spread across the host cities of Agadir, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakesh, Rabat, and Tangier; Rabat will be responsible for the majority of fixtures. ZeroFox anticipates that the crime and public safety risk will be moderate, with visitors primarily exposed to opportunistic petty crime rather than serious targeted violence.

Mobilizations linked to recent widespread Generation Z protests are unlikely to subside before AFCON 2025 and may flare again in host cities, where media attention will be highest.

Opportunistic lone-actor terrorism cannot be ruled out—as demonstrated by incidents in Morocco and globally—especially given the appeal of major sporting events to extremist individuals or groups seeking to cause harm and maximize impact.

- **Generation Z Protest:** In late September 2025, demonstrations in major cities—including Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh, Tangier, and Agadir—as well as smaller towns, turned into rioting and sustained clashes with security forces, leaving three protesters dead and more than 2,000 people facing prosecution. Large, coordinated street mobilizations have since subsided; however, politically charged tensions are very likely to persist in the coming months.
- **Soccer-Specific Protests:** Recent unrest has been driven largely by GenZ 212, a loosely organized, mainly youth-led collective protesting authorities' alleged mismanagement of priorities, claiming that spending on stadiums and soccer tournaments is prioritized over that for core public services and living conditions. Therefore, the hosting of a major soccer tournament will very likely instigate further protests. GenZ 212 coordinates mostly through social media, where members and followers announce protest plans, recycle GenZ 212 messaging and imagery, and upload videos from demonstrations, including material alleging abuse by security forces.
- **Worldwide Phenomenon:** Morocco's GenZ 212 protests are part of a broader series of Gen Z-branded unrest seen this year, likewise driven by social issues and perceived government failures. Indonesia, Nepal, Peru, Madagascar, and Mexico have also experienced youth-led movements that have leveraged social media to gain followers and mobilize.



Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.



Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

