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Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP

#29: March 27, 2026

F-2026-03-27a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics, Deep and Dark Web

March 27, 2026

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were *identified prior to 4:00 AM (EDT) on March 27, 2026*; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

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| Key Findings

- On March 26, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump issued a statement extending the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) by an additional 10 days; the new deadline is April 6, 2026.
- Iran rejected a 15-point U.S. proposal to end the conflict and countered with five conditions. Despite these proposals, the risk of escalation remains high. The U.S. Department of War ordered thousands of additional troops to the region, likely for potential ground operations or to challenge Iran's control of the SoH, while Iran has begun charging transit fees for passage to solidify its control.
- Earlier, on March 21, 2026, President Trump threatened attacks on Iran's energy infrastructure. Iran is expected to retaliate against facilities across the Gulf, which would almost certainly worsen the global energy crisis while ensuring it feeds into other sectors (led by global food trade).
- Handala Hack Team posted purported personal information about U.S. citizens, threatening to physically target U.S. employees of Lockheed Martin in Israel and their families if they did not cease their work supporting the war.

| Ceasefire Details

On March 26, 2026, President Trump issued a statement extending the deadline for Iran to open the SoH by an additional 10 days; the new deadline is April 6, 2026.¹ Earlier, he had threatened to strike Iranian power plants and oil infrastructure if the SoH was not reopened before March 27.

President Trump claims the extension is because “talks are going well,” and Iran has requested the extension.² The Iranian government denies any negotiations with the United States are happening; however, there is a roughly even chance that elements of the Iranian regime are in talks with the United States, and the denials are meant to maintain their public stance.

- On March 24, 2026, President Trump proposed a 15-point plan to end the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.³ The next day, Iran publicly rejected the plan, issued a counteroffer, and vowed to continue fighting.⁴

The U.S. proposal requires Iran, after a month-long ceasefire, to commit to never develop nuclear weapons. This includes banning enrichment and transferring all enriched nuclear material to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the proposal stipulates that Iran’s leading nuclear facilities be decommissioned and destroyed. Other demands include free navigation in the SoH, placing limits on the number and range of Iranian missiles, and ending Iran’s policy of supporting regional proxy groups through arms transfers or financial support.

- The primary benefit offered to Iran in the proposal is significant sanctions relief. Sanctions imposed in October 2025 very likely contributed to an economic

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[hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2026/03/26/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump?post-id=cmn7wvk1900003b6urlyztytz](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/26/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump?post-id=cmn7wvk1900003b6urlyztytz)

² [hXXps://www.theguardian\[.\]com/world/2026/mar/26/donald-trump-urges-iran-end-war-or-face-assassinations](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/26/donald-trump-urges-iran-end-war-or-face-assassinations)

³ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2026/03/24/world/middleeast/us-iran-peace-plan.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/world/middleeast/us-iran-peace-plan.html)

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[hXXps://www.presstv\[.\]ir/Detail/2026/03/25/765835/iran-rejects-us-proposal-lays-out-five-conditions-ending-imp-osed-war-source](https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/03/25/765835/iran-rejects-us-proposal-lays-out-five-conditions-ending-imp-osed-war-source)

collapse in Iran in December 2025, which, in turn, led to some of the largest protests in the Islamic Republic's history.⁵

Iran announced five conditions to end the war that included sanctions relief, recognition of Iranian control over the SoH, and a broader ceasefire encompassing Iran's proxy groups. Specifically, Iran demanded halting the war and the Israeli "assassination campaign" against Iranian military and political leadership. It is also demanding guarantees that these measures will not resume against Iran or Iran-aligned groups across the Middle East.

- Iran is unlikely to agree to a 30-day ceasefire prior to a more formal agreement, because such a pause would almost certainly allow for market stabilization, enable energy importers to stockpile, and permit the United States and Israel to re-arm without a guarantee to the end of fighting.
- In contrast, Iran is unlikely to rebuild its military within that same timeframe, while the economic stabilization during this 30-day period would likely limit the scope of U.S.-Israeli concessions.

The Iranian conditions largely avoid addressing the key issues outlined in the U.S. proposal: specifically, those regarding Iran's nuclear and other weapons programs. Iran is unlikely to agree to the U.S. demands as written, particularly the stipulation that it dismantle its nuclear facilities and restrict the use of a reduced missile arsenal to self-defense only. However, the war has very likely depleted Iran's weapons stockpiles and set back its nuclear program by years, to such an extent that the country would likely be in compliance with these requirements for years regardless of its intent.

Strait of Hormuz

Reopening of the SoH, preferably through diplomacy, remains central to both proposals. However, Iran's de facto control over the SoH provides its government with significant leverage to avoid concessions. Iran is expected to leverage its influence over energy markets to ensure that any ceasefire-driven stabilization does not leave the country vulnerable to future targeting.

⁵ ZeroFox Intelligence Brief: Iran Protests Leading to Likely U.S. Response, January 14, 2026

- Iran is reportedly allowing certain vessels to transit through the SoH if a fee is paid and proposing legislation in Parliament to make the toll permanent. Nearly two dozen vessels have reportedly used an Iran-approved route that runs along the Iranian coastline, north of Larak Island in the SoH—a change from the pre-conflict norm of ships sailing south of the island.⁶ The transit fee is reportedly USD 2 million and is only applicable to vessels not affiliated with the United States or Israel. Iran conveyed these terms in a letter circulated to members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on March 23, 2026.⁷

Iran is very unlikely to voluntarily relinquish its control over the SoH, as it likely views the threat of closing off the vital energy supply chain as key to avoiding future targeting by the United States or Israel. Consequently, Iran will likely apply the same logic to rejecting a ceasefire that would allow the United States to re-arm and stabilize markets if it does not include protections against future attacks.

| War Details

The U.S. and Israeli militaries estimate that they have destroyed about two-thirds of Iran's missile launchers,⁸ yet Iran continues to hit targets around the region. Iran is likely maintaining its advanced weapons stockpile by firing fewer munitions from hard-to-reach bases at already weakened targets.⁹

- On March 26, 2026, Iran fired 15 ballistic missiles and 11 drones at the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—the most since March 9.¹⁰ A day earlier, Iran fired no ballistic missiles at the UAE. The UAE is by far Iran's most targeted country in the region

⁶ <https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-24-2026/>

⁷ <https://www.dw.com/en/is-iran-cashing-in-millions-from-strait-of-hormuz-blockade/a-76503935>

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<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-25/iran-s-harder-to-hunt-long-range-missiles-taking-greater-toll>

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<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/live-blog/2026-03-26/live-iran-war-trump-latest-news-updates-analysis-oil-markets>

¹⁰ <https://x.com/ADMediaOffice/status/2037063271313006593>

Despite the recent uptick, attacks on the UAE overall are down, but the success rate is higher than in the earliest days of the conflict.¹¹

- Iranian officials stated they are preparing a “strong response” against the UAE, accusing it of playing an active role in supporting U.S.–Israeli military operations.¹² Additionally, Iran has stated that any facility hosting U.S. military forces—including hotels in the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and other regional countries—will be considered legitimate targets.¹³

A joint statement by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan warned that sleeper cells aligned with Iran are planning destabilization activities across the region.¹⁴

On March 24, 2026, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), a coalition of Iran-backed Iraqi militias, claimed it had destroyed a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter at Baghdad International Airport. The group also released a video purporting to be a first-person view (FPV) drone attacking the helicopter and a nearby U.S. radar system.¹⁵ The video is consistent with a fiberoptic FPV drone and does show a drone impacting a Black Hawk helicopter; however, ZeroFox cannot verify the legitimacy of the video or the IRI’s claims at this time.

- FPV drones are flown by remote control and stream live video back to the pilot, who can guide the drone to a specific target. Rather than being flown by line of sight (or guided to a target by pre-programmed guidance), FPV drones allow for real-time adjustments from a safe distance for greater accuracy.¹⁶

The use of FPV drones by Iran-backed militias in Iraq, if confirmed, represents a technology exchange that would likely cause operational difficulties for the United States. Fiberoptic FPV drones are reportedly immune to jamming and can carry small explosive

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[hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/live-blog/2026-03-26/live-iran-war-trump-latest-news-updates-analysis-oil-markets](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/live-blog/2026-03-26/live-iran-war-trump-latest-news-updates-analysis-oil-markets)

¹² [hXXps://x.com/Tasnimnews_EN/status/2037158572325212558?s=20](https://x.com/Tasnimnews_EN/status/2037158572325212558?s=20)

¹³ [hXXps://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/breaking-iran-vows-strike-tourist-36929458](https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/breaking-iran-vows-strike-tourist-36929458)

¹⁴ [hXXps://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/2036857246122926314](https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/2036857246122926314)

¹⁵ [hXXps://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/)

¹⁶ [hXXps://www.jouav.com/blog/what-is-an-fpv-drone.html](https://www.jouav.com/blog/what-is-an-fpv-drone.html)

payloads—very likely making them effective weapons for targeting U.S. aircraft, forces, and installations in Iraq.¹⁷

Russia has reportedly given FPV drone components to Iran, and Iran very likely possesses these drones in its inventory.¹⁸ However, until now it was unclear if Iran had transferred FPV drones to its proxies. If FPV drones in Iraq are confirmed, it will very likely lead to an increase in IRI attacks against U.S. targets in Iraq. Even if the U.S. military operation against Iran were to end, it is very likely FPV drones would continue to be used in Iraq against U.S. installations.

Cyber Activity

Coordinated cyber operations targeting government infrastructure and private-sector entities continue across Israel, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries. These activities appear to be driven primarily by pro-Iranian, pro-Palestinian, pro-Israel, anti-Iran, and pro-Russian hacktivist collectives employing a combination of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacement, data exfiltration, and claimed intrusions into Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

Handala Hack Team

On March 26, 2026, pro-Palestinian hacktivist group Handala Hack Team posted on its leak site claiming to release personally identifiable information (PII) and other data allegedly associated with 28 American senior engineers at the U.S.-based defense and aerospace manufacturer Lockheed Martin, who allegedly work in Israel. Handala Hack Team stated it gave these Lockheed Martin employees a 48-hour window to cease their operations that directly support U.S. and Israeli military action in Iran, further threatening to physically target the employees' homes and families in the United States—either with missiles or via the group's "friends" in the United States.

- Handala Hack Team also included images in its public post of the alleged employees' passports, work location details, home addresses, and other PII, effectively doxxing those that the group deems as responsible for developing weapons projects being used against Iran.

¹⁷ [hXXps://understandingwar\[.\]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-25-2026/)

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

If Handala Hack Team’s claims are true, this would constitute another example of the group escalating its tactics to include threats of physical violence, as seen on March 24, when the group announced a bounty on President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. However, in this case, the collective is directly threatening employees of a company; this is a notable deviation that is likely to continue depending on the outcome of the 48-window—and whether the group has capabilities to physically target entities in the United States as it claimed.

- There is a roughly even chance that Handala Hack Team’s post is a means to fearmonger and pressure the Lockheed Martin employees to comply. The collective is reportedly a state-sponsored group, and there is a roughly even chance that the threat indicates Iran’s willingness to engage in state-sponsored terrorism.
- The group has a history of sensationalist threats, but there are no reported instances of it carrying out physical attacks.

Lockheed Martin Employees Given 48 Hours to Respond: A Tight Deadline Looms

2026-03-26

Lockheed Martin Employees Given 48 Hours to Respond: A Tight Deadline Looms

We, the Handala Hack , have today initiated a new phase of Operation Lockheed Martin.

We now possess the complete data of 28 senior American engineers based in the occupied territories and involved in military projects—including names, identification numbers, passports, places of residence, and service bases. All of this information has been leaked .

These engineers, who have worked for years in key technical roles for the occupier's military, were engaged in critical projects such as the maintenance of F-35 and F-22 fighter jets and the THAAD defense system. The veil of technical secrecy has now been lifted.

In recent hours, we have established contact with some of them to demonstrate just how fragile digital barriers can be. From conversations about their daily interests to ordinary details of their lives, all was done to show that "privacy" is merely a word in a book, not a reality.

We called them and told them where they live, the names of their children, their favorite foods, their weekend activities, and the locations of their families' residences in the United States.

They were told they have a limited time to change course and leave an area that is no longer safe. We warned that delaying their decision means entrusting their fate to a storm that has already begun—a storm made not of smoke and fire, but of data and exposure.

They were given 48 hours to cease cooperation with the Zionist regime and leave the occupied territories immediately. Otherwise, their homes would become missile targets. We also have friends in the United States who care more for their families than they do themselves, and if they do not return home, these friends will visit their families.

Handala Hack Team's post on its leak site

Source: ZeroFox Intelligence

On March 26, Handala Hack Team posted on its Telegram channel announcing that an "FBI Breach is coming soon", further claiming that it will be the "biggest breach of the past decade." Following this post, Handala Hack Team's Telegram channel was taken down, almost certainly by Telegram to prevent the collective from releasing the alleged

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) breached data. This follows an FBI takedown of Handala Hack Team's leak sites.¹⁹

On March 25, Handala Hack Team claimed it had released 14 GB of personal and confidential documents linked to former Mossad director Tamir Pardo, alleging the data includes details of covert operations—including assassination activities and the Stuxnet cyber program targeting Iran. The group's leak seemingly includes several images of Tamir Pardo and others, along with emails allegedly discussing strategies for Iran and other sensitive information.

| Conclusion

The release of demands by both sides to end the war in Iran suggests a shared understanding that the conflict can conclude via diplomatic de-escalation. Iran stands to gain significantly from the offered sanction relief, and the U.S. proposal appears to ensure the survival of its political and military establishment. For the United States, a potential path to restoring the SoH as a serviceable supply chain is visible. Further, the concessions regarding Iran's nuclear and weapons requirements are likely less onerous than they appear, given the level of destruction inflicted on those programs during Operation Epic Fury. However, certain signals point toward escalation. These include the continued buildup of U.S. forces in the region and unresolved issues surrounding Iranian control of the SoH and Iran-aligned groups—notably Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Israel is likely to continue targeting regardless.

¹⁹ <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-disrupts-iranian-cyber-enabled-psychological-operations>

| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%