



| Flash |

Israel and Iran at War

F-2025-06-13b

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitical

June 13, 2025

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 7:00 AM (EDT) on June 13, 2025**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

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| Key Findings

- On June 12, 2025, Israel began what it said would be days of attacks against Iranian military and nuclear sites. In the coming days, there will likely be a comprehensive campaign to destroy Iranian air defense systems, communications networks, and offensive military capabilities, as well as its nuclear weapons program.
- Iran will almost certainly retaliate. In addition to drone attacks against Israel, Iran will likely also launch ballistic missiles, which are generally harder to intercept. Strikes from what is left of Iran's proxies in Syria are also likely.
- Historically, Iran's full retaliation to military aggression has not been immediate, and its options remain extremely limited due to the government's conventional military weaknesses and degradations to its proxies.
- Western physical assets in the region are at risk of terror attacks, with embassies, military installations, international organizations, and Western companies in the region all being potential targets. In addition, the assets of oil companies, financial services, and telecommunications are likely targets for cyberattacks, which allows Iran plausible deniability.
- The Middle Eastern oil industry is particularly vulnerable, as Iran has demonstrated an ability to impact the industry's operations; there is a roughly even chance Iran will block oil supply through the strategic Strait of Hormuz (SoH).

| Analyst Commentary

Strikes Decapitate Iranian Military

During the early morning hours of June 13, 2025, approximately 200 Israeli aircraft launched dozens of “preemptive” strikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites across the country, including the Natanz Nuclear Facility, missile production sites, and several targets in residential areas of Iran’s capital, Tehran. According to Israeli and Iranian sources, a number of senior Iranian military figures—such as Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Hossein Salami and Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, as well as a number of prominent nuclear scientists—were killed in the attack.¹ Further Israeli strikes are anticipated in the coming days. In response to Israel’s strikes, Iran reportedly launched more than 100 drones toward Israel, which declared a state of emergency in anticipation of further attacks.² However, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that all drones were successfully intercepted before they reached Israeli airspace.³

- Commenting on the strikes, Eyal Zamir, the head of the IDF, claimed that Iran’s nuclear program had “reached the point of no return.” Meanwhile, an unnamed senior Israeli intelligence figure also asserted that Iran recently reached the point where it could likely develop “15 nuclear devices within days.” Both these claims reportedly contradict assessments made by U.S. intelligence agencies.⁴
- Following the strikes, senior U.S. officials stated that Israel acted unilaterally, warning Iran not to target U.S. facilities in the region in response.⁵
- U.S. President Donald Trump stated that he hopes Iran will continue to negotiate a nuclear agreement, despite the attack.⁶

¹ [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/6/13/sounds-of-explosions-heard-in-irans-capital-tehran](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/13/sounds-of-explosions-heard-in-irans-capital-tehran)

² [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/live/c93ydeqq71t](https://www.bbc[.]com/news/live/c93ydeqq71t)

³ [hXXps://www.jns\[.\]org/idf-working-to-intercept-100-plus-iranian-drones/](https://www.jns[.]org/idf-working-to-intercept-100-plus-iranian-drones/)

⁴

[hXXps://www.economist\[.\]com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/06/13/israel-launches-an-attack-on-iran-without-america](https://www.economist[.]com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/06/13/israel-launches-an-attack-on-iran-without-america)

⁵

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/rubio-says-us-not-involved-israeli-strikes-against-iran-2025-06-13/](https://www.reuters[.]com/world/middle-east/rubio-says-us-not-involved-israeli-strikes-against-iran-2025-06-13/)

⁶ [hXXps://www.axios\[.\]com/2025/06/13/israel-strike-iran-trump-nuclear-talks](https://www.axios[.]com/2025/06/13/israel-strike-iran-trump-nuclear-talks)

- Several British outlets reported that the United Kingdom is not planning to aid Israel in its defense against Iranian drone and missile strikes.⁷
- According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iranian nuclear sites at Fordo and Isfahan were not hit. However, there is a roughly even chance they will be targeted in the next 24–72 hours.⁸

Iranian Response

Iran will almost certainly retaliate further. In addition to drone attacks against Israel, Iran will likely also launch ballistic missiles, which are generally harder to intercept, and strikes from what is left of Iran's proxies in Syria are also likely. Attacks on Israeli embassies and commercial entities are probable, and a cyber response is very likely. However, the Iranian government is very likely aware it cannot survive a conventional war with Israel and the United States that threatens the country's territorial integrity. Furthermore, Iran's proxy networks in the region—led by Hamas, Hezbollah, and those operating in Syria—have been significantly weakened in the last year.

- Normally, Iran uses proxies in Iraq and Syria—as well as Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon—to target Israel. Such attacks give the Iranian government plausible deniability and, with some exceptions, remain limited in scope.
- Iran-backed groups remain strong in Iraq, where many U.S. military assets are located. The United States made it clear it did not play a role in these attacks, which reduces the likelihood that its own assets will be targeted.
- Iranian allies such as the Yemeni Houthi Movement and Iraqi Shi'a Special Groups also continue to target Israel; due to the physical distance and the groups' limited military capabilities, these organizations are very unlikely to present a significant threat to Israel in the short term.
- In April 2024, Iran launched several hundred drones and missiles toward Israel in response to a deadly Israeli bombing that struck an Iranian diplomatic facility in Syria weeks earlier. Despite the size and unprecedented nature of the strike, Israel (with help from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan) was able to intercept and nearly completely neutralize the attack.⁹

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[hXXps://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/britain-will-not-protect-israel-iran-retaliates-times-newspaper-2025-06-13/](https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/britain-will-not-protect-israel-iran-retaliates-times-newspaper-2025-06-13/)

⁸ [hXXps://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1933411146033246424](https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1933411146033246424)

⁹ ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report – Geopolitical and Cyber Risks of Iranian Attack on Israel dated April 15, 2024

Iran is likely to bide its time and use the asymmetric and proxy tactics it has employed for years if it does retaliate. There is a roughly even chance this would include not only some military engagements against the United States and ally forces in the region but also attacks that disrupt the region's oil supply, as well as cyberattacks targeting Western companies and critical infrastructure. These attacks satiate Iran's need for retaliation while limiting the prospect of an armed U.S. response.

Historically, Iran has preferred to conduct its attacks in ways that allow it to deny responsibility. However, there are several public responses Iran may take outside of military action. There is a roughly even chance Iran abandons nuclear talks with the United States and no longer observes operational limitations on its nuclear industry in both capacity and uranium enrichment, demonstrating its nuclear proliferation threat.

In another possible scenario, Iran could seek to target the world's oil supply. Since the United States unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, Iran has been threatening to close international navigation in the SoH, a vital sea passage, in response to U.S. economic sanctions and at times of heightened political tensions.¹⁰

- Iran would likely close the SoH with mines, small attack boats, and short-range missiles that would warn off any oil tankers.

If Iran attempts to close the SoH in retaliation, the economic impact is expected to be huge, as the SoH is used to connect crude oil from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Iraq to major markets in Asia, the Pacific, Europe, and North America. Shipping companies may decide it is not worth passing near Iran in the Gulf of Oman if attacks are likely. In the hours following Israel's strikes, the price of oil increased by 11 percent.¹¹

- If Iran closes the SoH, there would be even more difficulty transporting oil by tanker ship in the Middle East, and its oil production would be further sanctioned, pushing prices up even further.¹²

¹⁰

[hXXps://www.drewry\[.\]co\[.\]uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/maritime-research-opinions/potential-strait-of-hormuz-closure-threatens-21-of-global-ing-supply](https://www.drewry.co.uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/maritime-research-opinions/potential-strait-of-hormuz-closure-threatens-21-of-global-ing-supply)

¹¹ [hXXps://www.wsj\[.\]com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-trump-tariffs-trade-war-06-13-2025](https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-trump-tariffs-trade-war-06-13-2025)

¹² [hXXps://www.ft\[.\]com/content/b3faaef5-b68f-4a35-a54f-1305afda1483](https://www.ft.com/content/b3faaef5-b68f-4a35-a54f-1305afda1483)

- There is a roughly even chance Iran will target the oil facilities of other neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which it has done in recent history.¹³

While unlikely, it is possible airlines operating in the airspace of Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf of Oman could be impacted. Following the killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, Iran fired missiles into Iraq on January 7, 2020, and a commercial flight to Ukraine departing from Tehran was hit.¹⁴

- Israel has accused Iran of orchestrating dozens of attempted assassinations and kidnappings of Israelis abroad in recent years.¹⁵ There is a roughly even chance Iran will increase its targeting of Israelis abroad and encourage terror attacks inside Israel as a form of retaliation.

| Conclusion

It remains too soon to determine the impact of Israel's preemptive strike globally; it is difficult to envision Israeli actions alone decapitating the Iranian nuclear program. The absence of allied assistance in this operation—particularly from the United States, which is continuing to call for nuclear talks with Iran as soon as this weekend—suggests these strikes could be merely a continuation of Israel's wider war against Iranian proxy groups led by Hamas in Gaza. Regardless of the impact on Iran's nuclear program, its retaliatory options remain extremely limited due to the Iranian government's conventional military weaknesses and degradations to its proxies. For this reason, Israel may view the present as the opportune time to continue to strike, as the risk of successful Iranian military retaliation is at its lowest. This would leave Iran with few options other than to strike out at easier targets, like energy and supply chain networks.

¹³ [hXXps://thesoufancenter\[.\]org/intelbrief-2024-october-14/](https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-october-14/)

¹⁴

[hXXps://www.international\[.\]gc\[.\]ca/world-monde/issues_developpement-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/flight-vol-ps752.aspx](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_developpement-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/flight-vol-ps752.aspx)

¹⁵ [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/](https://www.reuters.com/investigations/murder-hire-inside-irans-proxy-war-with-israel-west-2024-10-05/)

| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Red

Sources may use

TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

Amber

Sources may use

TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may NOT share

TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

Recipients may ONLY share

TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that

TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

Green

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

Clear

Sources may use

TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may share

TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

Recipients may share

TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%