



**| Flash |**

# **Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP**

## **#32: April 7, 2026**

F-2026-04-07a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics, Deep and Dark Web

**April 7, 2026**

## Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 4:00 AM (EDT) on April 7, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

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## | Key Findings

- Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey sent a 45-day ceasefire proposal to Iran and the United States to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (SoH), as both sides reiterated threats to strike energy infrastructure, starting on April 7. Iran rejected the offer and is very unlikely to accept a ceasefire that requires the reopening of the SoH without security guarantees. The large gap in negotiating positions between both sides makes an agreement unlikely before the deadline.
- While ending the war quickly likely remains a priority, recent statements by U.S. President Donald Trump and ongoing troop deployments signal a likely short-term escalation of Operation Epic Fury. The U.S. military will likely wind down the conflict after meeting only some of its stated goals in the 2–3 week window offered by President Trump. However, if the United States expands its war aims to challenge Iranian control of the SoH, the conflict will almost certainly extend into May.

## | Latest Developments

On April 1, 2026, President Trump gave a televised address regarding Operation Epic Fury, signaling a likely short-term military escalation by the United States and Israel. Trump stated that the United States and Israel “must honor the dead by completing the mission” and were nearing their “strategic objectives”—which he framed as destroying Iran’s missile capability, proxy groups, and nuclear program and indicated the operation would take another “two or three weeks.”<sup>1</sup>

President Trump said that indirect talks with Iran would continue during the escalation period. However, the U.S. and Israeli militaries then began striking targets beyond the stated military objectives of Operation Epic Fury.

- On April 4, Israel reportedly targeted several Iranian petrochemical facilities, including one in Asaluyeh that produces roughly 50 percent of Iran’s petrochemical products.<sup>2</sup>
- On April 1 and 2, U.S. and Israel strikes targeted the Darou Pakhsh Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company and the Pasteur Institute of Iran in Tehran—allegedly for their roles as research institutions for Iran’s chemical weapons.<sup>3</sup>
- Airstrikes recently destroyed two major bridges in Iran, and President Trump stated Operation Epic Fury would exclusively target Iran’s bridges once the April 7 deadline to reopen the SoH expires, calling it “bridge day.”<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, an ongoing U.S. military build-up in the region continues, with the United States and Israel very likely finalizing targets in recent days, which likely includes further dual-use locations like those mentioned above, as well as Iranian energy installations.

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[hXXps://www.whitehouse\[.\]gov/releases/2026/04/president-trump-delivers-powerful-primetime-address-on-operation-epic-fury/](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/president-trump-delivers-powerful-primetime-address-on-operation-epic-fury/)

<sup>2</sup> [hXXps://aje\[.\]news/ukui10?update=4466304](https://aje[.]news/ukui10?update=4466304)

<sup>3</sup> [hXXps://understandingwar\[.\]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-2-2026/](https://understandingwar[.]org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-april-2-2026/)

4

[hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/economy/2026/4/6/in-maps-and-photos-five-iranian-civilian-bridges-at-risk-of-us-strikes](https://www.aljazeera[.]com/economy/2026/4/6/in-maps-and-photos-five-iranian-civilian-bridges-at-risk-of-us-strikes)

- A third U.S. aircraft carrier, the *USS George H.W. Bush*, deployed in early April and is due to arrive in the coming weeks, adding 6,000 more troops to the 50,000 troops already in the region.
- The *USS Boxer*, carrying 2,500 Marines, is in transit, while several thousand sailors and Marines arrived last week.<sup>5</sup>
- The Trump administration is also reportedly considering sending 10,000 more ground troops, which would likely bring the total number of U.S. ground troops in the region to approximately 17,000.<sup>6</sup>

Iran is likely focused on the U.S. military build-up in the region, pointing to these deployments as evidence that the United States is not serious about reaching a peace deal and is planning a ground attack instead.<sup>7</sup>

While President Trump did not mention the SoH in his televised address, on April 5, 2026, he issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Iran to open the SoH or the United States would begin striking Iranian critical infrastructure. On April 5, Trump made a social media post extending that deadline to 8:00 PM ET on April 7, without supplying a reason.<sup>8</sup>

- President Trump initially issued this threat—to target Iran’s energy and nuclear facilities unless it reopened the SoH—on March 21 but has extended it several times since, citing ongoing negotiations.

Just ahead of the deadline on April 6, Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey reportedly sent Iran and the United States a 45-day ceasefire proposal to reopen the SoH.<sup>9</sup> Iran publicly rejected the offer hours later, demanding an end to the war instead and reiterating its previous

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<sup>5</sup> [hXXps://www.stripes\[.\]com/branches/navy/2026-03-31/uss-boxer-11th-meu-hawaii-21240757.html](https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2026-03-31/uss-boxer-11th-meu-hawaii-21240757.html)

<sup>6</sup>

[hXXps://www.wsj\[.\]com/politics/national-security/what-an-influx-of-17-000-u-s-troops-could-mean-for-the-iran-war-7569afea](https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/what-an-influx-of-17-000-u-s-troops-could-mean-for-the-iran-war-7569afea)

<sup>7</sup> [hXXps://www.nbcnews\[.\]com/world/iran/iran-waiting-possible-us-ground-assault-troops-rcna265665](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iran-waiting-possible-us-ground-assault-troops-rcna265665)

<sup>8</sup> [hXXps://www.globalguardian\[.\]com/newsroom/president-trump-extends-deadline-for-iran-to-reach-deal](https://www.globalguardian.com/newsroom/president-trump-extends-deadline-for-iran-to-reach-deal)

<sup>9</sup> [hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2026/04/06/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/06/world/live-news/iran-war-us-trump-oil)

demands for a lifting of sanctions and ending hostilities against its proxies in Iraq and Lebanon.<sup>10</sup>

Iran is very unlikely to relinquish its control over the SoH and recently conducted its first attacks on regional shipping in weeks. However, Iran has also granted permission to more ships to pass, with at least 15 ships doing so in a 24-hour period between April 5–6.<sup>11</sup> Before that, on April 4, Iran announced that Iraq would be exempt from shipping restrictions in the SoH, allowing for as much as three million barrels a day of Iraqi oil cargoes.<sup>12</sup>

- The Iranian Parliament is rushing through the “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan”; the plan establishes Iranian control over the SoH, allowing it to impose a toll on vessels, and likely prohibits passage for vessels allied with the United States or Israel.<sup>13</sup> Ships being permitted to pass through the SoH now are likely abiding by the terms of the management plan.

During this same period, Iran struck Kuwaiti water and power facilities,<sup>14</sup> while Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and a major petrochemicals plant in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also reported attacks.<sup>15</sup> These attacks likely signal how Iran would retaliate if the United States proceeds with its threat to target Iranian infrastructure on April 7 if the SoH is not reopened.

- Iran is unlikely to agree to a 45-day ceasefire prior to a more formal agreement. Such a pause would almost certainly allow for market stabilization, enable energy importers to stockpile, and permit the United States and Israel to re-arm without a

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<sup>10</sup>

[hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-06/iran-rejects-ceasefire-before-trump-ultimatum-expires-on-hormuz](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-06/iran-rejects-ceasefire-before-trump-ultimatum-expires-on-hormuz)

<sup>11</sup>

[hXXps://www.worldcargonews.com/shipping-logistics/2026/04/iranian-media-say-15-ships-allowed-to-transit-hormuz-as-vessels-continue-to-grapple-with-increase-safety-risks/](https://www.worldcargonews.com/shipping-logistics/2026/04/iranian-media-say-15-ships-allowed-to-transit-hormuz-as-vessels-continue-to-grapple-with-increase-safety-risks/)

<sup>12</sup>

[hXXps://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-urges-customers-send-oil-loading-plans-after-hormuz-exemption-document-2026-04-06/](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraq-urges-customers-send-oil-loading-plans-after-hormuz-exemption-document-2026-04-06/)

<sup>13</sup> [hXXps://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-march-31-2026/)

<sup>14</sup>

[hXXps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/5/kuwait-says-power-water-facilities-hit-by-iran-as-gulf-attacks-continue](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/5/kuwait-says-power-water-facilities-hit-by-iran-as-gulf-attacks-continue)

<sup>15</sup> [hXXps://www.arabnews.com/node/2638856/middle-east](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2638856/middle-east)

guarantee to end the fighting. In contrast, Iran is unlikely to be able to rebuild its military within that same timeframe, and the economic stabilization achieved during this 45-day period would likely limit the scope of U.S.-Israeli concessions.

Instead, Iran has threatened to target nearby Gulf state energy infrastructure, as well as other dual-use critical infrastructure, while its proxies have threatened attacks against Israel and Jordan.<sup>16</sup> Houthi rebels in Yemen have warned they will expand the conflict to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea if the conflict escalates to targeting Iranian critical infrastructure.

To this end, on April 5, Hezbollah reportedly fired a cruise missile at an Israeli ship in what was likely a signal of its intentions and capabilities beyond the deadline.<sup>17</sup> If Operation Epic Fury escalates its targeting on Iranian energy infrastructure and dual-use critical infrastructure, reciprocal attacks from Iran and its proxies across the region are almost certain. These risks will likely persist throughout the 2–3 week window offered by President Trump. However, this window makes a U.S. war effort to reopen the SoH less likely, as it would likely need to extend into May to do so. While the United States does have enough forces in place to stage some ground operations, it is unlikely to attempt to reopen the SoH with what is currently in place. Therefore, there is a roughly even chance the conflict could begin deescalating by late April.

## **Cyber Activity**

Coordinated cyber operations targeting government infrastructure and private sector entities continue across Israel, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries. These activities appear to be driven primarily by pro-Iranian, pro-Palestinian, pro-Israel, anti-Iran, and pro-Russian hacktivist collectives employing a combination of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacement, data exfiltration, and claimed intrusions into Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

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<sup>16</sup>

[hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2026/4/5/kuwait-says-power-water-facilities-hit-by-iran-as-gulf-attacks-continue](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/5/kuwait-says-power-water-facilities-hit-by-iran-as-gulf-attacks-continue)

<sup>17</sup> [hXXps://aa\[.\]com\[.\]tr/en/middle-east/hezbollah-hits-warship-in-eastern-mediterranean-israeli-media/](https://aa[.]com[.]tr/en/middle-east/hezbollah-hits-warship-in-eastern-mediterranean-israeli-media/)

On April 5, 2026, pro-Iran threat group Nasir Security claimed responsibility for leaking data allegedly exfiltrated from Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior. To substantiate the claim, the group shared screenshots and multiple datasets as proof of compromise. It stated this cyberattack was conducted in retaliation for Kuwait’s support of the United States and Israel during the ongoing conflict.<sup>18</sup>

On April 6, 2026, Handala Hack Team claimed to have leaked all WhatsApp and X communications of Raz Zimmt, head of the Iran Desk at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies—allegedly exposing private and professional exchanges without restriction. If authentic, the data is likely to impact Zimmt’s credibility, expose contacts, and enable targeting of Israeli analysts and officials tied to Iran policy. It also aligns with Handala Hack Team’s modus operandi of using personal data exposure as pressure, which can drive intimidation, misinformation, and further harassment across the conflict environment.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> ZeroFox Intelligence

<sup>19</sup> ZeroFox Intelligence

## Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

## Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%