



ZEROFOX

INTELLIGENCE

| Report |

Monthly Geopolitical Report March 2025

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Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 12:00 AM (EST) on February 27, 2025**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.¹

Key Findings

- U.S. tariffs are expected to start in March before progressing throughout April, very likely leading to supply chain disruptions.
- The new U.S. administration has telegraphed its desire to end both Russia's war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war quickly. However, several powerful actors stand to lose from the security re-arrangements and will likely undercut U.S. aims.
- The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas negotiated by the Biden administration is likely to continue into March 2025 but collapse before being fully implemented, with the United States and Israel likely to pursue alternatives.
- The U.S. proposal to end Russia's war in Ukraine will likely include an implicit security guarantee for Ukraine, closer U.S.-Russia ties, billions in new European Union (EU) defense spending, and a U.S. military focused on China.

Europe

Russia-Ukraine Settlement

A series of high-profile diplomatic proceedings dominated February developments in Russia's war in Ukraine, while battlefield conditions remained relatively stable throughout the month. It has become increasingly clear the Trump administration is seeking a quick end to the war. The start of the U.S.-Russia diplomatic talks and Trump's pursuit of an agreement providing U.S. access to

¹ Report Purpose: The purpose of this report is to provide weekly updates on significant geopolitical occurrences and logistics developments, as well as potential impacts to the global supply chain.



Ukraine's natural resources marked the two most significant events this month. On February 18, U.S. and Russian delegations met for talks—for the first time during the conflict—in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. During the talks, the two sides agreed to appoint representatives to begin negotiations to end the war and work to renew U.S.-Russia diplomatic relations.² The lack of Ukrainian representation at these discussions prompted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to reiterate he would not accept a plan negotiated without the participation of Ukraine.³

In the beginning of February, President Trump suggested future U.S. aid to Ukraine could depend on allowing the United States access to Ukraine's mineral resources. (President Zelensky had first suggested Western partners could receive access to Ukrainian minerals in his proposed victory plan unveiled in October 2024.⁴) Over the next several weeks, the Trump administration increased pressure on Ukraine to sign a mineral deal, with two sides reaching an agreement on February 25. President Zelensky is expected to travel to Washington, DC, and sign the deal with President Trump on February 28.⁵

The deal will reportedly establish a joint U.S.-Ukraine fund to finance reconstruction projects. Under the terms of the agreement, Ukraine will contribute 50 percent of its future proceeds from developing its mineral resources and resource-related infrastructure to the joint U.S.-Ukraine fund. This includes revenues derived from minerals, some oil and gas projects, and associated infrastructure facilities, such as ports. Future agreements will reportedly define the U.S. stake in the fund. The deal also reportedly mentions that the United States will seek to maintain a stable Ukraine. As it stands, the deal falls short of providing any security guarantees for Ukraine or any guarantees the United States will have access to Ukrainian minerals in the short term.⁶ Despite this deal appearing to mimic the status quo, it does signal enough of a security guarantee that Russia is less likely to re-invade in the short term.

- **Looking Forward:** The U.S. strategy in talks appears clear: the United States likely aims to negotiate an end to long-standing post-World War II security dynamics. Including Saudi Arabia in the talks is very likely a sign that the Trump administration also wants a quick resolution to the Israel-Hamas war, with Saudi Arabia taking a leading role in getting Arab states on board with the U.S. position. The Trump administration is very likely forging a closer relationship with Russia. Were the war to continue, Russia would very likely increase

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[hXXps://meduza\[.\]io/en/feature/2025/02/18/u-s-and-russia-agree-to-begin-working-on-a-path-to-end-war-in-ukraine-following-talks-in-saudi-arabia](https://meduza.io/en/feature/2025/02/18/u-s-and-russia-agree-to-begin-working-on-a-path-to-end-war-in-ukraine-following-talks-in-saudi-arabia)

³ [hXXps://kyivindependent\[.\]com/ukraine-not-on-agenda-in-next-us-russia-talks-state-department-says/](https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-not-on-agenda-in-next-us-russia-talks-state-department-says/)

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[hXXps://www.president\[.\]gov\[.\]ua/news/haj-nasha-spilna-robota-za-planom-peremogi-yaknajshvidshe-ob-9384](https://www.president.gov.ua/news/haj-nasha-spilna-robota-za-planom-peremogi-yaknajshvidshe-ob-93849)

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[hXXps://www.ukrinform\[.\]net/rubric-polytics/3964840-trump-confirms-plans-to-meet-with-zelensky-on-february-28.html](https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3964840-trump-confirms-plans-to-meet-with-zelensky-on-february-28.html)

⁶ [hXXps://kyivindependent\[.\]com/breaking-kyiv-washington-reach-agreement-on-minerals-deal/](https://kyivindependent.com/breaking-kyiv-washington-reach-agreement-on-minerals-deal/)



its dependencies on China, while a quick resolution on Russian terms would likely negate that. The United States is very likely reducing its military commitments in Europe to focus more on Asia, where the Trump administration will likely provide similar NATO-style security agreements to U.S. allies like the Philippines and Japan instead. Despite clarifications on the U.S. position in the last month, there are a number of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by telegraphing the approach so publicly. European states are unlikely to view the threat of Russian aggression as minimally as the United States has and could prolong the war with increased investment in defense and in Ukraine. China is likely also concerned that a fully focused United States could impact its economic and defense sectors.

- **Security Guarantees:** One of Ukraine's main objectives in any peace negotiations will be concrete security guarantees from U.S. or European partners. Zelensky has reiterated several times he will not accept any peace agreement that does not include security guarantees. Trump recently stated the United States will not provide any such guarantees, which will likely put the onus on European states to ensure Ukraine's post-war security. Due to Ukraine's experiences with ambiguous Western security guarantees outlined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which failed to prevent Russia's invasion, Ukraine is unlikely to be satisfied with vague promises of defense and is likely to demand explicit measures.⁷ Therefore, the implicit U.S. security guarantee contained in the mineral agreement will very likely be key to convincing Ukraine they have enough U.S. protection without advertising to Russia that a Western military presence will remain on its border.
- **France leading European Guarantees:** French policymakers in particular are taking the lead on increasing European defenses. France has historically been skeptical that Americans could be counted on to prioritize European security. General de Gaulle famously withdrew from NATO's integrated command structure (though not the alliance as a whole) in 1966, declaring France needed to take on the political and strategic responsibilities it had gained by becoming a nuclear state.⁸ That independent streak now places France in the leadership position as a driver of European security, with Germany as a potential economic driver.
- **Nuclear Weapons Hosted in Germany:** Newly elected German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has floated the idea of France stationing jets armed with nuclear weapons in his country to replace the U.S. missiles that currently serve as a deterrent.⁹

⁷ [hXXps://treaties.un\[.\]org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb)

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[hXXps://enseignants.lumni\[.\]fr/fiche-media/00000000750/la-position-de-la-france-vis-a-vis-de-l-otan-en-1966.html](https://enseignants.lumni[.]fr/fiche-media/00000000750/la-position-de-la-france-vis-a-vis-de-l-otan-en-1966.html)

⁹ [hXXps://www.telegraph\[.\]co\[.\]uk/world-news/2025/02/24/france-to-offer-nuclear-shield-for-europe/](https://www.telegraph[.]co[.]uk/world-news/2025/02/24/france-to-offer-nuclear-shield-for-europe/)



Germany: Two-party Coalition Very Likely After General Elections

On February 23, 2025, Germany held general elections, with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Friedrich Merz winning the most votes (around 28 percent). The CDU and the Social Democrats (SPD) of outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who won 16 percent of the vote, are now very likely to form a coalition government. Two smaller parties failed to get above 5 percent, and now their votes will be shared among the larger parties in Parliament.¹⁰ This will allow the CDU and SPD to form a two-party coalition without needing a third party to gain a majority.

- **Looking Ahead:** A two-party coalition is seen as being better able to address Germany's key issues surrounding the sluggish economy, the need to increase spending, and the desire to reduce migration. Germany has seen rapid migration in recent years, while its economy has limited state spending due to tight debt restrictions. Merz hopes to have a coalition agreement in place by mid-April 2025. The election has revealed a clear path to agreement: a two-party coalition is expected to quickly decide on issues like reducing migration and spending more on German defense. Germany's decisions will reverberate across the EU, which faces similar issues—but without the economic power of Germany.

Belgium: Nine-day Rail Strike Until March 3, Followed by General Strike on March 31, 2025

Starting at 10:00 PM on February 21, 2025, two major rail lines began worker strikes causing major travel disruptions until March 3.¹¹ The strikes will cause immediate disruptions not only to rail travel but also to other forms of public transportation such as buses and trams, which will very likely see additional demand.

- **Further protests:** This is the latest major strike action, which has included repeated strikes on the 13th of each month by a coalition of unions. The last strike caused major aviation issues. Belgian unions are also planning a general strike on March 31, which is expected to be the most disruptive thus far.¹² The strikes are largely over the new government's plan to change benefits.

Serbian Protestors Call for Interim Transitional Government

On February 17, 2025, the Serbian ProGlas initiative called for an interim transitional government, claiming it would be the "least painful" way out of Serbia's political crisis. ProGlas's statement comes after months of student-led anti-government protests in response to the Novi Sad train station roof collapse, which ProGlas blames on corruption. Opposition politician Miroslav Aleksić, the president of the center-right National Movement of Serbia party, welcomed the initiative,

¹⁰ <https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-and-voter-demographics-explained-in-charts/a-71724186>

¹¹ <https://www.belgiantrain.be/en/travel-info/train-network-travel-info/strike>

¹² <https://www.brusselstimes.com/1440762/general-strike-announced-for-31-march-tbtb>



saying the current government has "lost its legitimacy."¹³ The protesters are largely non-aligned and have rejected the opposition's support, as protesters view them as similarly corrupt. Nevertheless, the protests have already seen numerous ministers resign, led by Prime Minister Milos Vucevic.

- **Further protests:** The persistence of the protest movement and ProGlas initiative represent one of the most serious challenges to President Aleksandar Vučić's government since his party came to power in 2012. Despite starting the protests over the train station collapse, the movement has expanded to include other indignities being blamed on the ruling class, with additional protests against both corruption and crackdowns on dissent.¹⁴ The protests have notably strengthened, as the government has offered concessions.

| Americas

Upcoming U.S. Tariffs in March and April 2025

U.S. President Donald Trump said the delayed tariffs on Canada and Mexico would go forward on March 4. Trump originally announced a plan to impose 25 percent tariffs on Canada and Mexico and 10 percent levies on Canadian oil scheduled to take effect on February 4. He then delayed them for one month after both countries agreed to tighten border and drug-trafficking restrictions. Thereafter, Trump announced a plan to impose a 25 percent import duty on steel and aluminum,¹⁵ followed by an executive order to investigate reciprocal tariffs on all the trading partners, both of which may start in April. Trump has also said he will likely impose tariffs on automobile, lumber, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical imports of around 25 percent.¹⁶

- **Tariffs:** Trump has enacted tariffs on aluminum and steel before, which likely increases the chance he will do so again. During his first presidency, Trump proposed the U.S. Reciprocal Trade Act, which would give the president broad powers to impose line-by-line tariffs across all trading partners. Therefore, some form of reciprocal tariffs are also likely. In the meantime, trade officials will analyze the tariff percentage that all countries place on U.S. imports and match them point for point.¹⁷ There is a roughly even chance that the definition of reciprocal will be expanded to include trade surpluses and taxes against U.S. companies.
- **Impacts:** The largest tariffs would be levied on countries in Asia like Thailand, Vietnam, and India, which (on average) impose far higher tariffs on the United States than the U.S. tariffs

¹³ [hXXps://vreme\[.\]com/en/vesti/proglas-prelazna-vlada-je-jedino-resenje/](https://vreme.com/en/vesti/proglas-prelazna-vlada-je-jedino-resenje/)

¹⁴ [hXXps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/15/thousands-protest-in-serbia-as-anger-over-corruption-swells](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/15/thousands-protest-in-serbia-as-anger-over-corruption-swells)

¹⁵ [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98yv3elyyqo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98yv3elyyqo)

¹⁶

[hXXps://www.euronews.com/business/2025/02/19/trump-raises-threat-of-higher-tariffs-on-more-goods-into-the-us](https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/02/19/trump-raises-threat-of-higher-tariffs-on-more-goods-into-the-us)

¹⁷ [hXXps://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-reciprocal-tariff-proposal-us-exports-8cf14a93](https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/trump-reciprocal-tariff-proposal-us-exports-8cf14a93)



charged to them. Brazil and South Africa are two other large exporting states that have historically protectionist trade policies when it comes to imports. Canada, Mexico, the EU, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan combined account for 80 percent of U.S. steel imports and, along with some Middle East allies, about 70 percent of aluminum imports.¹⁸ Many Asian countries produce popular cars and are also the biggest producers of semiconductors, led by Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.¹⁹ Semiconductor tariffs could lead to higher prices for consumer goods that use them, which include laptops, smartphones, and appliances. The pharmaceutical tariffs will primarily target EU companies, raising the cost of certain medications.

- **Retaliation:** The EU has already threatened retaliation, and Brazil said it was planning to raise tariffs on U.S. tech companies in response,²⁰ while media reports in Europe and Canada have highlighted similar ideas. Originally, many countries threatened to match U.S. tariffs to make sure that American consumers would also feel the economic pain of tariffs. However, because the U.S. economy is so much larger than those of other countries, matching tariffs would likely harm other countries more than American consumers. Instead, media reports and some public statements suggest countries are likely to enact more symbolic and targeted tariffs. During the first Trump administration, the EU and Canada chose to only tariff products like bourbon whiskey, Levi's jeans, and motorcycles because they are made in states that historically vote Republican.²¹ These products also have lower demand in Europe or Canada, so such tariffs would cause less damage to their economies. Since the first Trump administration, the EU has passed the Anti-Coercion Instrument, a mechanism designed to counter economic pressure. The EU runs a trade deficit of EUR 150 billion in digital services with the United States.²²
- **China:** While it remains unclear if any of these tariffs (which primarily target U.S. allies) will go into effect, the Trump administration announced separate, non-tariff supply trade restrictions against China, which are more concrete and more likely to occur. Aside from the new 10 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, in the last week, the United States also announced a slew of other supply chain measures targeting China. President Trump told the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to limit Chinese investments in U.S. tech, energy, and other strategic sectors.²³ Shortly after, the Commerce Department

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹

¹⁹ [hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-18/trump-says-likely-to-impose-25-tariffs-on-autos-drugs-chips](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-18/trump-says-likely-to-impose-25-tariffs-on-autos-drugs-chips)

²⁰ [hXXps://www.ajot.com/news/brazil-plans-levies-on-us-tech-firms-after-trump-steel-tariffs-report-says](https://www.ajot.com/news/brazil-plans-levies-on-us-tech-firms-after-trump-steel-tariffs-report-says)

²¹ [hXXps://www.euronews.com/2018/06/25/harley-davidson-hit-by-eu-tariffs](https://www.euronews.com/2018/06/25/harley-davidson-hit-by-eu-tariffs)

²²

²² [hXXps://www.euronews.com/business/2025/02/10/why-trumps-tariffs-could-push-europe-to-target-us-tech-services](https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/02/10/why-trumps-tariffs-could-push-europe-to-target-us-tech-services)

²³ [hXXps://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1328890.shtml](https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1328890.shtml)



called on Mexican officials to place their own tariffs on Chinese imports,²⁴ likely because China has been importing goods into Mexico and other allied states and then sending them on to the United States, likely with the aim of avoiding U.S. tariffs. Lastly, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) proposed imposing fees on the use of Chinese-built vessels shipping traded goods. Under the plan, shipping companies would pay several fees—including a levy up to USD 1 million—when their ships enter a U.S. port.

- **Australia:** An exemption to tariffs on aluminum has become a major political issue in Australia. President Trump accused the country of breaking a voluntary export limit agreement he alleges was agreed to verbally in 2018, though the Albanese government has said it is unable to find official documentation of this deal. Australia exported roughly USD 400 million tons of aluminum per year from 2021–2023, a significant but not overwhelming amount that was encouraged by the Biden administration.²⁵ However, the Trump administration views that figure differently, with the U.S. trade advisor stating that Australia's aluminum exports are "crushing" and "killing" America's manufacturing industry. These comments strongly signal that there will be no exception to the 25 percent import duty Australia seeks to escape.²⁶

Brazil: Former President Bolsonaro Charged with Orchestrating a Coup

On February 18, 2025, former President Jair Bolsonaro was officially charged with orchestrating a coup and attempting to poison President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva. Prosecutor-General Paulo Gonet alleges that Bolsonaro and 33 others participated in a plan to remain in power after losing the 2022 elections to Lula. According to police, the plot included plans to sow distrust in the electoral system, drafting a decree to provide legal cover for the plot, pressuring top military brass to go along with the plan, and inciting a riot in the capital. The Supreme Court will now analyze the charges, and, if accepted, Bolsonaro will stand trial and likely be found guilty.²⁷

- **Upcoming Elections:** Bolsonaro is already banned from participating in the 2026 general elections but reportedly still harbors ambitions to run again. Expect Bolsonaro to orchestrate large protests by his supporters ahead of key trial dates; he has already called on the United States to support his candidacy and for protests on March 16. While Bolsonaro running in the next election is extremely unlikely, current President Lula is also

²⁴

[hXXps://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/trump-team-asks-mexico-to-levy-duty-on-chinese-imports/articleshow/118511408.cms](https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/trump-team-asks-mexico-to-levy-duty-on-chinese-imports/articleshow/118511408.cms)

²⁵ [hXXps://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aluminium-exports-under-fire-australia-really-blame](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aluminium-exports-under-fire-australia-really-blame)

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷

[hXXps://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2025/02/18/pgr-denuncia-ex-presidente-jair-bolsonaro-por-tentativa-de-golpe-de-estado.ghtml](https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2025/02/18/pgr-denuncia-ex-presidente-jair-bolsonaro-por-tentativa-de-golpe-de-estado.ghtml)



polling poorly, and the prospect of a Bolsonaro ally winning the next elections is high. However, Bolsonaro is pressuring his allies in Congress to exonerate him. Any other candidates, including Bolsonaro's sons, will be expected to pardon him if they win the election.

Ecuador: Virtual Tie in First-Round Presidential Election, with Second Round Set for April 13, 2025

On February 9, 2025, Ecuador held the first round of the presidential election, with both President Daniel Noboa and his main rival, Luisa Gonzalez, receiving around 44 percent of the vote. With neither candidate getting enough votes to win outright, a second-round vote will take place on April 13, 2025.²⁸ Noboa has only been in office since late 2023 after he finished out the term of former President Guillermo Lasso, who resigned. Noboa's first year in office proved popular due to his tough stance on crime against drug-trafficking gangs that have turned Ecuador from one of the region's safest countries to one of its most dangerous. However, Noboa's popularity has declined significantly, as a drought has led to regular nationwide electricity blackouts for months. The state of emergency imposed to battle drug gangs has also dampened economic activity while achieving only marginal security gains. Gonzalez's better-than-expected performance slightly increases her likelihood of winning in the second round. Gonzalez has promised left-leaning economic reforms and right-leaning social restrictions around abortion. Noboa, on the other hand, is more conservative economically and well-liked by the international business community.²⁹

Gonzalez has close ties with former President Rafael Correa, who is living in exile in Belgium but maintains a strong base of support.³⁰ Correa is closely affiliated with other left-leaning presidents in the region, like Nicolas Maduro and Evo Morales, and "Correista" candidates are expected to undertake policies that help the poor while also targeting political adversaries and wealthy multinationals. Noboa has consolidated his position as the leader of the anti-Correa movement.

- **Crime:** With the vote so close, crime could play an important role in the last month of the election. Drug gangs assassinated a leading candidate ahead of the 2023 elections, which has been credited with helping Noboa win the election. A significant increase in crime in the next month could also damage Noboa. Since pandemic restrictions were lifted in

²⁸

[hXXps://www.infobae\[.\]com/america/america-latina/2025/02/10/daniel-noboa-y-luisa-gonzalez-se-disputaran-la-presidencia-de-ecuador-en-una-segunda-vuelta-electoral/](https://www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2025/02/10/daniel-noboa-y-luisa-gonzalez-se-disputaran-la-presidencia-de-ecuador-en-una-segunda-vuelta-electoral/)

²⁹

[hXXps://www.bloomberg\[.\]com/news/articles/2024-05-23/noboa-s-waning-popularity-puts-ecuador-bond-rally-at-risk](https://www.bloomberg[.]com/news/articles/2024-05-23/noboa-s-waning-popularity-puts-ecuador-bond-rally-at-risk)

³⁰

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/americas/ecuador-ex-president-correas-party-taps-luisa-gonzalez-presidential-candidate-2024-08-10/](https://www.reuters[.]com/world/americas/ecuador-ex-president-correas-party-taps-luisa-gonzalez-presidential-candidate-2024-08-10/)



mid-2021, Ecuador has emerged as one of the region's most violent countries. Ecuador has shifted from simply being a transit country for drugs produced in Peru and Colombia to a stronghold for drug cartels and criminal groups. After several unsuccessful temporary states of emergency, Noboa imposed an indefinite emergency order at the beginning of 2024.³¹ The popular tough-on-crime crackdown drastically reduced the homicide rate but imposed economy-damaging movement restrictions and curfews. Ecuador's crime rate remains elevated and stagnant but below the 2023 highs.³²

- **Power outages:** Noboa's popularity remained elevated even after the security impacts from his emergency order leveled off; the economic impacts also failed to dent his approval ratings. His popularity only began to decline once emergency power cuts were enforced. Ecuador has failed to diversify its energy sources and wider economy, and the country's hydroelectricity dependencies have been exposed by drought, with hours of daily power outages nationwide.³³
- **Economy:** Noboa remains popular with the international business community, which is likely to react positively to an election victory. On the other hand, a Gonzalez victory—despite campaigning on more moderate economic change—will likely coincide with a drop in foreign investor sentiment. Gonzalez has close ties to Correa, who is widely perceived by international investors as having used Ecuador's oil wealth to implement massive spending plans against the interests of international investors.

| Middle East

Israel Raises Tensions Elsewhere amid Calm in Gaza and Lebanon

On February 8, 2025, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam succeeded in forming a new government, Lebanon's first since 2022. Although Hezbollah and its Shi'a ally Amal were able to name four of the cabinet's 26 ministers, including the head of the Finance Ministry (Yassine Jaber), the government is widely seen as the most technocratic in decades, with Hezbollah's role significantly weakened.^{34,35}

³¹

[hXXps://www.france24\[.\]com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240703-ecuador-noboa-vuelve-a-decretar-el-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-tras-ser-revocados-dos-anteriores](https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240703-ecuador-noboa-vuelve-a-decretar-el-estado-de-excepci%C3%B3n-tras-ser-revocados-dos-anteriores)

³² [hXXps://www.riotimesonline\[.\]com/ecuador-sees-homicide-drop-under-noboa/](https://www.riotimesonline.com/ecuador-sees-homicide-drop-under-noboa/)

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[hXXps://www.bloomberg\[.\]com/news/articles/2024-05-23/noboa-s-waning-popularity-puts-ecuador-bond-rally-at-risk](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-23/noboa-s-waning-popularity-puts-ecuador-bond-rally-at-risk)

³⁴

[hXXps://www.washingtoninstitute\[.\]org/policy-analysis/lebanons-new-government-may-walk-thin-line-between-promises-and-compromises](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lebanons-new-government-may-walk-thin-line-between-promises-and-compromises)

³⁵

[hXXps://www.economist\[.\]com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/13/hizbullahs-decline-is-a-boon-for-lebanons-new-government](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2025/02/13/hizbullahs-decline-is-a-boon-for-lebanons-new-government)



Ten days later, Israel forces mostly withdrew from Lebanon. However, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops remained on five strategic hilltop outposts just inside Lebanon's side of the border. This decision triggered threats and recriminations from the Lebanese government and Hezbollah—but no clashes or efforts to force the remaining Israelis out of the country.³⁶

In the Gaza Strip, the first phase of the ceasefire has proceeded largely according to plan. To date, despite a level of uncertainty and chaos surrounding Trump's proposal to remove Gaza's population from Gaza,³⁷ 25 Israelis and foreign nationals have been released in exchange for more than 350 Palestinian prisoners.³⁸³⁹ The first phase of the truce is set to expire on March 2, 2025. However, U.S.-backed negotiations are currently underway to extend this portion of the agreement.⁴⁰

Since the October 7, 2023, attack, the West Bank has also seen a surge in violence. Nonetheless, the situation has escalated further in recent weeks. In late January 2025, Israeli troops launched a large-scale offensive against Palestinian militants in Jenin under the name "Iron Wall." The operation then expanded to in and around Tulkarm in early February, displacing tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians.⁴¹ In response, a Hamas-aligned group calling itself the Tulkarm Brigade seemingly took responsibility for three bombs that detonated in empty buses in the Tel Aviv area on February 20, 2025.⁴² This incident triggered the deployment of Israeli tanks into the West Bank for the first time since 2002, during the Second Intifada.⁴³

- **Looking forward in Lebanon:** Despite the threats from Hezbollah and protestations of the Lebanese government, Israeli forces are likely to remain in their Lebanese outposts indefinitely.⁴⁴ The still beleaguered Hezbollah and undermanned Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are highly unlikely to risk reigniting a conflict with Israel in the near to medium term.
- **Gaza:** By attempting to secure an extension of the first phase of the agreement in the Gaza Strip rather than moving forward to its next stages, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is likely trying to freeze the conflict, guaranteeing that Hamas remains in power

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[hXXps://www.middleeastmonitor\[.\]com/20250218-aoun-i-will-not-accept-a-single-israeli-remaining-on-lebanese-territory/](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250218-aoun-i-will-not-accept-a-single-israeli-remaining-on-lebanese-territory/)

³⁷ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2025/02/04/us/politics/trump-gaza-strip-netanyahu.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/04/us/politics/trump-gaza-strip-netanyahu.html)

³⁸ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/world-middle-east-67477240](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67477240)

³⁹ [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/2/15/israeli-captives-story](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/15/israeli-captives-story)

⁴⁰

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/israel-looks-extend-phase-one-gaza-truce-long-term-deal-proves-elusive-2025-02-25/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-looks-extend-phase-one-gaza-truce-long-term-deal-proves-elusive-2025-02-25/)

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[hXXps://www.france24\[.\]com/en/middle-east/20250203-israeli-army-operation-in-west-bank-s-tulkarm-like-a-smaller-scale-gaza](https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250203-israeli-army-operation-in-west-bank-s-tulkarm-like-a-smaller-scale-gaza)

⁴² [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/cwydln190xqo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwydln190xqo)

⁴³

[hXXps://apnews\[.\]com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-ceasefire-hostages-02-23-2025-1c2dc86afd2e05888d5d588f462e898b](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-ceasefire-hostages-02-23-2025-1c2dc86afd2e05888d5d588f462e898b)

⁴⁴ [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/israel-news/defense-news/article-842516](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-842516)



while also ensuring the release of as many hostages as possible. Netanyahu's main priority is very likely preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state. This means averting the emergence of any new political force in the enclave that could realistically challenge Hamas and function as a legitimate interlocutor in future peace talks. In practical terms related to the ceasefire, it also means not allowing the agreement to proceed to its second and third stages, which include an end to the war and the beginning of reconstruction.

- **West Bank and Syria:** Netanyahu also appears eager to inflame regional tensions and set conditions for potential future conflicts that could continue to delay a domestic political reckoning for his government's failure to prevent Hamas' attack on October 7.⁴⁵ In this vein, on February 23, 2025, Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that the IDF will stay in some West Bank refugee camps for the next year and that thousands of displaced Palestinian residents cannot return to their homes for the foreseeable future.^{46,47} On the same day, Netanyahu warned that Israel will not "allow" Syrian government forces to deploy south of Damascus in the Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda provinces.⁴⁸

Syria Holds National Dialogue as Tensions Linger in Northeast

On February 24, 2025, Syria's transitional government began a two-day national dialogue conference billed as the first step toward forming a new constitutional order. Hundreds of attendees representing Syria's diverse ethnic, religious, and social groups attended the event, where participants discussed ideal frameworks for the country's new constitution. Authorities announced the beginning of the conference only 24 hours before it began; that and its short length led some observers to speculate the transition government may have sought to obfuscate the process.⁴⁹ Syria's Kurdish minority also expressed disappointment at receiving few invites, despite Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling much of the country's northeast.⁵⁰

- **The Conference's Conclusions:** A joint statement issued at the dialogue's conclusion called for a constitution that enshrines "a balance between authorities" and establishes "justice, freedom, and equality" for citizens.⁵¹ The recommendation is non-binding, but the transition government has promised to take it into consideration during the formation of the new constitution.

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[hXXps://www.haaretz\[.\]com/israel-news/2025-02-24/ty-article/.premium/while-israels-enemies-attempt-to-reduce-tensions-netanyahu-keeps-pushing-for-conflict/00000195-3491-d641-abfd-b7fb30490000](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-02-24/ty-article/.premium/while-israels-enemies-attempt-to-reduce-tensions-netanyahu-keeps-pushing-for-conflict/00000195-3491-d641-abfd-b7fb30490000)

⁴⁶ [hXXps://www.ft\[.\]com/content/8e2b53ab-1de1-466e-b759-501cc8a0ce58](https://www.ft.com/content/8e2b53ab-1de1-466e-b759-501cc8a0ce58)

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[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/liveblog_entry/katz-says-he-instructed-idf-to-stay-for-year-in-west-bank-refugee-camps-and-not-allow-40000-residents-home/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/katz-says-he-instructed-idf-to-stay-for-year-in-west-bank-refugee-camps-and-not-allow-40000-residents-home/)

⁴⁸ [hXXps://apnews\[.\]com/article/israel-syria-buffer-zone-military-netanyahu-6a107f835d4262b56551ad940a5144d7](https://apnews.com/article/israel-syria-buffer-zone-military-netanyahu-6a107f835d4262b56551ad940a5144d7)

⁴⁹ [hXXps://understandingwar\[.\]org/background/iran-update-february-25-2025](https://understandingwar.org/background/iran-update-february-25-2025)

⁵⁰ [hXXps://theArabweekly\[.\]com/syrias-national-dialogue-entrenches-sharaas-power-while-sidelining-kurds](https://theArabweekly.com/syrias-national-dialogue-entrenches-sharaas-power-while-sidelining-kurds)

⁵¹ [hXXps://www.aljazeera\[.\]com/news/2025/2/26/key-takeaways-from-syrias-national-dialogue-conference](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/26/key-takeaways-from-syrias-national-dialogue-conference)



- **Signs of Progress with the SDF:** Talks continue between Damascus and the SDF, which controls much of the northeast, over a possible merger. SDF leaders recently expressed openness to integrating into the new Syrian military, though significant disagreements will need to be resolved before an agreement is reached.⁵²

Turkey: PKK Leader Calls for the Group's Dissolution

On February 27, 2025, the leader of Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group waging a 40-year insurgency against the government, called for the group's disbandment and an end to the conflict. The leader, Abdullah Ocalan, met with Turkish authorities several times in recent months, sparking rumors that he was considering calling for an end to the fighting. Though he likely made the announcement only after securing concessions from Turkey, the terms of their agreement are unclear at this point. Ocalan's announcement has the potential for wide-ranging impacts in the region.⁵³

- **PKK Disbandment:** It is unclear if the PKK will immediately heed Ocalan's call. Ocalan has exercised little day-to-day control over the group since his imprisonment in 1999, though he remains highly respected within Turkey's Kurdish community.⁵⁴ Whether PKK fighters lay down their arms will likely depend on messaging from other leading Kurdish figures within Turkey and is unlikely to be immediate.
- **Effects Within Turkey:** If the PKK halts fighting, Turkey may allocate resources to develop the Kurdish-majority southeast, which has fallen behind the rest of the country in recent decades. In December 2024, authorities announced a development plan worth USD 14 billion for the southeast following a meeting with Ocalan, indicating Turkey may have committed to greater support for the region in exchange for Ocalan's announcement.⁵⁵ A halt to fighting could also ease social tensions within Turkey and free up government resources to focus on other issues.
- **Effects in Syria:** If the PKK disbands, it will place more pressure on the Kurdish-led SDF to reach a deal with Damascus over integrating into the country's new military. PKK-affiliated groups make up a portion of the SDF's forces, which has caused friction with Turkish-allied Syrian authorities. The PKK's disbandment would make it easier for the SDF to remove these fighters from its ranks, potentially facilitating an agreement with Damascus. The loss of these fighters would also weaken the SDF's military capabilities, likely making the group more amenable in discussions.⁵⁶

⁵² [hXXps://www.newarab\[.\]com/news/kurdish-led-sdf-agree-integrate-forces-syrian-army](https://www.newarab.com/news/kurdish-led-sdf-agree-integrate-forces-syrian-army)

⁵³ [hXXps://www.newarab\[.\]com/news/major-shift-ocalan-calls-pkk-drop-weapons-disband](https://www.newarab.com/news/major-shift-ocalan-calls-pkk-drop-weapons-disband)

⁵⁴ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2025/02/28/world/middleeast/pkk-leader-abdullah-ocalan.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/world/middleeast/pkk-leader-abdullah-ocalan.html)

⁵⁵ [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/middle-east/call-peace-turkey-whats-it-key-actors-2025-02-27/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/call-peace-turkey-whats-it-key-actors-2025-02-27/)

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*



| Asia

Philippine VP Duterte Impeached Ahead of What Could Be Violent Election Campaign in May 2025

The Philippine House of Representatives impeached Vice President Sara Duterte for threatening to assassinate President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and for allegedly misusing public funds. However, the Senate held off deciding whether Duterte should be ousted until June. If 15 out of the 23 sitting senators agree to convict her for impeachable offenses, she will be removed as vice president, but senators may also vote to throw out the impeachment instead to keep her in office.⁵⁷

Duterte's impeachment signals an intensified feud with her former ally President Marcos and his supposed intent to curtail her presidential ambitions ahead of the midterm elections on May 12. Duterte's father, the previous president Rodrigo Duterte, called on the armed forces to intervene on his daughter's behalf, highlighting the potential for social unrest between the two powerful families.⁵⁸

- **U.S.-Filipino Ties:** The unrest also has implications for U.S.-China relations. Under Marcos Jr., the Philippines has established closer ties with the United States; the country now has U.S. backing in its territorial dispute with China, where both nations contest the same waters. (China has similar territorial disputes with most of its neighbors, many of whom have established military ties with the United States which include naval bases across South and East Asia.) The United States now has an entire string of allies that could hypothetically block Chinese shipping lanes. In light of its export-dependent economy, China likely views control of those shipping lanes as vital to its national security.
- **Elections:** The political dispute between Duterte and Marcos could impact U.S.-Filipino ties, especially as Duterte's father, Rodrigo, had closer ties with China.

Indonesia Protests over Budget Cuts

Students in Indonesia engaged in a week of protest against budget cuts by the administration of Prabowo Subianto, using the tagline "Dark Indonesia" (Indonesia Gelap). The phrase is a counterpoint to the "Golden Indonesia" development ideal championed by the President and also happens to represent one of the most visible signs of the austerity imposed on the civil service: lights in office buildings are being shut off at 4:30 PM in order to reduce hours worked.⁵⁹

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[hXXps://www.straitstimes\[.\]com/asia/se-asia/philippine-vice-president-sara-duterte-impeached-for-alleged-misuse-of-funds](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/philippine-vice-president-sara-duterte-impeached-for-alleged-misuse-of-funds)

⁵⁸ [hXXps://eastasiaforum\[.\]org/2025/02/25/dutertes-impeachment-and-the-spectacle-of-philippine-politics/](https://eastasiaforum[.]org/2025/02/25/dutertes-impeachment-and-the-spectacle-of-philippine-politics/)

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[hXXps://www.abc\[.\]net\[.\]au/news/2025-02-20/prabowo-faces-first-nationwide-protest-dark-indonesia-budget-cut/104959096](https://www.abc[.]net[.]au/news/2025-02-20/prabowo-faces-first-nationwide-protest-dark-indonesia-budget-cut/104959096)



- Motivations:** Cuts to education funding are playing a key role in motivating students to take to the streets. Much of the budget squeeze is due to Prabowo's flagship program, which aims to provide free meals to schoolchildren in order to address childhood malnutrition. Experts caution that the program might be too expensive and force deleterious cuts in other sectors, a prediction that appears to be coming true.⁶⁰

| Africa

Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandan Proxy Group M23 Takes over Key City of Goma, Expands Control in East

The M23 rebel group has taken over the two main cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Goma and Bukavu—likely cementing de facto Rwandan control over a vast swathe of mineral-rich forest. This fighting is the largest development in the ongoing conflict in Eastern Congo since M23 formed and captured Goma in 2012.⁶¹ Despite diplomatic pressure and sanctions being levied on Rwanda, which is widely identified as the proxy controller backing M23, the group does not appear ready to quickly abandon its gains.⁶²

In fact, after the captures, M23 has begun setting up an administration and taking steps to return life to normal for civilians.⁶³ While M23 can coerce citizens for now, how well it will be able to operate as a government remains to be seen. Access to money is a critical issue: the M23-appointed governor of North Kivu (where Goma is located), Bahati Musanga Joseph, asked local banks to arrange with those in Kinshasa to send money via Uganda.⁶⁴ This awkward workaround is far too uncertain to be the financial bedrock of a new administration. Retributive action against a range of perceived opponents in the captured regions is likely, if not already in progress. A UN report accused M23 of summary executions of three children,⁶⁵ but the real danger is in reprisals against ethnic Hutus in the region. During the Congo War from 1996–1997, Rwanda invaded these same areas of the DRC (at the time Zaire), motivated by a desire to destroy Hutu groups that it claims fled into the region after committing the Rwandan Genocide.⁶⁶ Rwandan

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[hXXps://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3300172/will-dark-indonesia-protests-against-prabowos-austerity-cuts-escalate-further](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3300172/will-dark-indonesia-protests-against-prabowos-austerity-cuts-escalate-further)

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[hXXps://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250129-m23-rebels-advance-on-bukavu-as-efforts-to-contain-drc-crisis-intensify](https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250129-m23-rebels-advance-on-bukavu-as-efforts-to-contain-drc-crisis-intensify)

⁶² [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8y5j49xgyo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8y5j49xgyo)

⁶³ [hXXps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ro4rK0ETJOY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ro4rK0ETJOY)

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[hXXps://international.la-croix.com/world/m23-grapples-with-governance-in-dr-congo-after-seizing-goma-bukavu](https://international.la-croix.com/world/m23-grapples-with-governance-in-dr-congo-after-seizing-goma-bukavu)

⁶⁵ [hXXps://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160231](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160231)

⁶⁶ [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgyzllmlkvo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckgyzllmlkvo)



fear of Hutu fighters someday invading from the eastern DRC underpins a long-running national policy to foment separatist movements and keep the region fractured, and the current conflict presents an opportunity to quietly eliminate key leaders in the Hutu community.

- **Apparent Territorial Realignment:** The DRC as a whole is not a very capable state and will struggle to recapture territory in the east after having lost its two largest cities and logistical centers. While formerly a war of territorial aggression would provoke a worldwide response, in recent years the consensus against changes to national borders seems to have lost much of its strength. M23 is currently establishing itself as an administrator but has not issued statements on its ultimate plans for the region. This leaves Rwanda free to decide between options such as a “buffer zone” under its control in the area, using M23 as a proxy government of a separatist state, or even directly taking over the territory.⁶⁷
- **Changes to Mineral Exports:** The eastern DRC contains huge quantities of key minerals needed in the energy transition, like cobalt. Due to the lack of state power, these mineral companies engage private security to protect their assets and negotiate protection agreements with the most powerful military forces nearby—whether that is legitimate government forces or rebel groups such as M23.⁶⁸ Mines in North and South Kivu should now be considered as under control of M23, which is likely to push for exports to run through Rwanda. Despite Western sanctions on Rwanda, it is nearly certain that the valuable minerals will be exported, either to buyers unconcerned with sanctions (notably China) or after having been smuggled via a third country, such as Uganda.

Sudan: Rival Governments Aim to Form Two countries with Russian Base in the East

On February 10, 2025, army leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is effectively the president of Sudan, said he would form a “technocratic” wartime government with a prime minister once he defeats the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia group.⁶⁹ The army is advancing on the capital, Khartoum, and Sudanese forces have made steady gains against the RSF. The RSF still controls most of the western half of Sudan but has struggled against recent upgrades to the Sudanese air force’s capabilities. Despite the RSF’s struggles, there are likely still weeks of fighting ahead, and RSF has said it will form its own government in the east, along the border with Chad. Both sides have been fighting for almost two years after the RSF rejected a plan to be absorbed into the Sudanese military. Before that, the RSF worked with al-Burhan to negotiate a transitional government that was

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[hXXps://www.insightturkey\[.\]com/commentaries/turkeys-buffer-zone-in-northern-syria-and-its-impact-on-irregular-migration](https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/turkeys-buffer-zone-in-northern-syria-and-its-impact-on-irregular-migration)

⁶⁸ [hXXps://www.gao\[.\]gov/assets/gao-25-107018.pdf](https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-107018.pdf)

⁶⁹ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/c9830566073o](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9830566073o)



due to become a permanent government in Sudan in 2023.⁷⁰ Sudan has effectively been ruled by the military for decades, and it very likely feared political reprisals and losing valuable revenue streams if a civilian government came into effect. If the Sudanese military successfully defeats the RSF, it will likely organize a new constitution and political power structure that maintains its dominance. Sudan is one of the world's fastest-growing countries by population size and is strategically located along the Red Sea. Therefore, it has become a center of power struggles between the United States, Russia, and China.

- **Changes to Mineral Exports:** On February 13, 2025, Russia reportedly reached an agreement with the Sudanese military for the establishment of a Russian naval base on the Red Sea.⁷¹ The military largely controls eastern Sudan, where the base will be located. The deal comes after Russia reportedly aided Sudan in turning the tide of the civil war.
- **Strategic Location:** Many countries have sought a military base in Sudan not only because of its strategic location along the Red Sea, which is a major shipping lane, but also because it is one of the fastest-growing countries in the world and located near other influential states like Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt. The United States was close to establishing a greater presence in Sudan before al-Burhan thwarted a political transition to civilian government in late 2022. A Russian base in Sudan will make up for some of the logistical losses Russia suffered when it lost its bases in Syria. From Sudan, Russia will be able to better project and influence operations across Africa, where it has security for mining deals in places like the Central African Republic, Libya, Chad, Niger, and Mali.⁷² However, Russia's ties in Sudan could be complicated if the state is divided similarly to Libya, where there are also two rival governments that frequently clash.

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[hXXps://reliefweb\[.\]int/report/sudan/sudan-situation-update-april-2023-political-process-form-transitional-civilian-government-and-shift-disorder-trends](https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-situation-update-april-2023-political-process-form-transitional-civilian-government-and-shift-disorder-trends)

⁷¹ [hXXs://al24news\[.\]com/en/russia-and-sudan-finalize-agreement-on-naval-base/](https://al24news.com/en/russia-and-sudan-finalize-agreement-on-naval-base/)

⁷² [hXXps://orionpolicy\[.\]org/russias-growing-military-footprint-in-africa-arms-deals-and-defense-cooperation/](https://orionpolicy.org/russias-growing-military-footprint-in-africa-arms-deals-and-defense-cooperation/)



| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.



| Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

