



| Flash |

Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP

#10: March 6, 2026

F-2026-03-06a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

March 6, 2026

Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 4:00 AM (EST) on March 6, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

| Flash | Military Strikes on Iran – SITREP #10: March 6, 2026

| Key Findings

- All sides in the conflict continue to use bellicose language, suggesting they are prepared for a long war and have unlimited supplies of weapons. However, both the U.S.-Israeli combined forces and Iran will likely face weapon shortages if the war continues for months.
- Western desire for immediate rebellion in Iran should be tempered with reality. Iran almost certainly lacks an indigenous opposition movement, as the government has imprisoned, exiled, or killed most dissidents in recent decades, likely leaving no movement or leader for citizens to rally behind.
- The combined force operation is likely entering a new phase of combat, with more focus on industrial targets, including missile production facilities. The first phase of operations has very likely neutralized Iran's air defenses. The next phase will likely be intended to further deplete Iran's missile and drone stockpiles.
- The United States almost certainly assesses the Iranian naval threat is reduced to a point the U.S. Navy can protect the Strait of Hormuz (SoH). However, no shipping company has yet accepted U.S. President Trump's offer of escort through the SoH, likely indicating a lack of faith in U.S. ability to defend civilian vessels in the region.

Latest Details

On March 6, 2026, a spokesman for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) stated that Iran is prepared for a “prolonged war” as the country continued to conduct strikes against regional neighbors.¹ Further, he claimed that Iran is preparing to introduce a new generation of weaponry to the current conflict, likely referring to more advanced, hypersonic missiles that have yet to be deployed in the current war. While Iran possesses advanced hypersonic missiles, these missiles have very likely already been used to target Israel.

- The IRGC spokesman made his statements to Iranian state television, very likely suggesting that he was attempting to bolster morale and support among a domestic audience.

However, the rate at which Iran has launched rockets and drones has decreased every day—with a missile decline of at least 90 percent and a drone decline of 83 percent from the first day of the conflict.² We continue to assess there is a roughly even chance Iran has significantly depleted its missile stock and is relying on drones—which are more difficult to intercept—to conserve its remaining stock.

- Even with this reduced number of missiles, Iran still maintains a large enough stockpile to likely support short-term escalations, as well as cause disruptions across the Gulf region and the SoH.

President Trump stated the United States has a “virtually unlimited supply of these weapons.”³ However, one former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) stated that the number of targets the United States has struck since Saturday suggests a rapid depletion of armaments—a stockpile that was very likely already under strain following four years of providing weapons to Ukraine and Israel.


¹

[hXXps://www.presstv\[.\]ir/Detail/2026/03/06/765014/Painful-blows-await-IRGC-spokesman-warns-of-long-war-and-new-initiatives--](https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2026/03/06/765014/Painful-blows-await-IRGC-spokesman-warns-of-long-war-and-new-initiatives--)

² [hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/2026/03/05/middleeast/us-israel-iran-war-what-we-know-intl-hnk](https://edition.cnn[.]com/2026/03/05/middleeast/us-israel-iran-war-what-we-know-intl-hnk)

³

[hXXps://edition.cnn\[.\]com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-05-26?post-id=cmme7ya1q00003b74414unatb](https://edition.cnn[.]com/world/live-news/iran-war-us-israel-trump-03-05-26?post-id=cmme7ya1q00003b74414unatb)



Iran's missile inventory and ranges

Source: [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]co\[.\]uk/news/articles/cdxzzqe82d2o](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdxzzqe82d2o)

Since March 1, 2026, the United States and Israel have struck at least 2,000 targets using various ammunition. While the United States almost certainly has a larger arsenal than Iran, Trump's meeting with military contractors to discuss ramping up armament production suggests that he likely understands the logistical problems the U.S. military will face if the conflict goes on longer than anticipated.

An additional problem for the United States and its regional allies is the cost difference between Iranian one-way drones and the interceptor missiles required to shoot them down. Iran produces cheap drones that are likely relatively fast to build and likely has several thousands of these drones remaining. By contrast, the interceptor missiles

produced by the United States and sold to its allies in the region are expensive and very likely take much longer to make.

The United States and Gulf states are reportedly in negotiations to buy much cheaper, and easier to produce, interceptor drones from Ukraine, almost certainly to combat Iranian drones and close the cost gap in defense of its bases and allies.⁴ During its four-year war with Russia, Ukraine has developed a very successful and relatively cheap drone that can track, target, and destroy attack drones.

- While both sides continue to use bellicose language that suggests a long war, it is very likely both Iran and the United States, and by extension, Israel, will face weapons shortages or logistics strains if the war continues for months.

Prospects for Iranian Uprising

The combined forces of the United States and Israel continued heavy airstrikes against Iran, striking IRGC and Iranian security apparatus targets. President Trump has continued to vocalize support for the Iranian people to rise up against the regime, even suggesting the United States would financially support Kurdish rebels. The strategy of targeting IRGC and security targets is likely intended to limit the ability of the Iranian government to crack down on the populace should an internal rebellion begin.

However, the Western desire for immediate rebellion in Iran should be tempered with reality. Iran almost certainly lacks an indigenous opposition movement, as the government has imprisoned, exiled, or killed most dissidents in recent decades. Other than the Kurds—who likely only represent a proxy force armed and funded by the United States—there is very likely no leader or movement for citizens to rally behind, making a successful overthrow of the Islamic Republic very unlikely in the near term.

Lebanon


Israel conducted another barrage of air strikes in Lebanon, targeting Iran-backed, Lebanese Shia militia, Hezbollah. Targets included rocket launch sites in southern

4

<https://abcnews.com/International/us-gulf-states-requesting-ukrainian-interceptors-iranian-drones/story?id=130790392>

Lebanon, resulting in the killing of at least one Hezbollah commander responsible for artillery units in southern Lebanon.⁵ Israel also struck several targets in Beirut, with air strikes in the southern suburb of Dahieh, for which it issued an evacuation order on March 5. Israel is very likely to maintain its operations tempo in Lebanon, likely designed to prevent Hezbollah operations in northern Israel in support of Iranian objectives.

- Hezbollah activities are very likely being guided by IRGC officers in Lebanon, causing the Lebanese government to ban IRGC officers in Lebanon, who will reportedly be arrested if found.⁶



Map of Israeli operations in Lebanon as of March 5, 2026

Source: Institute for the Study of War

⁵ <https://www.idfonline/status/2029631896863277172>

⁶ <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-888963>

Oil and Shipping

Oil prices have remained steady despite the SoH remaining effectively closed, with little or no traffic transiting the narrow seaway that separates Iran from the Arabian Peninsula. Brent Crude remained at USD 85 per barrel in overnight trading, a fractional price dip from our last report.⁷ The relative price stability is likely due to the oil markets pricing in the impacts of a short-term conflict. If hostilities stretch beyond the one-month mark, there is an increasing likelihood that oil and gas prices will rise much faster.

President Trump stated the U.S. Navy could escort ships through the SoH,⁸ a move almost certainly aimed at easing the strains on international shipping and oil exports from the Persian Gulf. However, thus far, no ships have accepted the U.S. offer, which suggests oil producers would likely rather accept short-term, relatively minor price fluctuations rather than risk the likely much worse market impacts if Iran successfully sinks an oil tanker.

Conclusion

The combined force operation is likely entering a new phase of combat, with more focus on industrial targets, including missile production facilities. The first phase of operations has very likely neutralized Iran's air defenses, in addition to inflicting severe blows to its command and control and military leadership. The next phase will likely be intended to exacerbate Iran's missile and drone shortage problems by making it difficult to reconstitute stockpiles.

U.S. diplomats will very likely seek to convince shipping companies to accept U.S. Navy escort to transit the SoH. The United States almost certainly believes it has reduced the Iranian naval threat to a level that would allow it to protect shipping in the region. However, continued statements from IRGC officials, and a natural aversion to unnecessary risk, will very likely prevent acceptance of the U.S. offer of protection.

⁷ [hXXps://oilprice\[.\]com/](https://oilprice.com/)

⁸

[hXXps://www.navytimes\[.\]com/news/your-navy/2026/03/03/trump-says-us-navy-could-escort-ships-through-strait-of-hormuz/](https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2026/03/03/trump-says-us-navy-could-escort-ships-through-strait-of-hormuz/)

However, if hostilities drag on for several weeks, and the United States is able to sufficiently demonstrate its dominance of the seas—which would require targeting Iranian anti-ship missiles stationed near the SoH—shipping companies would likely be more open to U.S. protected convoys to resume shipping in the region.

Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%