



| Flash |

Peace Talks Stall – SITREP #39:

June 5, 2026

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Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitics

June 5, 2026

Scope Note

*ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 8:30 AM (EDT) on June 5, 2026**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.*

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| Key Findings

- Clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon are very likely holding up U.S. and Iranian negotiations on ending the war. There is a roughly even chance fighting in Lebanon causes the U.S.-Iran ceasefire to collapse while increasing the possibility the conflict spreads, particularly to the Red Sea.
- A full return to conflict remains unlikely as both sides have refrained from reigniting the conflict, despite repeated flare-ups.
- Since the last report, the United States has reportedly made revisions to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ending the war in Iran. Iran is unlikely to respond until matters in Lebanon are resolved.
- The status quo does not bode well for the global economy, as it requires the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) to remain closed. Consequently, the negative economic impacts of the war will likely intensify as the stalemate persists. Iran will likely move ahead with formalizing a toll system in the SoH so that it can financially benefit from the impasse.

Latest Details

Lebanon

On June 1, 2026, Iran suspended talks with the United States, publicly conditioning the resumption on Israel suspending its operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and returning to its “pre-war positions”; Iran also threatened to expand the conflict to the Red Sea if Israel did not comply.¹ In response, U.S. President Donald Trump declared a conditional ceasefire on June 3 between Israel and Hezbollah, which he claimed both accepted. The terms called for a comprehensive pause to the fighting, conditional on the “cessation of Hezbollah fire” and the group withdrawing its forces from south of the Litani River. At the same time, the government of Lebanon was charged with creating Hezbollah-free “pilot zones” across the country.² However, fighting has continued, and Hezbollah officials have since rejected the agreement. Additionally, the Hezbollah-focused terms of the proposal were unlikely to have satisfied Iran’s demand for a complete end to the war in Lebanon.

- In the short term, the United States is likely to pressure Israel to lessen its operations in Lebanon, especially if President Trump believes these actions jeopardize peace talks with Iran.
- While Israel is likely to abide by the MOU if it mandates an end to hostilities in Lebanon, it will very likely continue pressing the United States to decouple the two conflicts in the future.
 - President Trump stated on June 4, 2026, that he wants to “separate” Lebanon and Iran talks, an idea consistently rejected by Iran.³

Houthis

Despite recent Iranian suggestions of imminent Houthi involvement, the group is almost certainly not subordinate to Iran. Rather, is it likely Iran is pressuring the Houthis to join the conflict, which it has largely avoided doing thus far. Unlike Hezbollah or Iranian-backed

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[hXXps://www.middleeasteye\[.\]net/live-blog/live-blog-update/irgc-says-israel-must-withdraw-pre-war-positions-lebanon](https://www.middleeasteye[.]net/live-blog/live-blog-update/irgc-says-israel-must-withdraw-pre-war-positions-lebanon)

² [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2026/06/03/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-hezbollah.html](https://www.nytimes[.]com/2026/06/03/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-ceasefire-hezbollah.html)

³ [hXXps://www.naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/320485-trump-says-he-wants-to-separate-lebanon-iran-talks](https://www.naharnet[.]com/stories/en/320485-trump-says-he-wants-to-separate-lebanon-iran-talks)

groups in Iraq, the Houthis control and govern territory in Yemen and risk turning the local population against them if they invite targeting. For now, the Houthis are likely balancing the need to be seen as participating on Iran's side while minimizing the risk of inviting foreign targeting.

The Houthis have managed to effectively shut down the Red Sea supply chain (by forcing vessels to reroute) since they entered the Israel-Hamas war in late 2023. Although the group has not launched strikes on Israel or Red Sea shipping since the ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2025, the Houthis previously targeted military and commercial ships over 190 times between November 2023 and June 2024.⁴ The lingering threat posed by the group is very likely still deterring most shipping in the Red Sea.

- Since the latest war in Iran has disrupted Gulf state energy sales through the SoH, Saudi Arabia has leveraged its Western port of Yanbu to distribute seven million barrels of oil daily to global markets.⁵ However, the port and the pipeline from eastern Saudi Arabia are well within Houthi strike ranges. To date, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have observed a truce that would almost certainly end if the Houthis target Saudi pipelines; such a strike would very likely lead to Saudi Arabia entering the conflict by striking Houthi locations in western Yemen.
- If the Houthis target global shipping, it would likely expand the energy crisis by making another key supply chain impassable and removing an additional seven million barrels per day from global markets.
- It is more likely that any Houthi participation in the conflict would be substantial enough to signal solidarity with Iran but sufficiently limited to keep the Houthis from being dragged further into the war. This would likely come in the form of limited and sporadic missile attacks on Israel or similarly low-key activity.

⁴ [hXXps://www.wilsoncenter\[.\]org/article/timeline-houthi-attacks](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-houthi-attacks)

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[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/business/energy/saudi-pipeline-pumping-7-million-bpd-oil-bypassing-hormuz-bloom-berg-news-reports-2026-03-28/](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/saudi-pipeline-pumping-7-million-bpd-oil-bypassing-hormuz-bloom-berg-news-reports-2026-03-28/)

MOU

President Trump has reportedly requested unspecified revisions to the MOU that was under negotiation last week. Under the terms of that MOU, Iran must eliminate its highly enriched uranium, but enforcement of this requirement is deferred; instead, the MOU implements a 60-day period after signing during which the two sides would agree on how to dispose of and limit Iran's highly enriched uranium.⁶

President Trump also reportedly wants firmer details on how Iran will oblige in reopening the SoH.⁷ The United States very likely wants a return to the pre-war status quo, while Iran is likely preparing a phased reopening of the SoH based on sanctions relief and the U.S. military lifting its blockade.

Lastly, President Trump is reportedly seeking amendments to how sanctions relief will be implemented.⁸ Iran has repeatedly specified that reopening the SoH is contingent on lifting some sanctions on its oil trade and that unfreezing a portion of its frozen assets is required in order for Iran to sign a MOU; further sanctions relief would then be dependent on the progress of future negotiations. President Trump likely prefers Iran to move first on reopening the SoH before permitting any sanctions relief.

| Conclusion

President Trump's reported request for amendments to the MOU is unlikely to solely derail the ceasefire but is almost certainly a factor in negotiations stalling, behind events in Lebanon. If a solution is not reached in the Lebanese theater soon, Iran will likely end talks, resume targeting Gulf states, and move forward with plans to establish a toll in the SoH. There is a roughly even chance that events in Lebanon lead to Yemen's Houthis joining the conflict. However, a full return to conflict remains unlikely, as both sides have refrained from reigniting the conflict despite repeated flare-ups.

This does not bode well for global economic prospects, as the status quo requires the SoH to remain closed. Consequently, the negative economic impacts of the war will likely intensify as the stalemate persists.

⁶ ZeroFox Intelligence Flash Report: Fragile Ceasefire – SITREP #38: May 28, 2026

⁷ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/c1w2xve3i5do](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1w2xve3i5do)

⁸ [hXXps://www.iranintl\[.\]com/en/202605292360](https://www.iranintl[.]com/en/202605292360)

| Appendix A: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	Red	Amber
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	Sources may use TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may NOT share TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	Recipients may ONLY share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. Note that TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.
	Green	Clear
WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?	Sources may use TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?	Recipients may share TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	Recipients may share TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

Appendix B: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%