

ZeroFox Intelligence Geopolitical Brief for July 2024

TLP: CLEAR

B-2024-07-05a



Executive Summary

The Paris Olympics Games will take place at a complicated geopolitical moment for France and the broader European Union (EU). In the east, the war between Ukraine and Russia recently entered its third year with no resolution in sight. At the same time, the Israel-Hamas War has been raging for the last nine months and appears similarly intractable. In both cases, the ongoing bloodshed has the potential to have a spillover effect on the games in the form of protests during sporting events and boycotts of corporate sponsors by a variety of activist groups. The Paris Olympics could also face cyberattacks from Russian-state threat actors or pro-Kremlin hacktivist groups in retaliation for France's continued support of Ukraine. In addition, two recent elections have heightened political polarization in the country, particularly when it comes to immigration and the cost of living. This political shift may potentially lead to demonstrations and other expressions of discontent during the Olympics the following month.

Before the Olympics, France holds nationwide parliamentary elections that were quickly organized following the unexpectedly weak performance of President Emmanuel Macron's Renaissance party in European parliamentary elections on June 6-9. The first round of the parliamentary elections was another strong showing for the leading opposition party, Rassemblement Nationale (RN), and ahead of the second round vote on July 7, Macron has transitioned to rallying his centrist coalition with that of the left as a bulwark against the rising influence of the right-wing RN party. The most likely outcome is a divided French parliament unable to pass significant domestic reforms while foreign policy remains under a weakened president.

In comparison, the British elections seem significantly calmer. With the Labour Party easily winning, the campaign has been centered on how large their parliamentary majority will be and how the outgoing Conservative government will recover from the historic loss. The winner of the election will likely assume an economy that can grow in the short term and perhaps benefit from polarization in France after years of France taking economic advantage of political dysfunction in the United Kingdom (UK).

Events in Europe will likely continue to overshadow the Israel-Hamas War. Heavy fighting in the Gaza Strip will likely continue in Rafah and elsewhere, but likely at a somewhat lower tempo than in recent weeks and months. As the war in Gaza eventually winds down and Israeli forces become less stretched, the chances for an expanded conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah increase. The Netanyahu government likely continues to see the perpetuation of the conflict as key to remaining in power by avoiding it. For now, low-level fighting in Gaza is more likely than a new front against Hezbollah.

Key Findings

- Despite achieving concessions from the Kenyan government on avoiding tax increases, further protests are likely which threaten the leadership of President Ruto.
- Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is very likely to interfere in the late July elections, which increases the probability that the international community will not recognize the results.
- A continued low level of fighting in Gaza is more likely in the short term than a new war between Israel and Hezbollah
- Houthi rebels have escalated their attacks and effectiveness on international shipping, promising continued supply chains for at least several more months.
- China's coast guard has become increasingly aggressive in targeting its neighbors over territorial disputes.
- China's Third Plenum will likely see economic stimulus to boost the struggling economy as well as new efforts to protect Chinese industries from Western trade sanctions; however, major changes that please international investors are unlikely.
- The British elections saw the ruling conservatives lose power to the Labour party, but the bigger political development could involve smaller parties hoping to establish a footprint.
- The French elections look likely to result in an embarrassing loss for President Macron, but the expected political paralysis could benefit him in the long run.
- Security forces are concerned about terror attacks on the Paris Olympics, while the French public is largely disillusioned with hosting the games.

Key Threats and Developments



France's ruling centrist party will likely emerge as only the third biggest party in the next parliamentary elections



Destabilizing protests in Kenya will likely take place for several more weeks



The anti-immigrant Reform UK party could emerge as a leading opposition party in the UK



China could react to protect its industries from Western trade retaliation, but is unlikely to make significant economic reforms



Houthi attacks have become more consequential



Japan and The Philippines are putting up a military response to an aggressive Chinese coast guard



The results of Venezuela's election are very likely to be rejected by the international community



Parisian authorities are concerned terrorism and protests could disrupt the Olympics

SCOPE NOTE: ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were identified prior to 12:00 PM (EDT) on July 4, 2024; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.



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France Elections

- On June 30, 2024, France held the first round of its snap parliamentary elections. This unexpected political contest was prompted by President Emmanuel Macron's surprise decision to dissolve the lower house of parliament, known as the National Assembly, on June 9, 2024, and call for a new vote. According to most analysts, the goal of the president's high-stakes gamble was to consolidate the authority of the governing Renaissance Party in the wake of its disappointing performance during the EU parliamentary elections in early June, which saw considerable gains by the far-right National Rally (RN).[1]
- President Macron's centrist coalition currently holds 250 seats in the National Assembly, short of the 289 required for an absolute majority. The National Rally party has 88 seats, while the conservative Republicans control 61. A fractious alliance of far-left, Socialist, and Green Party lawmakers holds 149 seats. All 577 seats of the National Assembly are contested in this snap election.
- During the first round, the RN won 33 percent of the vote and a left wing coalition called the New Popular Front came in second with 28 percent. A centrist alliance led by the governing Renaissance Party trailed in third place with 21 percent of the vote.[2] Leading candidates and parties will now compete in a second round of voting which will be held on July 7, 2024.

Forward Look:

- According to projections from several polling institutions, the RN could win between 240 and 310 seats in the National Assembly following the second round of voting. The New Popular Front is expected to obtain between 150 and 120 seats. In contrast, the centrist alliance led by the Renaissance Party is predicted to only hold onto at most 120 seats, and could possibly win as few as 70.[3]
- The unprecedented shift in favor of the RN has the potential to create a new legislature that is dominated by the RN and deeply hostile to President Macron's political agenda. As a consequence, the president will likely be unable to accomplish any significant domestic reforms during his last two and a half years in office. The RN has also pledged to reverse the government's unpopular pension reform, slash VAT on energy and fuel, and introduce even stricter immigration laws.[4]
- If the RN wins a governing majority of 289 seats, then it will gain the ability to call no-confidence votes and dissolve the cabinet. In addition, one of the leaders of the party, likely Jordan Bardella, would become prime minister, ushering in a period of split government or 'cohabitation'. The RN could also use its dominant position in the legislature to further increase its national visibility and promote its agenda, potentially strengthening the party's chances at winning the presidential election in 2027.
- Lastly, the political tensions related to the snap election will likely result in protests and strikes across France. In addition to the usual disruptions, this social unrest could also adversely impact the upcoming Paris Olympic Games, which will be held on July 26 through August 11, 2024.

Paris Olympic Games

- On July 26 through August 11, 2024, France will host the Summer Olympic Games. This prestigious international competition faces several potential threats, most notably crime, social unrest, and acts of terrorism. In addition, the Olympics will take place in the middle of summer, raising the risk that natural hazards will have an adverse effect on the games.

Forward Look:

- The frequency of petty crime in Paris generally correlates with the level of tourist activity in the city, and this pattern is anticipated to continue during the Olympic Games. Visitors will likely face the risk of pickpocketing, particularly near luxury establishments, popular tourist landmarks (especially the Eiffel Tower, Notre Dame, and the Champs-Élysées), and around event venues such as stadiums.[5]
- France has a long history of social unrest, and it is quite likely that demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of disruptive activity will impact the upcoming Olympic Games. In addition to domestic concerns over political and economic issues, there are also likely to be protests directly related to the sports competition itself. This may include actions by the CGT-RATP public transport union, environmental activist groups, and government employees.[6]
- The scale and visibility of this international competition makes it a high-value target for terrorist groups and radicalized individuals. One of the primary security challenges for the organizers of the Paris Games will be safeguarding the opening ceremony scheduled for July 26. This event is set to be an unprecedented spectacle, breaking from tradition by being held outdoors on the Seine River rather than in a stadium.[7] The open-air setting chosen for this ceremony as well as the large number of spectators involved make it a possible hotspot for an attack.
- Natural hazards represent a major unpredictable factor that could substantially influence the course of the games. The 2024 Olympics are set to take place in late July and early August—one of the warmest times of the year. Moreover, average temperatures have increased with each year as the effects of global warming become more pronounced. Athletes and visitors may potentially be negatively impacted by extreme heat waves. In addition, efforts to stay cool could be complicated by the relatively sparse distribution of green spaces within Paris and the absence of air conditioning in most buildings.

Kenya: Protest Risk Ruto's Presidency

Forward Look:

- Violent protests have caused widespread casualties and damages throughout Kenya in recent weeks over a finance bill that raised taxes. In response to the protests, President William Ruto promised not to sign the bill and to negotiate with protesters. However, demonstrations are likely to continue in the coming weeks, as many have begun to call for Ruto's resignation, and the bill's deadline will last until mid-July. At least 39 people were killed in the protests, and more than 360 were injured since the onset of the protests, when police officers began firing live ammunition at demonstrators.[8] Police and protesters continue to clash in Nairobi and Mombasa, while protests have spread throughout the country. Further violent disruptive activities are anticipated in the coming weeks, which will significantly impact travel and business operations. The protests pose a significant risk to Ruto's hold on power, who faces few options to regain public trust among the young population participating in the protests.

FOOTNOTES

[1] <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-european-election-results-2024-emmanuel-macron-snap-election-marine-le-pen-national-rally-jordan-bardella-national-assembly/>
[2] <https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cn087x77gldt>
[3] <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/30/world/europe/france-elections.html>
[4] <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/06/27/macron-has-done-well-by-france-but-he-risks-throwing-it-all-away>

[5] <https://fr.usembassy.gov/services/assistance-for-victims-of-crimes-in-france/pickpockets-in-paris-how-to-a-void-becoming-a-victim/>
[6] <https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240308-france-s-cgt-union-says-it-will-strike-during-paris-olympics>
[7] <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/28/france-assesses-paris-olympics-threat-in-light-of-moscow-attack>
[8] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/03/kenya-william-ruto-imf-protests-tax-bill/>



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Russia-Ukraine

- Ukraine was able to stabilize the Kharkiv front in June after Russia launched new offensive operations in the region in May. Russia continues to hold a small amount of territory on the Ukraine-Russia border near Kharkiv, but is unlikely to generate significant advances beyond these areas.[9]
- Russia continues to focus its offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. These operations attempt primarily to seize the strategic city of Chasiv Yar and sever Ukrainian ground lines of communications near Pokrovsk. While Russian gains have been slow and minimal, Russian troops have advanced in key neighborhoods of Chasiv Yar and threaten to capture the city in the coming months.
- The U.S. and several other Western countries allowed Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike targets within Russia. According to Western officials, this permission is limited to Russian targets in close proximity to the border that pose an immediate threat to Ukraine. These limitations suggest the policy will not meaningfully boost Ukraine's defenses against Russian strikes.[10]
- Ukrainian officials continue to lobby for Western air defense systems to defend against Russian airstrikes. Ukraine is particularly concerned about Russian strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Russian strikes have destroyed over 50 percent of Ukraine's electricity production, and rolling blackouts are in effect throughout much of the country. Several of Ukraine's nuclear power units are currently undergoing repairs, which is compounding the existing shortages.

Forward Look:

- On August 1, a moratorium on Ukraine's debt-service payments from foreign bondholders is set to expire. Ukraine must either negotiate an extension to the moratorium or face a default.
- The European Union began accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova on June 25. The accession process typically takes over six years; Moldova's and Ukraine's processes may take even longer given the territorial disputes and other structural issues in each country. Russia is also highly likely to use hybrid tactics to undermine the accession negotiations for both countries.

China: Third Plenum

- The Chinese Communist Party will gather from July 15–18 for China's biggest annual policy meeting, the Third Plenum.[11]

Forward Look:

- The plenum will likely focus on China's production of advanced technologies after sanctions imposed by the U.S. on semiconductor technologies and tools used to make the chips. China lacks the sophistication of Western technology companies, but the Plenum could see moves from China to close the gap.
- China will likely conduct a new round of fiscal and tax reform to boost the sluggish economic recovery. The Third Plenum will highlight economic support for the private sector after years of sluggish growth. China has tried to shift to a more pro-business policy in recent years, but domestic consumption remains low while foreign investment has been declining rapidly. The economy has also been harmed by contradictory security laws, which, for most private and foreign investors, offset the benefits of any economic reforms. Expect the economic reforms to be largely inadequate, foreign investment in particular to remain low, and economic growth to be sluggish compared to previous years.

Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah

- On June 16, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the dissolution of Israel's war cabinet. The move had been expected after the departure of two prominent members, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, on June 9, 2024. Both figures had been harshly critical of Netanyahu and the government's conduct of the war in the Gaza Strip. Shortly after the decision to disband the body, Netanyahu indicated that it is unlikely to be reformed.[12]
- Meanwhile, heavy fighting in the Gaza Strip has continued sporadically in Rafah and elsewhere, although at a somewhat lower tempo than in recent weeks and months. Israel's inability to hold territory and provide alternatives to Hamas rule has meant that the militant group is currently "rebuilding its weapons production capacity in the Gaza Strip," as well as reconstituting military and political control across the enclave.[13]
- In recent weeks, tit-for-tat strikes between the Israeli military and Hezbollah near the border area have reached the highest intensity since the beginning of the conflict in October 2023.[14] On June 18, 2024, senior Israeli officials stated that "Israeli generals" have approved "battle plans" for an invasion of Lebanon despite Hezbollah's insistence that it has no interest in participating in a wider war.[16] Regardless, United States diplomats, including Amos Hochstein and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, have warned that Washington will likely be unable to "hold Israel back" if the government decides to launch a war.[15]

Forward Look:

- The dissolution of the war cabinet is highly unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the war or the stability of the government itself.
- Despite claims made by National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi on June 25, 2024, that Israel will begin to "replace Hamas" in northern Gaza in the "coming days," there exists no viable domestic alternative to Hamas, or clear plans to create such a political body.[16] This means that the militant group is likely to persist in some form following the war.
- As the war in Gaza eventually winds down and Israeli forces become less stretched, the chances for an expanded conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah increases. The Netanyahu government likely continues to see the perpetuation of the conflict as key to remaining in power by avoiding a political reckoning that would see it roundly defeated in fresh general elections.
- The Israeli military establishment would also likely support such a move, which would give it a chance to redress embarrassing errors made during the 2006 Lebanon war. A poll from June 2024 also found that 62 percent of the Israeli public would support a war in Lebanon at some point in the near-term.[17]
- U.S. officials described recently renewed ceasefire talks as having reached a "breakthrough." This indicates that there is chance a deal is reached in the coming days, although this outcome remains unlikely.

FOOTNOTES

- [9] [hXXps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates)
[10] [hXXps://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2024/06/31/7458622/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2024/06/31/7458622/)
[12] [hXXps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-01/china-s-third-plenum-and-what-it-means-for-tax-reform-and-supply-chains_](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-01/china-s-third-plenum-and-what-it-means-for-tax-reform-and-supply-chains_)
[13] [hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-officially-disbands-war-cabinet-after-gantz-departure-from-government/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-officially-disbands-war-cabinet-after-gantz-departure-from-government/)
[14] [hXXps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-23-2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-23-2024)
[15] [hXXps://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/17/israels-northern-border-is-ablaze](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/06/17/israels-northern-border-is-ablaze)
[16] [hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/top-israeli-generals-approve-lebanon-offensive-battle-plans-army-says/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-israeli-generals-approve-lebanon-offensive-battle-plans-army-says/)
[17] [hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-plan-to-replace-hamas-to-begin-in-northern-gaza-in-coming-days-hanegbi/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-plan-to-replace-hamas-to-begin-in-northern-gaza-in-coming-days-hanegbi/)



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Elections in the United Kingdom

- The UK held general elections on July 4, 2024.[18]
- The Labour party is very likely to emerge the largest party in parliament.
- Smaller parties performed well, including the upstart rival to the Conservative party, Reform UK.
- The UK elections were targeted by orchestrated misinformation and disinformation campaigns that may have affected the election.

> Forward Look:

- Reliable exit polls show that the opposition UK Labour Party will win around 410 seats (out of 650) in the next parliament, thus being able to govern alone. The outgoing UK Conservative Party lost hundreds of seats and is expected to hold only around 130 seats altogether. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has already resigned, although seat allocation has not yet finished. While the Labour Party won a near-record number of seats, they benefited from the performance of smaller parties, which primarily took seats away from the Conservatives rather than from Labour, and the Labour share of the total vote was actually less than in the two previous elections, which they lost badly. This suggests Labour is not as popular as the election indicates, but on the other hand, two of the smaller parties who performed well, the Liberal Democrats and Greens, are aligned with Labour on many issues and could strengthen their majority when it comes to passing reforms. Reform UK gained seats after winning none in the previous elections, and they could continue to take votes away from the Conservative Party.
- The UK voting system tends to benefit establishment parties like the Conservative and Labour parties, which have “heartlands” and a floor of support that prevents smaller parties from winning seats. The system does not benefit parties that have shallower but more widespread appeal, like the Green Party, whose policies may be popular but struggle to build seat totals.
- Reform UK party and its previous iterations have traditionally struggled like the Green Party, since voters in support of its policies may decide voting for the Conservative Party is better value. However, this election could see them become a larger opposition party, which would open them up to more widespread appeal for future elections.
- ZeroFox Intelligence identified instances where the UK voting system incentivized cyber threat actors to target elections where multiple parties are running candidates or the election is particularly close because influencing even a small group of voters could shift the outcome.[19]
- With a strong majority, Labour will be expected to address the UK’s economic issues, like high inflation, slow growth, high debt levels, and struggling public services. They will have few revenues to address the issues that could lead to voter backlash; however, the next government will also benefit from an economy that is expected to improve, allowing for gradual improvements. Expect Reform UK to pressure the next government on immigration, especially, but expect little change in the UK’s support for Ukraine.

China’s Coast Guard Law

- In mid-June 2024 China passed a new coast guard law that is likely to trigger conflicts with its neighbors who have competing claims to international waters.[20]

> Forward Look:

- China’s new coast guard regulations, which took effect on June 15, 2024, have triggered new conflicts with Japan in the East China Sea and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Under the updated regulations, China has the authority to detain foreign nationals suspected of trespassing in the disputed waters for up to 60 days. China claims sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (referred to as the Senkaku archipelago in Japan) in the East China Sea, while Japan currently exercises administrative control over the uninhabited islands. The new laws provide the legal framework for the Chinese coastguard to conduct law enforcement operations in Japanese waters around the Senkakus, risking clashes between both sides. China has been stepping up coast guard deployment in the past few years, with dozens of Chinese fishing vessels patrolling close to the islands. For instance, the Japanese government reported for the first time that four armed Chinese coast guard vessels entered the Senkaku archipelago one week before the updated regulations came into effect.[21] China has several similar disputes with other nations, notably the Philippines, where the Chinese coast guard is also active. For now, China is utilizing its coast guard because its maneuvers would not be classified as military. However, the longer it uses its coast guard for actions that could be considered militaristic, the greater the probability that nearby nations, backed by the U.S., could classify the Chinese coast guard as an arm of the army. This could then increase the likelihood of a conflict if both sides use their navies.

Houthi Disable More Merchant Vessels

- In June, Yemen’s Houthi militia conducted several successful attacks on ships in the Red Sea, sinking at least one merchant vessel and disabling another.
- One crew member of the coal carrier Tutor, which sunk, is missing and feared dead. Another crew member of the Verbena, which was evacuated after a missile strike left it disabled, was critically injured and airlifted by the U.S. Navy for medical attention.
- The Tutor is only the second vessel sunk since the beginning of the Houthi attack campaign last November.
- June saw the most Houthi attacks of any month in 2024, with a total of 16 confirmed attacks.[22]

> Forward Look:

- Houthi attacks have shown increased sophistication in recent weeks and more successful attacks are possible in the near term.
- The majority of attacks remain ineffective, with missiles often missing targets or causing minimal damage.
- Explosive drone boats will likely make up a greater percentage of attacks going forward. The Houthis have gotten better at launching these weapons without being detected by American or British patrols.[23]
- The Houthis also claim to have stepped up attacks on targets in the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas and the Indian Ocean, though many of these claimed attacks often go uncorroborated.

FOOTNOTES

[18] [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/live/uk-politics-69051548](https://www.bbc.com/news/live/uk-politics-69051548)

[19] ZeroFox Intelligence Brief - Cyber Threats to UK Elections

[20] [hXXps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c06kvlllpvo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c06kvlllpvo)

[21] [hXXps://www.cnn.com/2024/06/21/china/china-death-penalty-diehard-taiwan-separatists-intl-hnk/index.html](https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/21/china/china-death-penalty-diehard-taiwan-separatists-intl-hnk/index.html)

[22] [hXXps://english.aljazeera.net/News/gulf/2024/07/03/houthi-mount-biggest-attacks-on-ships-this-year-during-june-](https://english.aljazeera.net/News/gulf/2024/07/03/houthi-mount-biggest-attacks-on-ships-this-year-during-june-)



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Venezuela Elections

- Venezuela is due to hold presidential elections on July 28, 2024.[24]
- Despite ongoing political repression by the administration of President Nicolás Maduro, he is polling to lose by over 20 percent to Edmundo González.
- There is a high likelihood Maduro will avoid defeat by canceling the election, disqualifying the opposition candidate, or interfering in the elections.

Forward Look:

- Maduro won re-election in 2018 after the opposition boycotted the vote, arguing it was not free and fair. After the election, a rival government backed by the U.S. and EU was formed by Juan Guaidó, who was recognized as the legitimate President of Venezuela for several years. However, a failed military coup attempt reduced his power.[24] Despite Maduro continuing to detain activists and banning the leading opposition candidate, María Machado, her replacement candidate, Edmundo González, is polling to win the election by more than 20%.[25] González is widely predicted to step down and be replaced by Machado if he does win.
- President Maduro is highly unlikely to permit an election where he could conceivably lose power, although he is under intense pressure across the region to hold credible elections, which likely explains why he has not banned González yet. Maduro could still cancel the elections, possibly under national security concerns after invading neighboring Guyana, or interfere in the election, which his government has been accused of doing before. Lastly, prohibiting the transfer of power in the event of an electoral loss is also possible. The opposition has proposed political amnesty for Maduro and his allies to coerce him to hold free elections, but Maduro has since responded by banning EU election observers and arresting aides close to Machado.
- The most likely outcome is a Maduro victory that is not accepted by the international community who in turn place punishing sanctions on Venezuela worsening the economy and migration crisis.

ABOUT ZEROFOX

ZeroFox (Nasdaq: ZFOX), an enterprise software-as-a-service leader in external cybersecurity, has redefined security outside the corporate perimeter on the internet, where businesses operate and threat actors thrive. The ZeroFox platform combines advanced AI analytics, digital risk and privacy protection, full-spectrum threat intelligence, and a robust portfolio of breach, incident, and takedown response capabilities to expose and disrupt phishing and fraud campaigns, botnet exposures, credential theft, impersonations, data breaches, and physical threats that target your brands, domains, people, and assets. Join thousands of customers—including some of the largest public-sector organizations as well as finance, media, technology, and retail companies—to stay ahead of adversaries and address the entire lifecycle of external cyber risks.

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APPENDIX A: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox Intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of the occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

APPENDIX B: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

TLP: RED

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may NOT share TLP: RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

TLP: AMBER

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may ONLY share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that TLP: AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

TLP: GREEN

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

TLP: CLEAR

HOW IT IS USED

Sources may use TLP: CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

HOW IT IS SHARED

Recipients may share TLP: CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

FOOTNOTES

[24] <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-68487783>

[25] <https://www.axios.com/2021/04/29/venezuela-juan-guaido-maduro-april-30-uprising>

[26] <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article288357410.html>

