



| Flash |

Resumption of Israel-Hamas War

F-2025-02-13a

Classification: TLP:CLEAR

Criticality: High

Intelligence Requirements: Geopolitical, Deep and Dark Web

February 13, 2025

Scope Note

ZeroFox Intelligence is derived from a variety of sources, including—but not limited to—curated open-source accesses, vetted social media, proprietary data sources, and direct access to threat actors and groups through covert communication channels. Information relied upon to complete any report cannot always be independently verified. As such, ZeroFox applies rigorous analytic standards and tradecraft in accordance with best practices and includes caveat language and source citations to clearly identify the veracity of our Intelligence reporting and substantiate our assessments and recommendations. All sources used in this particular Intelligence product were **identified prior to 7:00 AM (EST) on February 13, 2025**; per cyber hygiene best practices, caution is advised when clicking on any third-party links.

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| Key Findings

- President Donald Trump's February 2025 statements that the United States will take possession of the Gaza Strip very likely signals that the Trump administration is not interested in pursuing the third phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
- A resumption in fighting very likely increases the risk of regional instability, with Houthi rebels very likely to resume attacks in the Red Sea if the ceasefire collapses.
- ZeroFox has observed an uptick in activity from pro-Palestinian cyber threat actors, who will likely increase their targeting of U.S. and Israeli entities in the event the ceasefire collapses.

| Details

On February 4, 2025, serious cracks began to emerge in the ongoing ceasefire agreement when U.S. President Donald Trump declared during a press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States will take possession of the Gaza Strip and turn the enclave into a real estate development devoid of

Palestinians.¹² Several days later, Netanyahu sent only a “low-level” delegation to Qatar for negotiations related to phase two of the ceasefire, which was initially planned to come into effect on March 2, 2025.³ This move appeared to signal to Hamas and Arab negotiators that Israel is likely not serious about seeing the agreement through to its conclusion and ending the war in Gaza.⁴

In response to these developments, a number of cyber groups increased their threats against Israel and its allies.

- On February 5, 2025, Bangladesh-based threat actor group Sylhet Gang threatened to “punish” any entities that support “any kind of U.S. occupation of GAZA strip.” Similar warnings were also issued in the following days by a several pro-Palestinian hacktivist groups, including RooTDoS and RipperSec.⁵⁶
- On February 6, 2025, the Blackfield hacking group, which had targeted Israeli entities in the past, claimed to have breached Bank Leumi Israel and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) accounts. They also allegedly exploited the personal computer of an unnamed senior IDF officer. Before that, on January 27, 2025, the group claimed they had exfiltrated data related to hospitalized IDF personnel.⁷ ZeroFox researchers believe that if the threat actors manage to de-anonymize the names of hospitalized IDF soldiers, such data would be highly valuable to Iranian intelligence and counterintelligence services.⁸
- On February 10, 2025, the Iranian-linked Handala Hack Team claimed it leaked 2.1 TB of data allegedly associated with the Israeli police force.⁹¹⁰

¹ [hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/trump-netanyahu-set-pivotal-talks-middle-east-agenda-2025-02-04/](https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-netanyahu-set-pivotal-talks-middle-east-agenda-2025-02-04/)

²

[hXXps://www.nbcnews\[.\]com/politics/donald-trump/trump-says-palestinians-wouldnt-allowed-back-gaza-plan-r-cna191491](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-says-palestinians-wouldnt-allowed-back-gaza-plan-r-cna191491)

³ [hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/2025/02/11/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-ceasefire-hostages.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/11/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-ceasefire-hostages.html)

⁴ [hXXps://www.newarab\[.\]com/news/israel-send-low-level-delegation-doha-gaza-talks](https://www.newarab[.]com/news/israel-send-low-level-delegation-doha-gaza-talks)

⁵ [hXXps://x\[.\]com/FalconFeedsio/status/1889565100953997765](https://x[.]com/FalconFeedsio/status/1889565100953997765)

⁶ [hXXps://x\[.\]com/Cyberknow20/status/1887492395995955528](https://x[.]com/Cyberknow20/status/1887492395995955528)

⁷ ZeroFox Intelligence

⁸ See Appendix A

⁹ [hXXps://hackread\[.\]com/handala-hackers-israeli-police-breach-data-leak/](https://hackread[.]com/handala-hackers-israeli-police-breach-data-leak/)

¹⁰ See Appendix A

The truce was even further imperiled when on February 10, 2025, Hamas threatened to delay the release of the next batch of hostages due to what it claims are ongoing Israeli ceasefire violations related to the flow of humanitarian aid.¹¹ In response, Netanyahu stated that the war will resume if the hostages are not released, a warning echoed by President Trump.¹² However, despite the escalating rhetoric, Hamas stated on February 13, 2025, that it will release three hostages as planned on February 15, 2025, indicating that the ceasefire will continue to move towards its remaining phases.¹³¹⁴

Phase Two	• The return of all remaining Israeli hostages in exchange for a not-yet-agreed-upon number of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons and detention camps (details still being negotiated) • The total withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip
Phase Three (final)	• Exchanging of bodies and remains of the dead • Beginning the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip under the supervision of a number of countries and organizations, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations • Ending the complete siege on the Gaza Strip

¹¹ [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/articles/c5ye69ey4pyo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ye69ey4pyo)

¹²

[hXXps://www.washingtoninstitute\[.\]org/policy-analysis/trump-gives-green-light-resume-fighting-gaza-does-netanyahu-want-do-it-now](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/trump-gives-green-light-resume-fighting-gaza-does-netanyahu-want-do-it-now)

¹³ [hXXps://arabcenterdc\[.\]org/resource/details-of-the-ceasefire-deal-that-hamas-has-accepted/](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/details-of-the-ceasefire-deal-that-hamas-has-accepted/)

¹⁴

[hXXps://apnews\[.\]com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-humanitarian-aid-8659eae6e0a7362504f0aa4aa4be53e0](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-hamas-war-humanitarian-aid-8659eae6e0a7362504f0aa4aa4be53e0)

| Analyst Commentary

Although Hamas has signaled that it will continue with the scheduled hostage release, this does not necessarily guarantee the extension of the ceasefire into phase two and beyond. The main impetus for the deal coming into place was pressure from the Trump administration. However, Trump's comments put stage three in particular peril, as his remarks would completely nullify the proposed reconstruction plan.

Moreover, Trump and his senior officials appear overall less determined to achieve an end to the war in the near-term. In this vein, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 13, 2025, that Israel must not allow Hamas to use the ceasefire to re-arm, signaling potential support for Israeli operations against Hamas regardless of the resolution of the current impasse.¹⁵

Even though the complete displacement of the Palestinian population is highly unlikely to occur due to significant logistical, moral, and legal concerns, the idea was quickly embraced by Netanyahu. This is likely because even the possibility of this outcome offers his government international political cover to continue the war, a potentially desirable outcome for Netanyahu given his domestic political concerns. For instance, a resumption in fighting could:

- Prompt the government to further delay the formation of a commission to investigate the failures that led to the attack of October 7, 2023;¹⁶
- Distract from Netanyahu's current criminal trial, which resumed on February 10, 2025, after a two-week hiatus;¹⁷ and
- Reduce the prospect of an early general election.¹⁸

Internationally, should the ceasefire collapse, the consequences would be most felt in the Red Sea, where it is likely that the Houthi Movement in Yemen would resume wider

¹⁵

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/backing-return-to-fighting-rubio-says-israel-cant-let-hamas-use-ceasefire-to-rearm/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/backing-return-to-fighting-rubio-says-israel-cant-let-hamas-use-ceasefire-to-rearm/)

¹⁶ [hXXps://www.jpost\[.\]com/breaking-news/article-841395](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-841395)

¹⁷

[hXXps://www.middleeastmonitor\[.\]com/20250210-israel-prime-ministers-corruption-trial-resumes-after-2-week-pause/](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250210-israel-prime-ministers-corruption-trial-resumes-after-2-week-pause/)

¹⁸ [hXXps://www.timesofisrael\[.\]com/netanyahus-offer-to-lapid-and-gantz-early-elections-in-a-years-time/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahus-offer-to-lapid-and-gantz-early-elections-in-a-years-time/)

attacks on shipping, after having paused strikes on all non-Israeli-linked vessels in the wake of the agreement.¹⁹ Most shipping lanes have decided against resuming Red Sea voyages due to the fragility of the ceasefire.²⁰

- The most significant impacts to supply chains will be for trade between Europe and Asia, which largely passes through the Middle East. A resumption in the crisis could worsen shipping prices, with traders concerned about an expanded conflict.
- There would very likely be a spike in energy prices, as 20 percent of the world's oil supply passes through the region.²¹ While the low demand for oil is largely keeping prices in check and traders are now used to avoiding the area, fears of an expanded conflict will likely cause a short-term energy price jump that will disappear if the conflict remains confined to Gaza and the Red Sea.

Fighting will very likely be confined to the immediate area of the conflict, unless Trump attempts to follow through with his plans to displace the approximately two million Palestinians living in the enclave. Any move in that direction would risk a regional war involving Egypt and Jordan, who have both reportedly threatened to discard their peace treaties with Israel in response to forcible resettlements of Gaza's population outside the strip.^{22,23}

In the cyber realm, the recent increase in attacks targeting Israeli entities should be expected to escalate in the event of the deal's collapse. These Pro-Palestinian threat actors will also likely look towards targets in the United States, given the government's support for Israel and Trump's prominent role in the current crisis. Entities are likely to be targeted by pro-Palestinian cyber groups mainly engaged in website defacements and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

¹⁹

[hXXps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-will-target-only-israel-linked-vessels-after-gaza-ceasefire-says-2025-01-20/](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-will-target-only-israel-linked-vessels-after-gaza-ceasefire-says-2025-01-20/)

²⁰ [hXXps://naharnet.com/stories/en/310913-netanyahu-says-we-ll-do-the-job-of-executing-trump-gaza-plan](https://naharnet.com/stories/en/310913-netanyahu-says-we-ll-do-the-job-of-executing-trump-gaza-plan)

²¹ [hXXps://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php)


²²

[hXXps://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-said-privately-warning-trumps-gaza-plan-endangers-peace-treaty-with-israel/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-said-privately-warning-trumps-gaza-plan-endangers-peace-treaty-with-israel/)

²³ [hXXps://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-ready-war-israel-if-palestinians-expelled-into-its-territory](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordan-ready-war-israel-if-palestinians-expelled-into-its-territory)

On February 12, 2025, ZeroFox observed a noticeable increase in activity from various pro-Palestinian hacktivist groups, which issued statements condemning the United States in response to comments made by President Trump regarding the Gaza Strip.

- **RootDoS.** The pro-Palestine hacktivist group has reportedly announced its decision to stop attacking other countries and pivot to targeting the United States.²⁴
- **Mysterious Team Bangladesh.** The pro-Palestine (Bangladesh-based) hacktivist group released a statement emphasizing that Gaza is, was, and will be Palestinian land and expressed full support for other resistance fighters. The group warned that any country intervening in Gaza will be retaliated against; further, the group emphasized that "we reject their dictatorial statement" and "war of resistance will continue as long as there are Muslim hackers in the world." This likely implies that its members are prepared to engage in cyber warfare and other forms of resistance.²⁵




Hacktivist Mysterious Team Bangladesh threatens against countries intervening in Gaza

Source: ZeroFox Intelligence

²⁴ ZeroFox Intelligence


²⁵ Ibid.

Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)



Blackfield hacking group's announcement that they breached Bank Leumi Israel and IDF accounts

Source: ZeroFox Intelligence



Blackfield's announcement hack of Israel police

Source: ZeroFox Intelligence

| Appendix B: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Red

Sources may use

TLP:RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.

Amber

Sources may use

TLP:AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may NOT share

TLP:RED with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.

Recipients may ONLY share

TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm.

Note that

TLP:AMBER+STRICT restricts sharing to the organization only.

Green

WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?

Sources may use

TLP:GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.

Clear

Sources may use

TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.

HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?

Recipients may share

TLP:GREEN information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.

Recipients may share

TLP:CLEAR information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.

| Appendix C: ZeroFox Intelligence Probability Scale

All ZeroFox intelligence products leverage probabilistic assessment language in analytic judgments. Qualitative statements used in these judgments refer to associated probability ranges, which state the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development. Ranges are used to avoid a false impression of accuracy. This scale is a standard that aligns with how readers should interpret such terms.

Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain
1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%