



# Assessment

## Cyber and Military Implications of the Ukrainian Counter-offensive

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Intelligence Requirements: Military, Disputes

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## Scope Note

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# Assessment

## Cyber and Military Implications of the Ukrainian Counter-offensive

### Executive Summary

Ukraine began its much-discussed counter-offensive in early June. The offensive will undergo several phases that will culminate with a decisive mass commitment of troops to attempt to regain significant territory. In its current initial phase, Ukraine is increasingly striking Russian targets far behind the frontlines to identify weaknesses and confuse the Russian military. Currently, Ukrainian troops are striking in three directions: in Zaporizhia, in Donetsk, and around Bakhmut.

Ukraine will eventually progress to the mass movement of some 60,000 troops in an attempt to retake territory from Russia. Ukraine has about four promising paths for its advance; Ukraine will not preemptively disclose which option it has chosen and will likely feign several directions. There is much speculation as to how successful Ukraine's offensive will be. As a result of Western support, Ukraine is better armed than it ever has been; however, Russia has deployed a complex system of defenses along the front lines. Meanwhile, Russia will likely respond to the offensive with heightened rhetoric and economic antagonism while its military tries to defend its current positions.

The success or failure of Ukraine's counter-offensive will prove critical to the future of the conflict. Ukraine has to recapture territory to prove Russia can be defeated and show the West a return on investment for its military and financial support. In contrast, Russia will likely seek a short- to medium-term stalemate. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely has assessed a stalemate would favor Russia, as he enjoys a significant amount of domestic societal control that would allow him to wear down Ukrainian forces for years. Putin is likely betting the West will lose interest in supporting Ukraine over time.

## **Tactics**

During Ukraine's initial attacks, it will seek to force Russia to commit the reserve troops of the third line of defense and draw them forward. Once the reserves are pulled forward, it will become easier for Ukraine to identify weak points in the Russian lines. Additionally, any breakthroughs in areas where reserves have already been committed are unlikely to be met by a new wave of repositioned Russian forces. Breakthroughs of this nature could be decisive in retaking territory.

The Ukrainian military expects losses in this and future phases of the offensive. While many recent media reports have highlighted Ukrainian losses and surmised they could foreshadow a failed offensive, it is too early to draw any conclusions about the success or failure of the operation. Media reports of this nature should be noted but not be relied upon for predictive analysis at this time.

## **Options for Ukrainian Advance and State of Play**

Ukraine has several options for the direction(s) of its advance. During the beginning stages of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, Ukraine will prod Russian defenses across multiple areas of the front to identify any potential vulnerabilities that could favor one advance option over the other. Meanwhile, Russian defense tactics may influence Ukrainian plans, such as destroying the Kakhova Dam. Additionally, Ukraine may feign different advances to confuse Russian troops before committing to its intended option(s). Ukraine will eventually have to decide where to commit its main assault units, and this decision will likely be conditions-based. The situation is highly fluid and subject

to change; however, ZeroFox has provided its initial observations of Ukrainian tactics as well as other likely options for the Ukrainian counter-offensive.

## Current State of Play

As of June 19, Ukrainian troops are advancing across three axes and have made marginal gains.<sup>1</sup> These efforts represent an initial phase in the offensive, during which Ukraine will prod Russian defenses to identify any vulnerabilities. Additionally, the multiple attack vectors will serve to confuse Russian military planners about where Ukraine intends to concentrate its decisive force.<sup>2</sup>

### Zaporizhia - Melitopol / Berdiansk

In Zaporizhia, Ukrainian forces are primarily striking south from Ukrainian-controlled Orikhiv to Russian-occupied Tokmak. Ukraine is conducting other attacks in western Zaporizhia; however, Orikhiv-Tokmak represents Ukraine's current primary effort in Zaporizhia. Tokmak serves as a key Russian rail hub that connects troops from Crimea in the south through Luhansk in the north.<sup>3</sup> If Ukraine could capture Tokmak, it would sever critical Russian logistics lines. Additionally, Ukraine would then be able to launch operations south from Tokmak to Melitopol or Mariupol. Russian troops constructed their most complex defenses in Zaporizhia. They encircled Tokmak with anti-tank ditches, meaning the Ukrainian advance along this axis would be slow-moving and likely suffer losses.

If Ukraine advances here, it will sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. Each of these cities would offer Ukrainian forces strategic logistical advantages. Melitopol is a major railway intersection that Russia has used to supply its forces in the south and east. Meanwhile, Berdiansk has fair road conditions that would make an advance with wheeled and tracked vehicles easier to operate. Additionally, both cities sit on the Sea of Azov; from Melitopol and Berdiansk, Ukraine could harass the dominant Russian navy with artillery.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates>

<sup>2</sup>

<https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-counter-offensive-begins-shall-leopards-break-free>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates>

## Donetsk – Mariupol

In Donetsk, Ukrainian forces are striking south, southeast, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk towards Vuhledar and Staromlynivka.<sup>4</sup> This drive would support a future push further south to Mariupol. Russian defenses in western Donetsk are slightly less fortified than defenses in Zaporizhia; however, these defenses will still prove a major obstacle for Ukrainian forces. This advance in western Donetsk closely borders the advance in Zaporizhia. As of June 19, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar said Ukrainian forces have advanced up to seven kilometers and have liberated 113 square kilometers of territory in Zaporizhia and western Donetsk.

Ukrainian forces could drive south through Donetsk to Mariupol. This option would not sever the land bridge between Crimea and Russian-occupied territories; however, it would provide a significant symbolic victory. Mariupol was one of the first Ukrainian cities to face extensive and indiscriminate Russian bombing when the war began. The battle for Mariupol lasted about three months, from February 2022 to May 2022, and was one of Putin's crowning victories at the beginning of the war. Retaking Mariupol would provide a huge boost to Ukrainian morale and mark a devastating defeat for Russia.

## Bakhmut

Over the past three weeks, Ukrainian troops have increased the pace of counterattacks surrounding Bakhmut.<sup>5</sup> Bakhmut has been the main focus of the war since about June 2022; the Russia-affiliated Wagner Private Military Company claimed it captured the city in late May 2023. Ukrainian troops are now striking northeast, northwest, west, and southwest around Bakhmut and have made marginal advances on the city's outskirts.

## Other Options

### Northern Luhansk

Ukrainian forces could strike southeast from Kharkiv into northern Luhansk. This option would cut off Russian supply lines that run north-south through Svatove and Starobilsk. If Ukraine severed these Russian supply lines, it could threaten Russian positions further south in Donetsk and Luhansk. Additionally, this advance would bring Ukrainian forces to positions along the Russian border, which would be a significant symbolic victory.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

Ukrainian forces or affiliated groups could also launch incursions across these border regions, similar to the ongoing attacks in the Russian Belgorod and Bryansk border areas.<sup>6</sup>

### **Kherson – Sea of Azov**

Ukrainian forces could launch an amphibious operation from Ukraine-controlled Kherson across the Dnipro River into Russian-occupied Kherson. Forces could then continue to drive through Kherson Oblast towards the Sea of Azov. This drive would cut the land bridge between Crimea and Russian-occupied Ukraine. This option would prove highly risky; it is unclear whether Ukraine possesses sufficient capabilities to launch a large, successful amphibious attack. Additionally, this area of the Dnipro River remains flooded due to the destruction of the Kakhova Dam, further complicating offensive operations in this region.

## **Russian Defenses**

For the past several months, Russian troops have been engaged in constructing layered defenses across much of the frontlines. Russian defenses are most heavily concentrated in Zaporizhia, Crimea, and parts of Donetsk. In the areas with the heaviest fortifications, Russia generally maintains three lines of defense:<sup>7</sup>

- The initial line incorporates foxholes and rudimentary trenches, followed by complex minefields covered by Russian air support and artillery.
- The main line consists of reinforced trenches, concrete firing posts, tank obstacles, and additional mines.
- The last line includes mainly the fighting positions of reserved troops.

To supplement its traditional military defenses, Russia has also adopted a strategy of destroying critical infrastructure to hamper Ukraine's planned advance. Russia's destruction of the Kakhova hydroelectric power plant dam represents the most prominent instance of this strategy. Open-source evidence suggests that on June 6, Russian forces planted an explosive device at a critical point inside the dam. This device

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<sup>6</sup> [hXXps://www.youtube\[.\]com/watch?v=zTdOdhKdtBU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTdOdhKdtBU)

<sup>7</sup> [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/world-europe-65615184](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65615184)

blasted a hole in the dam, and the powerful rushing water then destroyed a larger section of the dam.<sup>8</sup>

Russia likely destroyed the Kakhova Dam to hinder the Ukrainian counter-offensive, even at a high cost to Russia itself. The downstream flooding that resulted from the destruction of the Kakhova Dam has greatly complicated if not totally eliminated the option of a Ukrainian advance from Kherson across the Dnipro River to cut off Crimea from the rest of Russian-occupied Ukraine.<sup>9</sup> The flooded area around Kherson is now so wide that Ukrainian amphibious troops would unlikely achieve a river crossing.<sup>10</sup> In a sign that Russia believes a Ukrainian attack across the Dnipro is now unlikely, the United Kingdom Defence Ministry reported on June 19 that Russia has begun transferring its Dnipro Group of Forces from the eastern bank of the river to reinforce the frontlines in Donetsk and Zaporizhia.<sup>11</sup>

While Russia likely succeeded in thwarting a Ukrainian offensive along this route, it did so at a sizable cost to its own territorial ambitions. The flooding disrupted Russian defensive operations, destroyed supplies, killed at least three soldiers, and forced troops to retreat anywhere between five and 15 kilometers in areas along the Dnipro River.<sup>12</sup> ZeroFox assesses Russia will continue to target critical infrastructure when it believes such an operation would provide some strategic value, albeit at a considerable cost.

In the past two weeks, Russia has also targeted the following infrastructure sites:

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[hXXps://www.nytimes\[.\]com/interactive/2023/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-collapse.html](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-kakhovka-dam-collapse.html)

<sup>9</sup> [hXXps://kyivindependent\[.\]com/isw-22/](https://kyivindependent.com/isw-22/)

10

[hXXps://www.themoscowtimes\[.\]com/2023/06/19/will-the-kakhovka-dams-destruction-hinder-ukraines-counter-offensive-a81531](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/06/19/will-the-kakhovka-dams-destruction-hinder-ukraines-counter-offensive-a81531)

<sup>11</sup> [hXXps://twitter\[.\]com/DefenceHQ/status/1670666440381267969/photo/1](https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1670666440381267969/photo/1)

12

[hXXps://www.understandingwar\[.\]org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023)

- An ammonia pipeline that runs from Togliatti, Russia, to Odesa, Ukraine. Both Ukraine and Russia have blamed each other for the strike.<sup>13</sup> The pipeline ceased operations after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022; however, Russia has demanded ammonia exports via the pipeline reopen as a condition of its continued participation in the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The damage to the pipeline would remove any pretense of Russia extending the agreement while maintaining plausible deniability. Russia has already warned the strike threatens the future of the grain deal.<sup>14</sup>
- A dam on the Mokri Yala River near the town of Novodarivka, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The June 11 destruction of the dam by Russian forces caused both river banks to flood; however, the damage appears to be somewhat limited given the small size of the dam. A spokesman for the defense forces of the Tavrya region, Valery Shershen, said Russian forces are destroying hydraulic structures to slow Ukraine's counter-offensive. Shershen maintained this latest dam destruction will not affect the advancement of Ukrainian forces in the region.

## Implications

### Ukraine

First and foremost, Ukraine must prove it can retake significant territory to show the West a return on investment for its military and financial support. Ukraine will require continued Western backing beyond its spring counter-offensive, which the West may be hesitant to provide if Ukraine does not appear to be an effective fighting force. If Ukraine can achieve these compelling advances, it will certainly use its momentum to argue for even more advanced Western support.

Ukrainian success would also establish better footing at any future potential negotiating table with Russia. It is far too early to determine when or if both sides would agree to a negotiated settlement; however, Ukraine could then enter into such discussions from a point of strength.

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<sup>13</sup>

[hXXps://www.reuters\[.\]com/world/europe/russian-forces-repeatedly-shell-ammonia-pipeline-ukraine-s-kharkiv-region-2023-06-06/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-repeatedly-shell-ammonia-pipeline-ukraine-s-kharkiv-region-2023-06-06/)

<sup>14</sup> [hXXps://www.bbc\[.\]com/news/world-europe-65845441](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65845441)

## Russia

Russia will likely seek to weather the Ukrainian counter-offensive with as minimal losses as possible while pursuing a stalemate. Putin likely believes that time is on Russia's side and that his forces will be able to grind down the Ukrainian military and society if given several more years to do so. A frozen conflict ahead of the 2024 U.S. presidential election could also help Russia achieve victory in the long run. If a Republican candidate wins the presidency, they may limit the amount of aid the United States provides to Ukraine—a trend Europe could follow. Putin could then allow his military time to recover and renew the conflict once Ukraine has run out of Western weapons and funding.

### Clamp Down on Internal Dissent

At previous inflection points during the war, Russia has clamped down on internal dissent—a trend it will likely continue during the counter-offensive. In late February 2022, Russia began to introduce dozens of laws that banned criticism of the military, banned domestic civil society opposition groups, and limited access to Western information. After an initial spurt of legislation in February and March 2022, the Russian government now continues a steady pace of roughly five new dissent laws each month. Arrests for violation of these anti-dissent laws typically rise during critical inflection points in the war. Immediately after the war began, Russian authorities arrested 15,354 people for their anti-war stance in a February 2022 police crackdown utilizing their newfound authority to limit dissent. After this first crackdown, the number of arrests decreased steadily before spiking in September and October 2022, when Ukraine made significant progress during its Kherson and Kharkiv offensives. Arrests steadily declined again until a slight increase in March 2023, when it became clear the Russian winter offensive had failed.<sup>15</sup>

A spike in Russian anti-war arrests during the Ukrainian spring offensive can be expected. Russia will extensively use its anti-dissent laws to restrict discussion of any developments that could reflect poorly on its military. Russia will also likely introduce new anti-dissent laws during the offensive as new challenges arise in the Russian information space.

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<sup>15</sup> [https://en.ovdinfo\[.\]org/wartime-repressions-report-may#2](https://en.ovdinfo[.]org/wartime-repressions-report-may#2)

## Propaganda

Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reportedly obtained a copy of Kremlin guidelines that detailed how the state-controlled media should discuss the Ukrainian counter-offensive. According to Meduza, this document advised reporters not to downplay the expectations for the counter-offensive or assert that Ukraine was unprepared; instead, the guidelines instructed the media to focus on the heavy NATO support involved in the offensive. This framing would allow the Russian government to quickly explain the results of the counter-offensive no matter if it fails or succeeds.<sup>16</sup> If the Ukrainian offensive fails, Russian authorities will be able to argue the military succeeded in repelling an extremely powerful NATO-backed attack. If the Ukrainian offensive succeeds, Russian authorities can blame NATO's tremendous amount of support and argue that, with all this Western might behind Ukraine, the Russian military has actually held its own quite well.

## New Economic Partnerships

In the long term, Russia will continue to seek new economic partnerships with countries outside of Europe. Russia lost its access to most European markets—notably the European energy market—in 2022. To replace these lost revenues, Russia has exported much of its oil to countries in Asia, namely India and China. These new partnerships offer Russia an export portfolio diversified from European markets and allow Russia to slowly rebuild its economy after losing its presence in Europe. If Russia can achieve Putin's desired stalemate, its economic shift towards Asia could return much-needed funds to the Russian economy to fund the war, albeit over several years.

While Asia was the primary focus of new Russian economic deals in 2022, Russia has also looked increasingly to Africa in 2023. On May 29, 2023, Kenyan President William Ruto announced Kenya would sign a trade agreement with Russia that aims to boost cooperation between businesses.<sup>17</sup> In July 2023, Russia will host an Africa-Russia summit in St. Petersburg, during which other economic agreements can be expected. Putin will also attend the BRICS meeting in South Africa in August, where he is expected to enhance

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<sup>16</sup> <https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/05/03/if-ukraine-succeeds-it-should-be-explainable>

<sup>17</sup>

<https://www.reuters.com/business/kenya-russia-sign-trade-pact-president-ruto-says-2023-05-29/>

economic and military cooperation between Russia and BRICS member states (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).

## Cyber Activity

Since the counter-offensive, there have been a number of high-profile cyber incidents attributed to Russian-backed threat actors; however, Russian-backed cyber activity continues to play a secondary role in its conflict in Ukraine, with threat actors preferring to utilize criminal and political cyber intrusions to military ones.

On June 13, 2023, France announced it had disrupted a Russian disinformation campaign whereby websites impersonating prominent French news organizations—including Le Parisien, Le Figaro, Le Monde, and 20 Minutes—were created with the purpose of spreading false news items aimed at undermining European support for Ukraine.<sup>18</sup> France alleged "Russian state entities" had played a role in the operation. Disinformation campaigns have been a key feature of Russia's war in Ukraine, and there was a precursor operation uncovered in 2022 similar to the media clones one.<sup>19</sup> ZeroFox has observed other disinformation campaigns during the war, including issues like possible NATO membership for Finland and Sweden and the impacts of food prices.<sup>20</sup>

One of the most prominent threat actors since the counter-offensive began has been the Russian-backed threat actor NoName057(16). Since the counter-offensive began, the group has escalated its targeting of European websites and infrastructure facilities. The most notable attack was revealed in mid-June, when the group launched distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on a number of Dutch port websites, including the website of the port of Rotterdam, Europe's largest port. The group cited the Dutch government's plan to buy and send tanks from Switzerland to Ukraine as the reason behind its attack.<sup>21</sup> Further analysis of the group's modus operandi is warranted since the offensive also saw numerous Swiss government websites targeted in recent days. For

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<sup>18</sup>

[hXXps://timesofmalta\[.\]com/articles/view/france-uncovers-major-disinformation-campaign-russia.1037432](https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/france-uncovers-major-disinformation-campaign-russia.1037432)

<sup>19</sup> [hXXps://www.disinfo\[.\]eu/doppelganger/](https://www.disinfo.eu/doppelganger/)

<sup>20</sup> ZeroFox Intelligence - [hXXps://cloud.zerofox\[.\]com/intelligence/advisories/17502](https://cloud.zerofox.com/intelligence/advisories/17502)

<sup>21</sup>

[hXXps://nltimes\[.\]nl/2023/06/14/dutch-ports-websites-offline-hours-days-due-pro-russian-cyber-attacks](https://nltimes.nl/2023/06/14/dutch-ports-websites-offline-hours-days-due-pro-russian-cyber-attacks)

example, on June 13, seven Swiss domains were DDoSed by the group.<sup>22</sup> A day earlier, ZeroFox observed the entity targeting over 30 European government and logistics websites in Italy, Sweden, Greece, Germany, and Bulgaria. Port domains were the main sector targeted, indicating the group may be attempting to cause logistics and supply chain disruptions.<sup>23</sup> Throughout the war, supply chain disruptions that have led to energy and food price increases have been among the most notable non-military maneuvers Russia has used to weaken Western support for Ukraine. Because Ukraine will be aiming to demonstrate a return on investment to the West and because it will need continued Western support in the years to come, Russia could use cyberattacks as one of the more effective countermeasures to dissuade Western states from continuing to back Ukraine.

ZeroFox has observed other dominant Russian-backed hacker groups since the counter-offensive was initiated, including the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (ародна Cyberarmi), which has almost exclusively targeted Ukrainian-based entities with DDoS attacks in recent days.<sup>24</sup> Targeted entities include government websites as well as manufacturing entities. One of the most dominant pro-Ukraine-backed cyber groups since the counter-offensive began has been теки инормации, a data leak group that is targeting government and private industries inside Russia.<sup>25</sup> The leaks are likely aimed at exposing the personal information of backers of the war.

Going forward, expect a steady stream of pro- and anti-Ukrainian cyber threats that are criminal in nature. Western-based industries are, therefore, at risk of being targeted by pro-Russian hacker groups intent on disrupting business operations. For example, Killnet, a Russian-backed group that has been targeting private firms in the West since the onset of the war, announced on June 16 it had started targeting European financial services and claimed to have disrupted the International Bank Account Number (IBAN) System, which allows for easy communication between global banks to facilitate transactions.<sup>26</sup> Killnet cited U.S. aid for Ukraine as the reason behind the operation.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> ZeroFox Internal Collections

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> ZeroFox Intelligence - [hXXps://cloud.zerofox\[.\]com/intelligence/advisories/20900](https://cloud.zerofox[.]com/intelligence/advisories/20900)

<sup>27</sup> [hXXps://www.darkreading\[.\]com/risk/killnet-threatens-imminent-swift-world-banking-attacks](https://www.darkreading[.]com/risk/killnet-threatens-imminent-swift-world-banking-attacks)

For the time being, the cyberattacks have had limited military impact; however, the increased use of electronic warfare does present an obvious use case. One of Russia's key initiatives to combat Ukraine's advance is the use of and ability to counter drones on the battlefield. During the onset of the war, Ukraine was able to target Russian military positions and convoys inside Ukraine using drones. Since then, Russia has developed more sophisticated electronic warfare techniques to jam and destroy around 10,000 Ukrainian drones a month.<sup>28</sup> Offensively, Russia has used GPS-guided munitions more effectively while also countering those launched by Ukraine's Western munitions. Lastly, a key NATO summit in July presents a likely target for Russian-backed actors.<sup>29</sup> Promises of more Western aid are expected, and it will be the first summit with new member Finland. Killnet claimed to have disrupted NATO aircraft earlier in 2023 when they were assisting with earthquake relief in Turkey.<sup>30</sup> Russia may view the summit as an opportune time to cause disruptions through DDoS attacks or an escalation in military cyber capabilities.

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<sup>28</sup>

[hXXps://www.naharnet\[.\]com/stories/en/298213-from-gps-guided-bombs-to-electronic-warfare-russia-improves-weaponry-in-ukraine](https://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/298213-from-gps-guided-bombs-to-electronic-warfare-russia-improves-weaponry-in-ukraine)

<sup>29</sup> [hXXps://www.nato\[.\]int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_212667.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_212667.htm)

<sup>30</sup> ZeroFox Internal Collections

## Appendix: Traffic Light Protocol for Information Dissemination

	<b>Red</b>	<b>Amber</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> when information cannot be effectively acted upon by additional parties and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or operations if misused.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> when information requires support to be effectively acted upon but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the organizations involved.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may NOT share</b> <b>TLP:RED</b> with any parties outside of the specific exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed.	<b>Recipients may ONLY share</b> <b>TLP:AMBER</b> information with members of their own organization and its clients, but only on a need-to-know basis to protect their organization and its clients and prevent further harm. <b>Note that</b> <b>TLP:AMBER+STRICT</b> restricts sharing to the organization only.
	<b>Green</b>	<b>Clear</b>
<b>WHEN SHOULD IT BE USED?</b>	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> when information is useful for the awareness of all participating organizations, as well as with peers within the broader community or sector.	<b>Sources may use</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> when information carries minimal or no risk of misuse in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release.
<b>HOW MAY IT BE SHARED?</b>	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:GREEN</b> information with peers and partner organizations within their sector or community but not via publicly accessible channels.	<b>Recipients may share</b> <b>TLP:CLEAR</b> information without restriction, subject to copyright controls.